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Abstract
This thesis contains three studies of job and occupational mobility, and their implications
for earnings. The second chapter of the thesis develops and estimates a model of job and
occupational search to examine how and how much learning influences young workers’ job
search and transition patterns. The model incorporates uncertainty regarding the accumulation processes of workers’ different skills, and features directed search whereby workers
choose search effort intensities for different occupations. The model is estimated using U.S.
data, with individuals’ occupational affiliations grouped into skilled white-collar, skilled
blue-collar, and non-skilled occupations. The estimates show large differences in search
frictions, skill acquisition rates, and learning opportunities across occupations. Simulation exercises show that learning can have a sizeable effect on young workers’ job search.
However, because of job search frictions, changes in job search effort due to learning do
not result in a comparable effect in occupational transition outcomes. Search frictions have
a particularly large consequence for those directing their search effort to the white-collar
occupation.
Building on the search and matching model of Albrecht and Vroman (2002), the third
chapter develops a dynamic model of employment transitions among full-time work, parttime work and nonemployment, and offers an explanation based on human capital depreciation for British women’s life-cycle employment transition patterns. Numerical examples
of the model indicate that the model can capture their stylized life-cycle transition patterns
through their endogenous decision making under reasonable parameter values.
The fourth chapter develops and estimates an equilibrium search model of immigrants
operating in the same labour market as natives, where newly arrived immigrants have lower
job offer arrival rates than natives but can acquire the same arrival rates according to a
stochastic process. Using Canadian panel data, substantial differences in job offer arrival
and destruction rates are found between natives and immigrants that are able to account for
three quarters of the observed earnings gap. The estimates imply that immigrants take, on
average, 13 years to acquire the native search parameters. Counterfactual exercises show
that the vast majority of earnings growth immigrants experience after migration is due to
the job search assimilation process.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Various movements that individuals make in labour markets have been major subjects of
labour economics. Examples include transitions between unemployment and employment
or between jobs (Mortensen, 1986; Topel and Ward, 1992), occupational changes (Neal,
1999; Kambourov and Manovskii, 2008), and migration between regions or between countries (Greenwood, 1997; Borjas, 1999). As well as documenting and analyzing mobility
patterns of different groups of individuals, the literature has been investigating their implications for a variety of issues ranging from life-cycle wage growth, unemployment, to
inequalities. Aiming to contribute to this literature, my thesis consists of three studies
of job and occupational transition patterns, the potential processes behind them, and their
implications for workers’ earnings.
Young workers change jobs and occupations more frequently than more experienced
workers, with their mobility declining as they age. The second chapter aims to measure
the extent to which learning behaviour accounts for their mobility patterns. With a view
that human capital acquisition, search frictions, and learning all influence workers’ job
transition patterns, it develops a dynamic Roy (1951) model of comparative advantages
incorporating these three processes. Specifically, the model incorporates uncertainty re1

2
garding the accumulation processes of workers’ two skills, and features directed search
whereby workers choose job search effort intensities for different occupations. Not fully
informed of their own skill accumulation processes upon their labour market entry, workers
make job search decisions relying on their beliefs about them, and resolve this uncertainty
by observing their skill acquisition outcomes over time.
The model is estimated by simulated maximum likelihood using job history data of
white male high school graduates from the 1979 cohort of the U.S. National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth (NLSY79), with individuals’ occupational affiliations grouped into skilled
white-collar, skilled blue-collar, and non-skilled occupations. The main findings from the
estimation results are as follows. First, the estimates reveal large differences among occupations in search frictions. There are substantial search frictions hindering transitions to
the white-collar occupation while the non-skilled occupation is associated with the least
search frictions.
Second, the estimated parameters governing skill growth suggest that the two skills in
the model are primarily related to the white-collar and blue-collar occupations, respectively.
Specifically, one of them is enhanced mostly in the white-collar occupation, while the
other grows the fastest with work experience in the blue-collar occupation. The non-skilled
occupation provides a limited skill growth environment.
Third, simulation exercises show that learning can have a sizeable effect on job search
effort over time. Workers who learn that they have high skill acquisition probabilities for
the white-collar related skill choose to focus more on the white-collar occupation, and those
who learn the opposite instead choose to allocate less job search effort on this occupation.
A signal regarding the blue-collar skill, however, has only a small effect on workers’ job
search effort choice.
Fourth, because of job search frictions, changes in job search effort due to learning do
not result in a comparable effect in occupational transition outcomes. Job search frictions

3
have a particularly large consequence for those who direct their job search effort to the
white-collar occupation because this occupation presents high search frictions. Moreover,
because signals about the white-collar skill are a predominant factor driving workers’ learning process but hard to come by without employment in the white-collar occupation, the
high search frictions associated with the white-collar occupation slow down the learning
process, reducing the effect of learning as a result.
In some cases, low mobility warrants scrutiny. It is common for British women to
switch from full-time to part-time employment when they become mothers, even though
such moves are often accompanied with occupational downgrading. Interestingly, not many
women reverse these changes later in their careers, with part-time employment becoming
prevalent among mothers. The third chapter offers an explanation emphasizing the role of
skill depreciation resulting from leaving their pre-motherhood occupations for this pattern
by developing a dynamic model of employment transitions among full-time work, parttime work and non-participation. Building on Albrecht and Vroman (2002), the model
incorporates differences in skill levels among workers and skill requirements among jobs.
In addition, I add to the worker’s problem two more dynamic aspects. The first comes from
changes in family circumstances due to the arrival of a child, which changes the pecuniary
returns from work in the labour market and potentially changes workers’ preferred hours of
work. The second is a skill depreciation process, which changes workers’ ability to meet
the skill requirements of different jobs.
After formulating the workers’ problem and describing their transition behaviour, numerical examples of the model are given to examine whether the model can capture the
stylized facts of the life-cycle employment transition patterns of British mothers. The
model’s ability to produce the patterns depends on two decisions made by workers. First,
they are willing to downgrade their occupations in order to switch from full-time work to

4
part-time work when childcare needs arise. Second, they prefer to stay employed part time
should skill depreciation prevent them from reversing their earlier downward occupational
changes. The numerical exercises presented in the chapter find reasonable parameter values
satisfying these two conditions. In particular, these parameter values envision a scenario
where the median length of the childcare period is seven years, and occupational downgrading is associated with a 20% wage reduction. They also imply that skill depreciation
occurs, on average, with five years of employment in the low skill occupation, or with two
and a half years of nonparticipation.
Departing from examining processes behind mobility patterns, the fourth chapter studies the role of job mobility in immigrant assimilation. Immigration has always played a
major role in Canada, and successful integration of immigrants in the labour market has
important implications for the Canadian economy. The vast majority of research in immigrant assimilation has been based on the standard human capital model, while differences
in job search behaviours or job search environments between native-born individuals and
immigrants have received less attention. However, there are various reasons to expect that
new immigrants face a different search environment than natives, including their lower
knowledge level of the host-country labour market, qualification recognition problems, and
social networks. Taking this idea of differences in job search behaviour one step further,
this chapter uses search theory to examine the role of job search in immigrant assimilation.
We develop and estimate a Burdett and Mortensen (1998) style equilibrium search model
of immigrants operating in the same labour market as natives, with newly arrived immigrants searching for jobs at lower job offer arrival rates than natives but allowed to acquire
the same arrival rates according to a stochastic process.
The model is estimated using duration and earnings data from the Canadian Survey of
Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) to measure the difference in job offer arrival rates

5
between new immigrants and natives, estimate how long it takes immigrants to acquire
the same job search parameters as natives, and study the implications of this assimilation
process for the native-immgirant earnings gap and immigrants’ earnings growth. Our estimation results indicate that there are substantial differences in job offer arrival and job
destruction rates between natives and newly arrived immigrants. Job offer arrival rates for
immigrants are 36% lower while unemployed and 93% lower while employed. These differences are able to account for three quarters of the observed earnings differential between
natives and immigrants. Our results also indicate that it takes immigrants 13 years, on average, to assimilate and acquire the same search parameters as natives, with counterfactual
exercises indicating that job search assimilation accounts for the vast majority of life-cycle
earnings growth of immigrants.
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Chapter 2
Job and Occupational Search and
Learning of Comparative Advantages
2.1

Introduction

Young workers change jobs and occupations more frequently than more experienced workers, with these transitions declining as they age.1 Human capital accumulation and job
search are two processes broadly consistent with these observed mobility patterns, with
high job mobility of young workers being viewed as a reflection of their career progression.2 While these theories view job and occupational transitions as upward mobility and
therefore beneficial to workers’ labour market outcomes, not all observed transitions are
consistent with this idea. It is not uncommon for young workers to experience occupational downgrading, or transitions between seemingly unrelated jobs.3
1

Topel and Ward (1992); Light and McGarry (1998); Neal (1999)
According to the human capital theory, acquisition of specific human capital increases the cost of moving
to jobs that do not reward such specific human capital, generating an inverse relationship between age and
the propensity of job change. In contrast, the job search theory regards a series of job-to-job transitions as
worker’s upward mobility and predicts a decline of job changes .
3
Sullivan (2010) reports a nontrivial likelihood of occupational transition from craftman occupations to
labouror and operative occupations (0.13). Sanders (2012) presents an example of an interesting occupational
2

7

8
Transition patterns at odds with either the human capital or job search model may reflect
information frictions that individuals face when they enter the labour market. A number
of studies argue that young workers’ tendency to change jobs reflects their job-shopping
behaviour.4 Through experimentation with different jobs, they gradually sort themselves
into better fitting jobs and occupations. In the job-shopping model, therefore, transitions
between unrelated jobs are outcomes of a learning process, and an integral part of workers’
career progression.
This chapter aims to measure the extent to which learning behaviour affects workers’
job search behaviours and transition patterns. Although workers may benefit from jobshopping in the long run, how and how much they are affected by it depends on the natures
of initial uncertainty and job search environment. Uncovering the role of them in workers’
early career transition behaviour is therefore an important empirical question.
With a view that human capital acquisition, search frictions, and learning all influence
workers’ transition patterns, it is important to consider them together in a unified framework to understand how these different incentives compete or interact with each other. As
an instance in which such a possibility is important, consider occupational choice models
in Keane and Wolpin (1997)’s framework, which has been widely used to describe worker’s
dynamic labour market outcomes. In this framework, workers move to different occupations if the gain from moving to their preferred occupations exceeds the mobility cost. It
does not account for possible differences in search frictions that workers experience in different occupations. However, since unlikely jobs are likely to give workers weak incentives
to search for, workers may not necessarily transition to occupations that they find the most
attractive. In addition, if different occupations provide different learning environments by
providing signals for different unknowns or because of differences in the frequency of sigtransition profile featuring a sequence of unrelated occupations made by a NLSY79 respondent.
4
See Jovanovic (1979), Miller (1984), and Neal (1999), for example.
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nal arrivals, how learning progresses depends on work history.5
Based on the dynamic Roy (1951) framework of comparative advantages, this chapter
first develops a model of workers’ job search behaviour, learning, and human capital acquisition. In the model, workers are endowed with two types of skill, and their skills are
enhanced by stochastic learning-by-doing in the labour market. They pursue different occupations because of differences among occupations in returns to skills and skill acquisition
opportunities.
Different workers possess different learning abilities for each skill, which are embodied
by the probabilities of acquiring higher skill levels in a period workers are employed. These
differences lead forward-looking workers to follow different occupational choice paths. For
example, a good learner in fine motor skills has an incentive to pursue occupations that
enhance fine motor skills. In contrast, for workers who have low learning abilities for
any skills, their occupational concerns mainly depend on how their current skill levels are
rewarded.
When workers begin their labour market careers, they are not fully informed about their
own learning abilities. Instead of making their transition decisions based on the true state
of their skill acquisition prospects, they rely on their beliefs about them. Workers resolve
this uncertainty by observing their skill acquisition outcomes. During this learning process,
workers may pursue different occupations because their beliefs evolve.
Workers face search frictions in the labour market, and obtain jobs through job search.
Instead of receiving a job offer at constant offer arrival rates, workers can vary job search
effort exerted for different occupations to optimize the likelihood of making their preferred
transitions. This captures the non-random transition behaviour across occupations docu5

Additional insights for possible interactions between human capital acquisition and job search processes
are obtained from job search models in a single labour market with the inclusion of human capital, such as
Rubinstein and Weiss (2006), Burdett et al. (2011) and Bowlus and Liu (2011).
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mented in the literature.6 Gathmann and Schönberg (2010) found that workers were more
likely to move between occupations that require similar tasks. Poletaev and Robinson
(2008) found that a distant occupational change was associated with a larger wage loss
than a close change for displaced workers. This finding also suggests that workers are less
likely to make a distant change in occupation unless they receive information favouring
such a move.
The model is estimated by simulated maximum likelihood (SML) using job history data
of white male high school graduates from the 1979 cohort of the U.S. National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth (NLSY79), with individuals’ occupational affiliations grouped into skilled
white-collar, skilled blue-collar, and non-skilled occupations by cluster analysis based on
the 1970 census occupation codes and their skill/task factor scores extracted in Robinson
(2011). In sum, the white-collar occupation is associated with high intelligence levels,
while the blue-collar occupation is associated with high fine motor skill levels.
The estimates reveal large differences among occupations in search frictions. There
are substantial search frictions hindering transitions to the white-collar occupation while
the non-skilled occupation is associated with the least search frictions. If an unemployed
worker allocates his job search effort equally among the three occupations, the likelihood
that a job offer comes from the non-skilled occupation is nearly 50% as opposed to a 10%
chance that a job offer comes from the white collar occupation.
The estimated parameters governing skill growth suggest that the two skills in the model
are primarily related to the white-collar and blue-collar occupations, respectively. Specifically, one of them is enhanced mostly in the white-collar occupation, while the other grows
the fastest with work experience in the blue-collar occupation, with the non-skilled occupation providing a limited skill growth environment. Moreover, the white-collar occupation
6

Occupational matching models, such as Miller (1984), McCall (1990), Neal (1999), and Pavan (2010,
2011), produce random occupational mobility, since every time workers make turnover decisions, a new
occupation is randomly drawn from a given match quality distribution.
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does not provide a favourable skill growth environment for the blue-collar related skill,
while the same can be said about the blue-collar occupation and the skills primarily related
to the white-collar occupation.
Simulation exercises show that while workers initially spread out their job search effort
across occupations, learning can have a sizeable effect on their job search effort allocation
over time. Workers who learn that they have high skill acquisition probabilities for whitecollar related skills choose to focus more on the white-collar occupation, and those who
learn the opposite instead choose to allocate less job search effort on this occupation. A
signal regarding blue-collar skills, however, has a very small effect on workers’ job search
effort choice. As a result, the learning process affects workers mostly through signals
regarding white-collar skills.
Because of job search frictions, changes in job search effort due to learning do not result
in a comparable effect on occupational transition outcomes. Job search frictions have a particularly large consequence for those who direct their job search effort to the white-collar
occupation because this occupation presents high frictions. Moreover, the same frictions
slow down learning because signals about white-collar skills, the predominant factor driving workers’ learning process, are hard to receive without employment in the white-collar
occupation. As a result, they also reduce the effect of learning early in the life cycle for all
workers.
Two recent papers also study the effect of uncertain comparative advantages in occupational mobility in dynamic frameworks. In Papageorgiou (2014), the economy is populated
with workers of different productivity types, which determine their comparative advantages
over different occupations. The true state of their comparative advantages, however, are not
revealed initially, and they go through a learning process to settle down in the occupations
which they are suited for. While his model incorporates directed search to consider the
effect of search frictions on the speed of learning, workers are assumed to search only in a
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single occupation at any given time. However, my estimates indicate that workers’ search
efforts are spread out over different occupations, especially while unemployed. In addition,
his model abstracts from the effect of human capital in mobility decisions, and therefore,
attributes any job or occupational change to learning.
Building on Yamaguchi (2012) and Antonovics and Golan (2012), Sanders (2012) developed a learning model in which workers are uncertain about their initial skill endowments. His counterfactual simulation finds a sizeable role for initial uncertainty on workers’ occupational mobility. However, search frictions are omitted from Sanders’ model.
This means that workers’ mobility decisions are not influenced by differences in search
frictions, and they transition to their preferred occupations every period. This paper shows
that search frictions are significant and affect the learning process considerably.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the
model. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 discuss the estimation strategy and the data used for estimation,
respectively. Section 2.5 presents the estimation results. Section 2.6 analyzes how learning
affects workers’ search effort allocation and occupational transition outcomes based on the
parameter estimates. Section 2.7 concludes.

2.2
2.2.1

The Model
Setup

The model starts with the dynamic Roy (1951) framework of comparative advantages.
There are K > 0 different occupations in the labour market. An occupation is a group
of jobs that require workers to perform a common set of tasks.7 Workers’ productivity at
a given occupation is determined by their skill levels. Assume that there are two kinds of
7

Heckman and Sedlacek (1985)
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skills and let (s1it , s2it ) represent worker i’s skill levels in period t. The wage paid to worker
i working at job j in occupation k in period t is given by
wi jkt = R j exp(yk (s1it , s2it )),
where function yk (s1 , s2 ) is increasing in both s1 and s2 . R j represents the employer specific
portion of the wage, and varies across employers.
A worker enters the labour market initially unemployed, with his initial period given
by t = 1, and stays in the market until an exogenously given terminal date t = T . The
objective of a worker is to maximize his expected discounted lifetime utility. Assume that
a worker’s instantaneous utility is given by the logarithm of the wage if employed, or the
value of non-market time b if unemployed. Thus, worker i’s utility flow in period t is given
by
uit = ln wi jkt = r j + yk (s1it , s2it )

(2.1)

where r j = ln(R j ). The distribution of r j is given by c.d.f. Fk (·). I also assume that all
workers have the time discount rate of

1
.
1+ρ

The workers’ problem has three main components: job search, human capital acquisition, and learning. These processes are discussed in turn in the next three subsections. In
the remainder of this section, the individual and time subscripts are subsumed to simplify
the notation.

2.2.2

Job Search

Workers find employment through job search. The arrival of a job offer is uncertain,
but workers can increase the likelihood of receiving an offer by raising the intensities of
their search efforts. I construct the following job search process with multiple occupations
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by modifying the specification of the endogenous search technology in Christensen et al.
(2005). Each period, a worker exerts search efforts (e1 , e2 , . . . , eK ) where each ek represents
the search effort intensity exerted to find a job in occupation k. Unemployed and employed
workers receive a job offer in occupation k with probabilities
λ0k (ek )

λ0k 1−α
=
e
1−α k

(2.2)

λ1k (ek )

λ1k 1−α
e ,
=
1−α k

(2.3)

and

respectively, where 0 < α < 1, and λ0k > 0, λ1k > 0 for all k = 1, 2, . . . , K. The assumption
α > 0 means that search efforts have diminishing returns. If α = 0, then the job offer
arrival probabilities are proportional to search effort intensities, and the optimal job search
strategy dictates that workers search for only one occupation in any given period. The cost
function of search efforts C(e1 , e2 , · · · , eK ) is assumed to be the total search effort, and thus
PK
C(e1 , e2 , · · · , eK ) = k=1
ek .
It is assumed that a worker receives at most one job offer within a period. Each job j
specifies R j , which is drawn from a known occupation-specific offer distribution with c.d.f.
Fk (·).

2.2.3

Skill Acquisition Process

Workers start their labour market careers with their initial skill levels given by (s01 , s02 ), and
accumulate their skills through stochastic learning-by-doing on the job.
Each period a workers is employed, he encounters an opportunity to increase at most
one of his skills with a certain probability. If he is employed in occupation k, a skill acquisition opportunity arrives with probability ωk` for skill ` = 1, 2. With probability 1−ωk1 −ωk2 ,
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the worker’s skill levels are unchanged in that period. If a worker gains such an opportunity,
s` changes to s0` according to the following stochastic transition process:






 s` + γk`

0
s` = 





 s`

with probability θ`
(2.4)
with probability 1 − θ`

where γk` > 0 for all ` = 1, 2, and k = 1, 2, . . . , K. As shown in equation (2.4), skill ` grows
by γk` with probability θ` in a given period. γk` can vary across occupations so that different
occupations provide different skill acquisition opportunities.
It is assumed that γk` and ωk` are common to all workers, but the values of θ1 and θ2
differ among them. θ` can be thought of as “the ability to learn” of workers for skill `, as
the higher the value of θ` , the more likely workers are to increase the corresponding skill.
The initial skill levels may be possibly related with the skill acquisition probabilities.
For example, a high initial skill level may signal a high skill acquisition probability. Although it is desirable to accommodate this possibility, doing so in general would add considerable complexity to analysis of the model. Therefore, I first abstract from this possible
relationship and study a case where the initial skill level and skill acquisition probability
are independently drawn. Specifically, I assume that the initial skill level takes either s` or
s` (s` < s` ), and m` ∈ (0, 1) denotes the fraction of workers starting with s` for their initial
skill ` level. It is assumed that for each skill ` ∈ {1, 2}, the population distribution θ` is
given by the Beta distribution with parameters p` and q` , and these distributions are known
to the workers. In Appendix A, I analyze a case in which a certain form of correlation
between θ` and s0` is allowed. Interestingly, estimation results for this specification indicate
that the correlation is very small.
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2.2.4

Learning

When workers enter the labour market, the true values of their skill acquisition probabilities
are unknown. Instead, they form their beliefs about these probabilties from the population
distributions of θ1 and θ2 , and update them according to observed signals. The signals are
skill acquisition outcomes, which are Bernoulli random variables. Thus, the model is a
Bernoulli learning model.
The learning process is greatly simplified because the Beta distribution is a natural
conjugate of the Bernoulli distribution, with the workers’ belief distributions remaining the
Beta distribution.8 Specifically, in each skill acquisition opportunity, the belief distribution
is updated to the Beta distribution with parameter p` + 1 and q` if a skill growth happens,
or updated to the Beta distribution with parameter p` and q` + 1 otherwise.
The true acquisition probability for each of skills 1 and 2 will be revealed to workers
if they encounter a sufficiently large number of learning opportunities, because the process
leads to a degenerate distribution with a point mass at θ` .9 However, this may not occur before the workers leave the labour market in the terminal period, if the workers’ occupational
choice and the probability of signal arrival at particular occupations results in infrequent
signals arrival.
Finally, instead of using the updating rule based on p` and q` , it is more convenient to
reparameterize the distribution by defining η` and υ` by
p`
,
p` + q`
1
υ` =
.
p` + q` + 1
η` =

Note that η` is the mean of the Beta distribution with parameters p` and q` , and υ` can be
8
9

See, for example, p.160 in DeGroot (1970).
See DeGroot (1970) p.225
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expressed in terms of the mean and variance of the same distribution.10 There is a one-toone transformation between (p` , q` ) and (η` , υ` ), which allows me to use (η` , υ` ) as sufficient
statistics to capture the learning process. The updating rule of the belief system is given as
follows. Let o` be an indicator variable taking 1 if skill ` increase in a given period, or 0
otherwise. Then Bayes’ rule yields the following updating rule for η` :
η0` = η` (1 − υ` ) + o` υ` ,

(2.5)

and υ` is updated according to
υ0` =

2.2.5

υ`
.
1 + υ`

(2.6)

Timing within a Period

The timing of labour market activities within a period is modelled by dividing them into
two sub periods. Workers spend the first sub period on job search and transition activities,
while they engage in work and may encounter a skill acquisition opportunity the second
sub period.
More specifically, in the first subperiod, workers engage in job search, exerting search
efforts e = (e1 , e2 , . . . , eK ). Unemployed workers receive a job offer from occupation k with
probability λ0k (ek ). If they receive a job offer, workers decide whether to accept the offer or
not. Employed workers receive a job offer from occupation k with probability λ1k (ek ), and
decide whether to accept the offer or not. Employed workers also face a risk of separating
from their current job and transition to unemployment with probability δk . I assume that a
job offer and job separation are mutually exclusive events.
Specifically, if a random variable X follows the beta distribution with parameters p` and q` , then υ` is
given by
Var(X)
υ` =
.
E(X)(1 − E(X))
10
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Unemployed workers receive b, the value of non-market time in the second sub period.
Employed workers are paid based on their skill levels at the beginning of the second sub
period. Then they may encounter a skill acquisition opportunity. Workers update their
beliefs about (θ1 , θ2 ) based on skill acquisition outcomes according to Bayes’ rule. It is
possible that employed workers find it preferable to quit the current job given the skill
acquisition outcomes. In that case, they are able to leave their jobs without incurring any
costs and become unemployed. However, it is assumed that they do not engage in job
search activities immediately after job separations and spend one period unemployed.11

2.2.6

Dynamic Programming Formulation of Worker’s Problem

The state variables used to describe the workers’ dynamic problem are (t, k, S , r), where
t indicates the current period, and k gives their employment and occupation states with
k = 0 indicating they are unemployed, and k = 1, 2, . . . , K indicating that they are employed in occupation k. S is a set of state variables pertaining to their skills, consisting
of (s1 , η1 , υ1 , s2 , η2 , υ2 ). Recall that s1 and s2 represent their skill levels, and η` and υ` for
` = 1, 2 are the parameters of their belief distributions about their skill acquisition probabilities. r is the employer specific component in the log wage equation (2.1), and only
relevant when the workers are employed.
Each period, workers engage in job search in the first sub-period .Then employed workers engage in work, and may experience human capital acquisition and learning in the
second sub-period. The value to workers carrying state variables (t, k, S , r) in the first subperiod is given by Wtk (S , r), if they are employed in occupation k, or Wt0 (S ), if they are
unemployed. The second sub-period features work, learning, and job separation, and the
11

This assumption is made to simplify the estimation process implemented in this chapter. The estimation data constructed for this paper do not contain information on whether workers ended jobs voluntarily
or involuntarily. Without means to distinguish direct job-to-job transitions from job-quit-to-job transitions,
likelihood-based estimation involves substantial complication.
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value of carrying state variables (t, k, S , r) in the second sub-period is given by Vtk (S , r), if
they are employed in occupation k, or Vt0 (S ), if they are unemployed.
The value to employed workers in the first sub-period, Wtk (S , r), is given by

Wtk (S , r)

Z
K 
hX
1
= max
λk0 (ek0 )
(e1 ,...,eK )

∞


0
max[Vtk (S , r0 ) − Vtk (S , r), 0 ]dFk0 (r0 )

−∞

k0 =1

i
+ δk Vt0 (S ) + (1 − δk )Vtk (S , r) − C(e1 , . . . , eK ) . (2.7)

Equation (2.7) reflects the workers’ job search behaviour. The offer is accepted if its value
to a worker exceeds the value of staying in the present state. The first term of the righthand side of the equation represents the expected gain due to job search, which accrues
from a transition to a new job whose value exceeds the current job. The last term is the cost
associated with the search efforts. The equation states that workers optimally choose the
search efforts to maximize the net benefit of job search each period.
Because λ1k (ek ) is strictly concave in ek and the marginal value of search effort is decreasing but tends to infinity at effort levels sufficiently close to 0, the optimal effort intensity to search for a job in occupation k0 is characterized by the first-order condition
∂λ1k0 (ek0 )
∂ek0

Z

∞
0

max[Vtk (S , r0 ) − Vtk (S , r), 0 ]dFk0 (r0 ) = 1.

−∞

Let e∗t (k, S , r, k0 ) denote the optimal search effort intensity function, where k and k0 , respectively, indicate the current occupation and a prospective occupation. Then solving the
first-order condition for ek0 with λ1k0 (ek0 ) specified by equation (2.3) gives e∗t (k, S , r, k0 ) as
e∗t (k, S , r, k0 ) = λ1k0

Z

∞

−∞

! α1
h 0
i
max Vtk (S , r0 ) − Vtk (S , r), 0 dFk0 (r0 ) .

(2.8)
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Substituting equation (2.8) into equation (2.7) yields

Wtk (S , r)

! α1
Z
K
α X 1 ∞
k0
0
k
0
=
λ0
max[Vt (S , r ) − Vt (S , r), 0]dFk0 (r )
1 − α k0 =1 k −∞
+ δk Vt0 (S ) + (1 − δk )Vtk (S , r).

Similarly, Wt0 (S ), the value of being unemployed at the beginning of period t, is given
by

Wt0 (S )

"X
Z
K 
0
= max
λk0 (ek0 )
(e1 ,...,eK )

k0 =1

∞


0
max[Vtk (S , r0 ) − Vt0 (S ), 0]dFk0 (r0 )

−∞

+

Vt0 (S )

#
− C(e1 , . . . , eK ) . (2.9)

Equation (2.9) has the same interpretation as equation (2.7) but the job offer arrival function
is given by λ0k (·) instead of λ1k (·). Solving the first-order condition for the maximization
problem above, the optimal search effort function for unemployed workers is given by

e∗t (0, S , k0 ) = λ0k0

Z

∞

! α1
i
max Vt (S , r0 ) − Vt0 (S ), 0 dFk0 (r0 ) .
h

k0

(2.10)

−∞

Then the value function can be rewritten as

Wt0 (S )

! α1
Z
K
α X 0 ∞
k0
0
0
0
max[Vt (S , r ) − Vt (S ), 0]dFk0 (r ) + Vt0 (S ).
=
λk 0
1 − α k0 =1
−∞

Now the second sub-period is considered in detail. Before turning to a characterization
of Vtk (S , r) and Vt0 (S ), however, I introduce the following notation to facilitate the description of the state variables’ laws of motion related to this sub-period.
S evolves in response to skill acquisition outcomes on the job. Let S k` (a) denote the
values of the state variables when a worker encounters an opportunity to increase his skill
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` level while working in occupation k = 1, 2, . . . , K. Variable a takes 1 if the worker’s skill
` has increased in the current period or 0 otherwise. For example, S 31 (1) represents the
state variables after a worker gets to accumulate skill 1 while working in occupation 3, and
S 21 (0) represents the state variables after a worker encounters a chance to accumulate skill
1 but fails to do so. Then based on equations (2.4), (2.5) and (2.6), S k` (a) is given by

S k1 (a) = s1 + aγk1 , η1 (1 − υ1 ) + aυ1 ,


υ1
, s2 , η2 , υ2 ,
1 + υ1


S k2 (a) = s1 , η1 , υ1 , s2 + aγk2 , η2 (1 − υ2 ) + aυ2 ,

υ2 
.
1 + υ2

Now I characterize Vtk (S , r) and Vt0 (S ) to complete the description of the workers’ problem. First, after completing job search in the terminal period, t = T , a worker only cares
about the current utility flow, therefore VTk (S , r) and VT0 (S ) are given, respectively, as
VTk (S , r) = r + yk (s1 , s2 )

and
VT0 (S ) = b.
For a non-terminal period t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1, Vtk (S , r) can be given by
1 
k
0
(S , r), Vt+1
(S )]
(1 − ωk1 − ωk2 ) max[Wt+1
= r + yk (s1 , s2 ) +
1+ρ
Z 1X
2
1

X
k
0
+
ωk`
θ̃`a (1 − θ̃` )1−a max[Wt+1
(S k` (a), r), Vt+1
(S k` (a))] f (θ̃` ; η` , υ` )dθ̃` . (2.11)

Vtk (S , r)

`=1

0

a=0

The first term on the right-hand side is the current utility flow, and the remainder of the
right-hand side of equation (2.11) expresses the continuation value of occupying state
(t, k, S , r). With probability 1 − ωk1 − ωk2 , a worker does not encounter a skill acquisi-

22
tion opportunity and thus his state variables remain unchanged. Then he makes a decision
whether to quit or not the current job.12 With probability ωk` , the worker encounters a
chance to increase his skill ` level, and the state variables are updated according to the skill
acquisition outcome. Since the worker does not know his skill acquisition probability for
certain, the continuation value is based on his current belief distribution. By calculating the
integrals in equation (2.11), the above equation can be simplified to

Vtk (S , r)

1 
k
0
(1 − ωk1 − ωk2 ) max[Wt+1
= r + yk (s1 , s2 ) +
(S , r), Vt+1
(S )]
1+ρ
2
1

X
X
k
0
+
ωk`
ηa` (1 − η` )1−a max[Wt+1
(S k` (a), r), Vt+1
(S k` (a))] . (2.12)
`=1

a=0

While in unemployment, workers neither accumulate skills nor acquire any new information about their skill acquisition probabilities. Thus Vt0 (S ) is given simply by
Vt0 (S ) = b +

1
W 0 (S ),
1 + ρ t+1

for t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1.

2.2.7

Analysis of Worker’s Problem

The worker’s problem involves several decisions and a large number of state variables,
making it intractable to fully analyze. Yet, it is straightforward to show that Vtk (S , r) and
Wtk (S , r) are increasing in r for all k = 1, 2, . . . , K. This establishes that workers employ
reservation wage strategies for accepting and quitting jobs. Specifically, let r̄t (k, S , r, k0 )
denote the reservation wage for occupation k0 set by workers working in occupation k in
12

0
0
Notice that the value after separating from the current job is given by Vt+1
(S ), not by Wt+1
(S ), reflecting
the modelling assumption that workers do not engage in job search immediately after a job quit.
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period t. r̄t (k, S , r, k0 ) is implicitly defined by equation
0

Vtk (S , r̄t (k, S , r, k0 )) = Vtk (S , r).

Clearly, the reservation wage for jobs in the current occupation coincides with the current r,
i.e., r̄t (k, S , r, k0 ) = r if k0 = k. Similarly, the reservation wages set by unemployed workers
are defined by
0

Vtk (S , r̄t (0, S , r, k0 )) = Vt0 (S ).
As for the voluntary job quit decision, let q̄t (k, S ) denote the reservation wage governing
the workers’ quitting decision in period t. This is implicitly defined by equation
k
0
Wt+1
(S , q̄t (k, S )) = Vt+1
(S ).

The total search intensity while employed is calculated as
K
X
k0 =1

e∗t (k, S , r, k0 )

=

K
X

λ1k0

Z

0
max(Vtk (S , r0 )

! α1

−

Vtk (S , r), 0)dFk (r0 ))

k0 =1

from equation (2.8). The monotonicity of Vtk (S , r) with respect to r establishes that the total
search intensity is non-increasing in r while everything else is held constant.

2.2.8

Numerical Issues

The value functions, Vt0 (S ), Wt0 (S ), Vtk (S , r) and Wtk (S , r) for k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K}, are calculated backwards starting at the terminal period t = T . Since they involve a large number
of the state variables and face a severe problem of the curse of dimensionality, I rely on
an approximation method similar to that in Keane and Wolpin (1994, 2001). Specifically,
I randomly draw a large number of the state vectors, and evaluate the value functions at
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these vectors using equation (2.12) for each k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K}. Then I fit approximating
polynomials for Vt0 (S ) and Vtk (S , r) by regression. The estimated regression coefficients
are stored to be used subsequently.

2.3
2.3.1

Estimation and Identification Strategy
Estimation Procedure

The model is estimated by simulated maximum likelihood (SML). I construct the individual
contribution to the likelihood from observed transitions and wage data. Individual i’s labour
i
market history can be expressed by Oit = {(occit , split , wit )}Tt=1
where T i represents the last

quarter of the observed history of individual i. Variable occit ∈ {0, 1, . . . , K} represents
individual i’s employment state and occupation in period t, with occit = 0 indicating that
individual i is unemployed in period t. Variable split keeps track of individual i’s position
within the current employment cycle.13 Specifically split = 0 if individual i is unemployed
in period t, and split = j if the worker is in the jth job after the most recent unemployment
spell. wit is the wage observation for individual i in period t.14
I add the following features to the model to make it estimable. The model cannot
account for wage decreases in several instances, including wage decreases on the same job,
and those occurring when individuals move to a new job in the same occupation. If they
are observed in the data, zero likelihood would be assigned to these events by the model.
In order to deal with these probability-zero events, I assume that wages are observed with
multiplicative measurement error with a lognormal distribution. In the log wage term, wage
13

As defined in Wolpin (1992), an employment cycle consists of an unemployment spell and continuous
job spells. Each cycle begins with a new unemployment spell, and ends with a transition to another unemployment spell.
14
Note wage information is not available for all periods workers were employed. Therefore, although
subsumed in the discussion, variables indicating that wage information was available for given periods are
included in the estimation data.
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observation wit can be given by
ln wit = ln w∗i jkt + εit ,
where w∗i jkt is the true wage value earned by individual i working at job j in occupation k in
period t, and εit is the measurement error term, which follows the i.i.d. normal distribution
with mean 0 and standard deviation σε .
The true log wage value is determined by equation (2.1). I specify this equation as
ln w∗i jkt = r j + βk1 s1it + βk2 s2it
for k = 1, 2, . . . , K, with βK1 and βK2 , the coefficients for occupation K, normalized to 1.15
In addition, I assume that r j , the employer specific component in the log wage function,
is drawn from the normal distribution with mean µk and standard deviation σk , with µK
normalized to 0.
Furthermore, the following modification to the model is made to reconcile the observed
data and model solution. As shown later, a large fraction of individuals in my estimation
sample were employed in the first post-schooling quarter. Attributing this high initial employment rate to search efforts in the first quarter would likely be at odds with the more
moderate transition rates observed in the subsequent quarters. The initial high employment
rate likely reflects search activities in school as well as those done after transition, and this
calls for additional structure to the model to properly account for it.
Rather than explicitly modelling search activities in school, I take the following approach to deal with this issue. First, the probability of being employed in the first quarter
15

I adopted this linear specification after more general specifications were tried, for example, with quadratic
terms in skill levels. The quadratic terms were not jointly significant at the 5% significance level in the
likelihood ratio test.
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is included in the set of parameters to be estimated. This probability is denoted by π. By
directly estimating the fraction of the sample initially employed, it is possible to reconcile
the discrepancy between the employment rate in the first quarter and transition rates in the
subsequent quarters.
This does not solve the problem entirely, however, for I also need to account for individuals’ occupations to calculate the likelihood function. To this end, I specify the probability
of working in a particular occupation in the first period as follows:
Pr(occi1 = k) = Pr(occi1 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K})Pr(occi1 = k|occi1 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K}).

This equation states that the relevant probability is divided into two components: the probability of being employed and the conditional probability that worker i works in occupation
k in the first period. The first component is equal to π, which is to be estimated directly,
and the second component is specified as
λ0k (e∗t (0, S , k))(1 − F(r̄t (0, S , r, k))

Pr(occi1 = k|occi1 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K}) = PK

h=1

λ0h (e∗t (0, S , h))(1 − F(r̄t (0, S , h)))

.

(2.13)

The numerator on the right-hand side of equation (2.13) is the product of the job offer
arrival probability from occupation k and the probability of accepting an offer given their
reservation wage strategy. Therefore, it is the probability of exiting from unemployment to
occupation k given workers’ optimal job search strategies. The denominator is the sum of
these probabilities for all the occupations.
Accounting for individuals’ wage and transition profiles using the model requires me to
account for the several unobservable state variables: workers’ skill levels, skill acquisition
probabilities, beliefs and employer-specific wage components. These pieces of information
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are given by latent variables (θ1 , θ2 ) and the state variables in the model
Vit = (s1it , η1it , υ1it , s2it , η2it , υ2it , r j ).

Define Õit by
Õit = (Oit , Vit ).
The likelihood contribution of individual i is obtained by integrating out the unobservable
i
variables from the probability of realizing a history given by {Õt }Tt=1
, θ1 and θ2 :

Li =

i
Pr({Ot }Tt=1
)

=

Z

Z
···

i
Pr({Õt }Tt=1
θ1 , θ2 )dVTi · · · dV1 dθ1 dθ2 .

Although the closed-form expression for the integral is unavailable, it can be calculated
by Monte Carlo simulation because of ease of simulating profiles of Vit consistent with
the model. The SML estimator is a set of structural parameters that maximizes the loglikelihood function defined by
`(Θ) =

N
X

ln Li

i=1

where Θ represents the parameters to be estimated.

2.3.2

Identification Discussion

The model parameters are identified through differences in observed wages and quarterly
transition data with respect to a variety of dimensions. Formally establishing identification
of the model parameters is difficult due to the complex nature of the model. Instead, I
attempt to provide the intuition for identification.
The parameters governing the job search process, i.e., λ0k and λ1k for k = 1, 2, . . . , K, and
α, are identified from the observed quarterly transitions. In particular, α, which enters into
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the job offer arrival probability functions in equations (2.2) and (2.3), governs the extent
of diminishing returns to scale in search effort for a single occupation. Therefore wide
differences in transition destination indicates strong diminishing returns to focusing on a
single occupation, while concentrated transition destinations indicates weak diminishing
returns.
The estimation data set provides panel data on wage observations. The parameters in
the log wage equations, in the wage offer distributions, and those governing the skill acquisition process are identified from differences in wage observation across various dimensions. Wage growth rates observed in different occupations are used to identify βk` and γk` .
Differences in wage growth among individuals are used to identify the distribution of skill
acquisition probabilities, i.e., p` and q` . Differences in individuals’ first wage observations
are used to identify the distributions of initial skill levels. Wages out of unemployment and
wage growth observed at job-to-job transitions are used to identify µk and σk . Note that the
identification relies on the assumptions βK1 = βK2 = 1 and µK = 0.
The time discount rate ρ is set to 0.0192. This value is equivalent to an annual discount
rate of 5 percent.

2.4

Data

The estimation strategy employed in the paper requires panel data that follow individual
labour market outcomes since the school-to-work transition. To meet this data requirement,
I use the U.S. National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) to construct quarterly
post-schooling labour market histories.
NLSY79 is a longitudinal study of a nationally representative cohort of individuals
who were between 14 and 21 years old when they were interviewed for the first time.
The survey conducted annual interviews from 1979 to 1994 and then the interview fre-
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quency was changed to bi-annual from then on. It collects information on respondents’
work and schooling activities since the last interview, enabling the construction of detailed
post-schooling labour market histories including wages, occupations, and spells of jobs and
unemployment.
The estimation sample is constructed from the white male cross section sample, and
uses the interview responses from 1979 to 2000. The sample is restricted to high school
graduates to make the sample population as homogeneous as possible. It also excludes
respondents who were in the armed forces or self-employed. Moreover, it excludes respondents who graduated from high school before 1978 because it is not possible to construct
complete post-schooling job histories before 1978.

2.4.1

Job History

In the estimation data set, a job is defined as a continuous employment relationship with
a particular employer which lasted at least 13 weeks of full time work.16 In each interview, NLSY79 records the starting and stopping weeks of up to 5 jobs held by respondents
since the last interview. Using this information, I first construct their weekly job histories
consisting all job spells. A job for which relevant job characteristics are missing or inconsistent with each other (e.g., information on occupation or hours of work is unavailable,
or the stopping week precedes the starting week), results in the job history being censored
immediately before the problematic job. Thus the likelihood calculation is based only on
the information prior to this spell.
Although my model assumes that workers hold only one job in a given quarter, it is
quite common to find cases in which respondents worked for more than one employer in
the same week. To deal with these cases, I employ a commonly used treatment for this in
16

Full-time work is defined as 35 weekly hours or more.
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the literature. Specifically, when encountering instances of multiple job holding, I assume
that the one which started later did not start until the one that started earlier ended.
The model is estimated in quarterly terms (13 weeks), and therefore the weekly job
histories constructed according to the above steps are converted into quarterly histories as
follows. Respondents are considered employed in a given quarter if they had job spells
whose total length within the quarter was no less than 7 weeks. Otherwise, they are considered unemployed in the quarter. If more than one job spell cover a particular quarter, then
the one that the respondent worked for more weeks during that quarter is considered as the
job for that quarter.
As for earnings information, NLSY79 provides at most one earnings observation for
each reported job during each interview. This information is assigned to particular quarters
according to the following rules. If a job was ongoing during the interview week, I treat
the reported pay as the one earned in the interview week and the corresponding quarter.
If the job spell ended earlier, the reported pay is treated as the pay earned in the quarter
when the job ended. The earnings information is converted into quarterly terms based on
the reported time unit of pay, converted into the real terms using 1993 dollars.
Finally, the calendar quarter of labour market entry is determined for each respondent
by locating the last time he was enrolled in high school. If it was in February, March or
April, then I determine the second quarter of the year as the entry quarter to the labour
market. Similarly, if it is in May, June or July, I determine the third quarter of the year as
the entry quarter to the labour market. If it is August, September or October, I determine
the fourth quarter of the year as the entry to the labour market. If it is November, December
or January, then I determine the nearest first calendar quarter as the initial quarter.
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2.4.2

Occupation Classification

The estimation strategy requires that the data provide information on occupations held by
individuals. To meet this requirement, the 1970 census 3-digit occupation codes assigned
to reported jobs are used to determine individuals’ occupations during given job spells.17
One limitation of using the Roy model is that estimation becomes unmanageable with a
large number of occupations. Thus aggregation of occupations is made to make the estimation feasible. This treatment is also justified because of concerns of misclassification of
occupation codes in the NLSY79 as pointed out by Neal (1999). Furthermore, it may be
desirable even in the absence of classification error because changes in occupation codes
at such detailed level may not involve material changes in task performed on the job, as
Robinson (2011) argues.
The model defines occupations as sets of jobs requiring workers to perform similar
tasks, and it is important to reflect this when assigning occupations into a small number of
groups. While previous studies on occupational choice, such as Keane and Wolpin (1997)
and Sullivan (2010), aggregated 3-digit occupations based on which major occupation category they belong to (e.g., professional, managerial, etc.) I turn to the growing literature
on task and skill content of occupations to guide my classification scheme.
This literature takes advantage of surveys such as the U.S. Dictionary of Occupational
Titles, or the German Qualification and Career Survey, which collect detailed information
on tasks performed and skills required for a wide range of occupations. Poletaev and Robinson (2008) and Robinson (2011) are examples of these studies for the United States. Using
factor analysis, they converted the rich array of characteristics of occupations from the
Dictionary of Occupational Titles to a small number of numerical scores. Each extracted
factor captures a certain type of skill such as intelligence or fine motor skill, and its value
17

This assumes that individuals’ occupations do not change within jobs.
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indicates the extent to which the skill is utilized. Thus each score serves as the coordinate
on a space where occupations are positioned with respect to their skill or task content. This
allows us to discuss the distance or closeness of occupations.18 I use these factor scores
as summary measures of task content of occupations and use them to construct aggregated
occupational groups used in the present analysis.
To group occupations, I use cluster analysis to aid the aggregation process. Cluster
analysis is a statistical method used to divide a sample into a number of subsets based
on their observed set of characteristics. Of various clustering methods developed and implemented in the literature, I adopt the finite mixture model of clustering.19 Detail of the
cluster analysis performed for this paper is given in Appendix B.
The census occupation codes are grouped into three sets of aggregated occupations.
Table 2.1 shows the summary of the constructed occupation groups. With a few exceptions,
the professional occupations are evenly divided into occupations 1 and 2. The professional
occupations assigned to occupation 2 are in general either technical (e.g. 153: electorical
and electronic engineering technicians) or in natural or medical science (e.g. 80: clinical
laboratory technologists and technicians). Managerial and sales occupations are mostly
included in occupation 1, and most craftsmen occupations are grouped into occupation 2.
Occupation 3 represents clerical, operatives, labourer and service occupations. Overall,
occupations 1 and 2 represent respectively white- and blue- collar occupations that require
high skill levels.
The cluster analysis employed three factors associated with intelligence (factor 1), fine
motor skills (factor 2), and physical strength (factor 3).20 The average factor scores in each
aggregated occupation groups are presented in Table 2.2. These constructed occupation
18

To make the extracted information available to an analysis with census occupations, the crosswalk between the DOT occupations and census occupations was used. and the skill or task connects are calculated.
19
See Fraley and Raftery (2002) for the methodology.
20
While 4 factors are retained in Robinson (2011)’s factor analysis, one of these factors, which is associated
with visual skills, is omitted in my cluster analysis because use of this factor produced a less intuitive result.
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Table 2.1: Summary of Aggregated Occupation Groups
1970 Census
Occupation Category
Professional
Managers
Sales workers
Clerical workers
Craftmen
Operatives
Transport equipment operatives
Laborers
Farmers
Service workers

Occupation
1 2 3
57 58 5
21 2 0
10 0 4
4 0 40
1 78 13
0 7 44
0 6 5
0 2 13
0 3 3
5 7 27

Table 2.2: Average Factor Scores of Aggregated Occupation Groups
Group Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
1
1.280
-0.300
0.593
2
-0.276
1.366
0.739
3
-0.738
-0.378
-0.522

groups have the following skill/task characteristics. On average, occupation group 1 scores
high on the factor associated with intelligence, while occupation group 2 scores high on the
factor associated with fine motor skills. Occupation 3 scores low on all the three factors.
Finally, the occupation classification constructed so far is used to assign each job spell
to an aggregated occupation group. While the model assumes that a worker’s occupation
remains the same within a job, I observe cases in the data where different 3 digit occupation
codes were assigned to the same job spell over years, and these reported 3 digit codes are
mapped to different groups in my aggregated occupation classification. These discrepancies
need to be resolved. To this end, I institute a set of rules handling these problems, which is
described in Appendix B.
Table 2.3 presents the results of the assignment. Most of the jobs are assigned either
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Table 2.3: Job Spells by Aggregated Occupation
Group Frequency
1
279
2
810
3
752

Proportion
15.15
44.00
40.85

occupation 2 or 3. This is understandable given the sample population is high school graduates and occupation 1 mainly consists of professional occupations, which are associated
with higher educational qualifications.

2.4.3

Analysis of Estimation Data

The final sample contains 413 individuals with an average length of post-schooling history
of 61 quarters. The average number of jobs spells held during the observed history is 4.5,
with an average duration of 12.4 quarters. The average number of unemployment spells
experienced during the observed history is 1.8, with an average duration of 3.4 quarters.
Table 2.4 presents the probabilities of making different kinds of transitions while employed each quarter. In the table, the sample period was divided into 4 distinct periods as
follows to show their patterns over time: (1) the first 10 quarters, (2) the second 10 quarters,
(3) the following 20 quarters, and (4) the last 20 quarters. Three types of transitions are
given here: job-to-job transitions, job-to-job transitions involving a change in occupation,
and job-to-unemployment transitions. All of them show declining profiles, indicating that
individuals’ employment relationships become more stable as they age.
Table 2.5 presents the quarterly and yearly occupation transition matrices. Again the
transition rates are reported separately for the 4 periods defined above. As discussed previously, the probability of making an occupational change declines with age, and this can be
seen in the occupation transition matrices. The diagonal elements of the transition matrices

35

Table 2.4: Probability of Transitions from Jobs per Quarter

Probability of making a
job-to-job transition
Probability of making an
occupation change
Probability of making a
job-to-unemployment transition

1-10Q

11-20Q

21-40Q

41-60Q

0.063

0.044

0.043

0.031

0.026

0.021

0.015

0.011

0.053

0.042

0.022

0.017

for occupations 2 and 3 increase with age. Interestingly, there is no discernible age pattern
for occupation 1.
The quarterly occupational transition matrix also shows that occupation 3 initially captures the largest share of the destination of unemployment-to-job transitions. This rate
remains stable for the first 10 years. Meanwhile, transitions from unemployment to occupations 1 and 2 increase over time, and after the first 10 years, occupation 2 overtakes
occupation 3 as the top destination of transitions out of unemployment.
Quarterly transitions between different occupations are small and it is difficult to observe any patterns in them. More clear patterns emerge in the yearly transition matrix.
In particular, transitions between occupation 2 and 3 are more frequent in the initial 10
quarters than in later quarters. Transitions to occupation 2 from occupation 3 are the most
common type of occupational change. This is likely due to occupational upgrading. Occupation 2 mainly consists of professional and craftsmen occupations and occupations 3
includes labourers and operatives. Sullivan (2010) also reports high transitions from the
latter occupation groups to the craftsmen occupations in his data from NLSY 79.
Figure 2.1 shows the fraction of the sample working in each occupation over time.
Slightly above two-fifths of the sample remains unemployed in their first quarter in the
labour market. The fraction unemployed rapidly drops in the first 4 years to around 0.1,
and then gradually declines to 0.07.
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Table 2.5: Transition Profiles between Occupations
Quarterly Transition
Occupation
Occupation (Destination)
(Origin)
Period UE Occ 1 Occ 2 Occ 3
1-10Q 0.721 0.025 0.107 0.145
Unemployed 11-20Q 0.685 0.040 0.124 0.144
(UE)
21-40Q 0.689 0.043 0.110 0.146
41-60Q 0.716 0.040 0.138 0.098
1-10Q 0.015 0.969 0.008 0.008
Occupation 1 11-20Q 0.019 0.967 0.012 0.006
(Occ 1)
21-40Q 0.011 0.973 0.010 0.004
41-60Q 0.014 0.976 0.005 0.006
1-10Q 0.051 0.006 0.925 0.017
Occupation 2 11-20Q 0.045 0.007 0.938 0.008
(Occ 2)
21-40Q 0.021 0.005 0.969 0.006
41-60Q 0.014 0.003 0.977 0.005
1-10Q 0.068 0.007 0.023 0.901
Occupation 3 11-20Q 0.050 0.006 0.020 0.922
(Occ 3)
21-40Q 0.032 0.005 0.015 0.950
41-60Q 0.022 0.006 0.009 0.965
Yearly Transition
Occupation
Destination
Origin
Period UE Occ 1 Occ 2
1-10Q 0.456 0.048 0.215
Unemployed 11-20Q 0.391 0.082 0.244
(UE)
21-40Q 0.364 0.097 0.210
41-60Q 0.393 0.113 0.264
1-10Q 0.022 0.935 0.028
Occupation 1 11-20Q 0.025 0.895 0.055
(Occ 1)
21-40Q 0.026 0.915 0.036
41-60Q 0.033 0.909 0.029
1-10Q 0.097 0.035 0.805
Occupation 2 11-20Q 0.080 0.034 0.862
(Occ 2)
21-40Q 0.037 0.018 0.914
41-60Q 0.028 0.015 0.933
1-10Q 0.122 0.038 0.092
Occupation 3 11-20Q 0.079 0.028 0.079
(Occ 3)
21-40Q 0.061 0.023 0.068
41-60Q 0.046 0.020 0.039

Occ 3
0.279
0.281
0.311
0.217
0.026
0.024
0.019
0.032
0.063
0.028
0.033
0.018
0.747
0.813
0.854
0.905
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Figure 2.1: Fraction of Individuals Working in Given Occupations

A large fraction of initial employment is in either occupations 2 or 3, with occupation 3
accounting for the largest share. The fractions of the sample working in occupations 2 and
3 initially increase rapidly. However, while the fraction for occupation 2 steadily rises and
reaches about 0.45, the fraction for occupation 3 experiences a steady decline after the first
year and then stabilizes. Occupation 2 accounts for the largest fraction of employed high
school graduates’ occupations after about 3 or 4 years. The fraction working in occupation
1 remains the lowest among the three occupations, but the share of the sample working
in occupation 1 gradually increases from about 0.1 to slightly above 0.2 over the 15 year
period.
Figure 2.2 presents the age profiles of mean log earnings. As discussed previously,
earnings information is not available for every quarter worked, and this appears to induce
fluctuations if the average is calculated by quarter. Thus to smooth the earnings profile, the
average was calculated annually. The left panel of the figure shows the values corresponding to all employed workers. The graph shows the concave profiles of log earnings, which
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Figure 2.2: Observed Log Wage

is widely documented in the literature.21 It shows that log earnings increases by nearly
0.5 in the first 15 years in the labor market. The right-hand panel of the figure shows the
average log earnings among workers in different occupations. These graphs do not account
for self-selection of workers, and therefore, do not reflect the occupation specific age profiles of earnings for the whole sample population. Those working in occupation 1 earn the
most throughout the sample period, while those working in occupation 3 earn the least on
average. Earnings for those working in occupation 2 are closer to that for occupation 1. As
for the wage growth profiles in different occupations, occupations 1 and 2 appear to have
higher growth rates than occupation 3.
21

See Rubinstein and Weiss (2007) for example.
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2.5

Estimation Results

2.5.1

Parameter Estimates

The upper panel of Table 2.6 presents the parameter estimates governing the skill acquisition process and initial skill level distributions. Given the parameter estimates, workers
gain a skill acquisition opportunity each period they work in occupations 1, 2, or 3 with
probability 0.87, 0.88, or 0.90, respectively.22 84% of skill acquisition opportunities are for
skill 1 in occupation 1. The corresponding values for skill 1 in occupations 2 and 3 are 8%
and 35%, respectively.
Skill acquisition opportunities also represent opportunities to receive signals about
workers’ own skill acquisition probabilities. Given the estimates of ωk` , a signal about θ1
arrives for skill 1 every 1.4, 14.1, and 3.2 quarters in occupations 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
The corresponding frequencies for θ2 are 7.2, 1.3, and 1.7 quarters. Thus, occupation 1
provides the fastest learning opportunity for skill 1 and occupation 2 for skill 2, while
occupation 3 provides learning opportunities for both skills.
Recall from equation (2.4) that γk` represents the amount by which skill ` increases in
occupation k. The estimated values of γk` for k = 1, 2, 3 and ` = 1, 2 also reveal differences
in skill acquisition processes across occupations. Since the estimates of γ31 and γ12 are
negligibly small, skills 1 and 2 hardly grow in occupation 3 and 1, respectively. Occupation
1 provides the best skill acquisition opportunities for skill 1. Occupation 2 provides the
counterpart for skill 2, followed by occupation 3.
The right-hand side of the first and second rows of the same panel of Table 2.6 present
the estimated parameters of the population distributions of skill acquisition probabilities.
These estimates imply that the average values of skill acquisition probabilities are 0.18 and
22

These values are equal to ωk1 + ωk2 for k = 1, 2, 3.
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Table 2.6: Parameter Estimates
Skill (`)
Parameter
γ1` × 100
γ2` × 100
γ3` × 100
ω1`
ω2`
ω3`

1
8.7477
(1.3834)
0.4771
(5.7166)
0.0527
(0.0211)
0.6666
(0.0413)
0.0666
(0.0124)
0.2958
(0.0235)

Skill (`)

2
Parameter
1
2
0.0000
p`
0.7605 9.3642
(0.8966)
(0.1720) (3.1471)
1.3016
q`
3.4022 9.4328
(0.1393)
(1.0956) (3.2968)
1.0482
s`
4.0105 2.7031
(0.0035)
(0.5600) (0.5630)
s`
5.3183 3.0550
0.1979
(0.0364)
(0.5611) (0.5672)
0.8163
m`
0.9707 0.3287
(0.0202)
(0.0108) (0.0355)
0.6054
(0.0279)

Occupation (k)
1
2
3
Parameter
0.0103 0.0277 0.0358
α
0.8126
(0.0016) (0.0043) (0.0066)
(0.0201)
λ1k
0.0034 0.0137 0.0294
b
5.9594
(0.0007) (0.0026) (0.0055)
(0.9832)
δk
0.0207 0.0246 0.0449
σε
0.3027
(0.0017) (0.0013) (0.0022)
(0.0015)
†
βk1
0.7200 0.5889 1.0000
π
0.5793
(0.0963) (0.0403)
(0.0265)
βk2
1.5349 1.3512 1.0000†
(0.1449) (0.0952)
µk
0.1736 1.3873 0.0000†
(0.2590) (0.3932)
σk
0.2681 0.2380 0.2684
(0.0241) (0.0113) (0.0130)
Loglikelihood value: -10794.60
Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses
† normalized values
Parameter
λ0k
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0.50 for skills 1 and 2, respectively.23 The distribution of the skill 1 acquisition probability
is highly skewed to the right, with a median of 0.13. In contrast, the distribution of the skill
2 acquisition probability is symmetric and concentrated around the mean. The median of
the distribution coincides with the mean, and the 5th and 95th percentiles of the distribution
are 0.31 and 0.68. In the model, workers form their prior beliefs from the population
distributions of the skill acquisition probabilities and their initial skill levels. Thus, these
estimates indicate that there is a very low level of uncertainty for the skill 2 acquisition
probability.
The estimates of s1 and s1 indicate a large gap between the upper and lower support
points for the initial skill 1 level. This gap has substantial implications for wages. For
example, a worker’s first wage will be lower by 1.31 log point in occupation 3 if they are
endowed with the lower initial skill 1 level than with the higher level.24 The gap between
the two support points for the initial skill 2 level distribution is narrower than for skill 1,
but its implications for wages are still substantial. A worker’s first wage will be lower by
0.35 log points in occupation 3 if they are endowed with the lower initial skill 2 level than
otherwise. About one third of the sample population is initially endowed with the higher
skill 2 level.
The first two rows of the lower panel of the table show differences in search frictions
among the three occupations. Transitions to occupation 1 are hampered by the low values
of λ01 and λ11 . Occupation 3 presents the lowest degree of search frictions among the three
occupations. For example, if unemployed workers exert the same job search effort level
to all the three occupations, the likelihoods that a job offer comes from occupations 1, 2,
and 3 are 0.140, 0.375, and 0.485, respectively.25 The corresponding probabilities while
Recall that the mean of a Beta distribution with parameters p` and q` is p` /(p` + q` ).
However, those endowed with the lower initial skill 1 level account for a small fraction of the sample
population.
25
The probability equals λ0k (e)/(λ01 (e) + λ02 (e) + λ03 (e)) = λ0k /(λ01 + λ02 + λ03 ) for each occupation k.
23

24
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employed are 0.073, 0.295, and 0.632 for occupations 1, 2, and 3, respectively. However,
the probability of exogenous job destruction is estimated to be the highest for occupation
3, far exceeding those for the other two occupations.
Estimated to be around 0.81, α indicates a high degree of diminishing returns to search
efforts. Therefore, job search efforts are predicted to be spread out over different occupations rather than narrowly directed at a particular occupation. For example, about twothirds of workers enter the labour market with initial skill levels (s1 , s2 ) = (5.31, 2.70), and
are the largest group in the distribution of initial skill levels. The proportions of job search
effort allocated to occupations 1, 2, and 3 by this group of workers are 0.19, 0.48, and 0.33,
respectively.
The estimates of βk` show that occupation 1 provides higher returns to both skills 1 and
2 than does occupation 2. Curiously, occupation 3 provides the highest return to skill 1.
As for the distributions of the employer-specific wage components, occupation 2 has the
highest mean, and the large difference between µ2 and µ3 offsets occupation 3’s advantage
in return to skill 1. If evaluated at the mean values of the offer distributions, the initial wage
is expected to be the lowest in occupation 3 for any possible pairs of the initial skill levels.
Overall, these estimates suggest that most workers value occupation 3 the least of the
three occupations. Workers are expected to be paid less working in occupation 3 than in
the other two occupations. Occupation 2 provides greater learning opportunities for both
skills than occupation 3. Furthermore, workers face higher risk of exogenous job separation in occupation 3. While all of these differences give workers’ less incentive to search
for jobs in occupation 3, they are counterbalanced by the higher efficiency of search effort for occupation 3. The estimation results therefore suggest that jobs in occupation 3
serve as temporary stepping stones. The higher search efficiency for occupation 3 encourages transitions to this occupation from unemployment, but once workers are employed in
occupation 3, they generally prefer to move to different occupations.
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Table 2.7: Predicted Probability of Transitions from Jobs per Quarter

Probability of making a
job-to-job transition
Probability of making an
occupation change
Probability of making a
job-to-unemployment transition

2.5.2

1-10Q 11-20Q
0.042
0.033
(0.063) (0.044)
0.023
0.017
(0.026) (0.021)
0.031
0.029
(0.053) (0.042)

21-40Q
0.027
(0.043)
0.014
(0.015)
0.028
(0.022)

41-60Q
0.024
(0.031)
0.012
(0.011)
0.026
(0.017)

Model Fit

To examine the model’s fit to the data, I generate a large sample of artificial work histories of workers using the estimated parameters, and compare the simulated data to the
observed mobility patterns and wage profiles. For each simulated observation, I first sample skill acquisition probabilities and initial skill levels from their distributions among the
worker population given by the parameter estimates. Then I record the predicted transition
outcomes.
Table 2.7 presents the simulated counterpart of the transition probabilities in Table 2.4.
The model matches the observed probabilities of job and occupational changes reasonably
well. The model is able to generate the declining age profiles of these probabilities, though
it underpredicts the job-to-job transition probabilities, and leaves a large portion of the
declining profile of job-to-unemployment transitions unexplained.
Table 2.8 presents the predicted quarterly occupation transition matrices, together with
the observed values given in parentheses. The predicted transition rates are close to the
observed values in magnitude in most of the cells. A few mismatches are noted. First, the
model overpredicts quarterly transitions from occupation 1 to unemployment because the
estimate of δ1 generates higher quarterly job separation rates than those observed. Second,
while the diagonal elements for occupations 2 and 3 increase over time in the data, the
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Table 2.8: Predicted Quarterly Occupational Transition Matrices
Occupation
Origin

Period
1-10Q

Unemployed

11-20Q

(UE)

21-40Q
41-60Q
1-10Q

Occupation 1

11-20Q

(Occ 1)

21-40Q
41-60Q
1-10Q

Occupation 2

11-20Q

(Occ 2)

21-40Q
41-60Q
1-10Q

Occupation 3

11-20Q

(Occ 3)

21-40Q
41-60Q

UE
0.711
(0.721)
0.715
(0.685)
0.723
(0.689)
0.699
(0.716)
0.026
(0.015)
0.020
(0.019)
0.021
(0.011)
0.020
(0.014)
0.023
(0.051)
0.026
(0.045)
0.025
(0.021)
0.024
(0.014)
0.050
(0.068)
0.046
(0.050)
0.046
(0.032)
0.045
(0.022)

Destination
Occ 1
Occ 2
0.035
0.132
(0.023) (0.107)
0.045
0.125
(0.040) (0.124)
0.036
0.124
(0.043) (0.110)
0.043
0.124
(0.040) (0.138)
0.955
0.014
(0.969) (0.008)
0.966
0.013
(0.967) (0.012)
0.967
0.010
(0.973) (0.010)
0.970
0.009
(0.976) (0.005)
0.003
0.971
(0.006) (0.925)
0.004
0.969
(0.007) (0.938)
0.004
0.970
(0.005) (0.969)
0.003
0.972
(0.003) (0.977)
0.008
0.048
(0.007) (0.023)
0.009
0.044
(0.006) (0.020)
0.008
0.042
(0.005) (0.015)
0.011
0.047
(0.006) (0.009)

Occ 3
0.122
(0.145)
0.115
(0.144)
0.118
(0.146)
0.134
(0.098)
0.005
(0.008)
0.001
(0.006)
0.002
(0.004)
0.001
(0.006)
0.002
(0.017)
0.001
(0.008)
0.001
(0.006)
0.000
(0.005)
0.893
(0.901)
0.900
(0.922)
0.903
(0.950)
0.898
(0.965)
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predicted values stay around 0.97 and 0.90, respectively. In addition, the model does not
replicate the declines with age in transition rates to unemployment from occupations 2 and
3, respectively.
Figure 2.3 compares the observed and predicted fractions of those unemployed and
working in the three occupations. The estimated model produces a good fit to the fractions
of the unemployed and those working in occupation 1. If any, the predicted unemployment
rate drops too fast initially, and stabilizes slightly above the observed level.
In contrast, the model has difficulty matching the shares of occupations 2 and 3 in the
workers’ employment, overpredicting occupation 2’s share and underpredicting occupation
3’s share. These discrepancies can be explained by the mismatches in the quarterly transition rates shown in Table 2.8. On the one hand, the inflow to occupation 2 from occupation
3 is overpredicted for the whole sample period, and this excess is not cancelled out by the
predicted outflow from occupation 2. On the other hand, the predicted outflow from occupation 3 does not decline with age, resulting in the divergence between the predictions and
data. Furthermore, the predicted transition to occupation 3 from the two other occupations
is almost negligible. The excess outflow from occupation 3 to occupation 2 and the lack of
inflow to occupation 3 from the other occupations reflect the point made earlier that occupation 3 acts as a transitory state in workers’ movements from unemployment to the other
occupations.
Finally, Figure 2.4 compares the observed and predicted log quarterly earnings profiles. The predicted earnings profile follows the observed counterpart closely, generating
the wage growth overall, though it does not capture the observed concavity.
Overall, the model is able to match the data in several dimensions. In particular, it
replicates the life-cycle patterns of job-to-job transition rates, the probability of changing
occupations, and life-cycle wage growth. At the same time, however, the estimates have a
tendency to miss the observed age effects in the occupational transition profiles.
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Figure 2.3: Observed and Predicted Occupation Affiliations

Figure 2.4: Observed and Predicted Log Wages

2.5.3

Augmented Model

The original model, called the baseline model from now on, substantially underpredicted
occupation 3’s employment share. Occupation 3 offers the least favourable opportunities
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in terms of both skill acquisition and earnings compared to the other occupations, so the
transition rate out of occupation 3 is overpredicted. This discrepancy suggests that the
baseline model is missing factors besides labour earnings and skill acquisitions that influence occupational choice. One way to ameliorate this is to model heterogeneity in workers’
tastes for working in different occupations by allowing non-pecuniary utility to enter their
labour market decision problem. Thus, I assume that a certain fraction of workers derive
non-pecuniary utility from working in occupation 3. This is assumed to be constant among
the group and over time, and denoted by z. This value is added to the pecuniary utility
flow each period the workers work in occupation 3. The proportion of this group in the
population is given by χ ∈ (0, 1). To facilitate discussions that follow, I call workers in this
group type B workers, and the rest are called type A workers.
Moreover, the baseline model failed to capture declining transition probabilities from
occupations 2 and 3 to unemployment with respect to age. Mirroring this problem, the
probabilities of staying in occupations 2 and 3 did not rise. To address this problem, job
destructions rates are allowed to depend on the potential experience of workers. Specifically, I assume that δk gives the exogenous job destruction probability in the first 20 quarters
after a worker’s labour market entry, δ0k for the next 20 quarters, and δk for the rest of his
00

time in the labour market.26
Table 2.9 presents parameter estimates for the augmented model. Reflecting the observed transition patterns to unemployment, the estimated job destruction rates from occupations 2 and 3 exhibit decreasing trends with age. The decline is especially steep for
occupation 2, with δ2 nearly a quarter of δ2 . The estimate of δ1 is more in line with the
00

observed quarterly transition rates from occupation 1 to unemployment in Table 2.5 than
the value estimated in the baseline model.
26

As shown in Table 2.5, there does not appear to be a trend in job separations from occupation 1 in terms
00
of workers’ ageing process. Therefore I restrict δ1 = δ01 = δ1 .
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With χ and z estimated to be 0.2620 and 1.6463, respectively, about one quarter of
the population is estimated to be Type B workers. The non-pecuniary utility value they
derive from working in occupation 3 is considerable; receiving the non-pecuniary utility is
equivalent to valuing their labour earnings from occupation 3 five times higher.27
The augmented model provides the same qualitative implications as the baseline model
in many respects. The distribution of the skill 1 acquisition probability is right-skewed
with mean 0.18 and median 0.13. The distribution of the skill 2 acquisition probability is
symmetric around mean 0.50, and tight around the mean with the 5th and 95th percentiles
at 0.31 and 0.68, respectively. Occupation 1 provides the best skill acquisition and the
fastest learning opportunities for skill 1, while occupation 2 is occupation 1’s counterpart
for skill 2. Occupation 3 presents the least search frictions. If unemployed workers exert
the same level of job search effort to all three occupations, the likelihood that a job offer
comes from occupation 3 is nearly 50% as opposed to 10% and 40% chances that a job
offer is for employment in occupation 1 and occupation 2, respectively. With α estimated
to be 0.8190, the estimated job offer arrival probabilities as a function of search efforts
exhibit a high degree of diminishing returns.
Table 2.10 presents predicted transition probabilities between jobs, between occupations, and from job to unemployment for the augmented model. Compared with the baseline model’s predictions, the augmented model fits the data better, especially for the quarterly job-to-unemployment transition probabilities. Table 2.11 presents the predicted quarterly occupation transition matrices from the augmented model. With the age-varying job
destruction rates, predicted transitions to unemployment from occupations 2 and 3 decline
with age. This also allows the model to predict that the likelihood of staying in occupations 2 or 3 rises with age. By allowing for workers with different tastes, the model is able
27

Recall that to type B workers, the per-period utility from working in occupation 3 is the sum of the
logarithm of labour earnings and the non-pecuniary utility term.
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Table 2.9: Parameter Estimates – Augmented Model

Parameter
γ1` × 100
γ2` × 100
γ3` × 100
ω1`
ω2`
ω3`

Skill (`)
Skill (`)
1
2
Parameter
1
2
9.4069 0.0000
p`
0.7425 9.3819
(1.6735) (1.2217)
(0.1880) (3.2944)
0.3295 1.2726
q`
3.4546 9.4270
(10.3300) (0.1474)
(1.2076) (3.4183)
4.0183 2.6936
0.0408 0.7682
s`
(0.0147) (0.0037)
(0.3265) (0.3146)
s`
5.3359 3.0259
0.6665 0.1611
(0.0423) (0.0335)
(0.3146) (0.3161)
0.0459 0.8480
m`
0.9736 0.3613
(0.0107) (0.0189)
(0.0109) (0.0371)
0.3947 0.4890
(0.0256) (0.0285)

Occupation (k)
1
2
3
Parameter
0.0097 0.0286 0.0364
α
0.8190
(0.0008) (0.0018) (0.0025)
(0.0059)
λ1k
0.0036 0.0201 0.0215
b
6.4576
(0.0003) (0.0016) (0.0001)
(0.4996)
δk
0.0110 0.0474 0.0547
σε
0.3047
(0.0015) (0.0036) (0.0040)
(0.0015)
0
0.0110 0.0173 0.0392
π
0.5751
δk
(0.0015) (0.0024) (0.0047)
(0.0269)
00
δk
0.0110 0.0130 0.0369
z
1.6463
(0.0015) (0.0021) (0.0041)
(0.1661)
βk1
0.7203 0.5898 1.0000†
χ
0.2605
(0.0932) (0.0507)
(0.0443)
βk2
1.5213 1.3469 1.0000†
(0.1461) (0.0870)
µk
0.2333 1.3568 0.0000†
(0.2922) (0.1964)
σk
0.2827 0.2141 0.2612
(0.0225) (0.0112) (0.0114)
Loglikelihood value: -10694.68
Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses
† normalized values
Parameter
λ0k

50

Table 2.10: Predicted Probability of Transitions from Jobs per Quarter

Probability of making a
job-to-job transition
Probability of making an
occupation change
Probability of making a
job-to-unemployment transition

1-10Q 11-20Q
0.042
0.036
(0.063) (0.044)
0.019
0.016
(0.026) (0.021)
0.046
0.041
(0.053) (0.042)

21-40Q
0.029
(0.043)
0.012
(0.015)
0.024
(0.022)

41-60Q
0.023
(0.031)
0.007
(0.011)
0.019
(0.017)

Figure 2.5: Observed and Predicted Occupational Choice – Augmented Model

to better match the outflow from occupation 3 to occupation 2 as well as the inflows to
occupation 3 from the other occupations.
These improvements also produce a better fit to the proportions of workers working
in the three occupations, as shown in Figure 2.5. The baseline model’s large mismatches
between the observed and predicted proportions of workers in occupations 2 and 3 are narrowed. The predicted fraction of workers unemployed follows the observed values closely.
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Table 2.11: Predicted Quarterly Occupational Transition Matrices
Occupation
Origin

Period
1-10Q

Unemployed

11-20Q

(UE)

21-40Q
41-60Q
1-10Q

Occupation 1

11-20Q

(Occ 1)

21-40Q
41-60Q
1-10Q

Occupation 2

11-20Q

(Occ 2)

21-40Q
41-60Q
1-10Q

Occupation 3

11-20Q

(Occ 3)

21-40Q
41-60Q

UE
0.757
(0.721)
0.770
(0.685)
0.773
(0.689)
0.764
(0.716)
0.023
(0.015)
0.012
(0.019)
0.010
(0.011)
0.011
(0.014)
0.055
(0.051)
0.047
(0.045)
0.019
(0.021)
0.013
(0.014)
0.063
(0.068)
0.051
(0.050)
0.044
(0.032)
0.037
(0.022)

Destination
Occ 1
Occ 2
0.029
0.095
(0.023) (0.107)
0.032
0.092
(0.040) (0.124)
0.029
0.087
(0.043) (0.110)
0.023
0.086
(0.040) (0.138)
0.961
0.008
(0.969) (0.008)
0.973
0.012
(0.967) (0.012)
0.975
0.012
(0.973) (0.010)
0.981
0.007
(0.976) (0.005)
0.007
0.932
(0.006) (0.925)
0.006
0.945
(0.007) (0.938)
0.006
0.973
(0.005) (0.969)
0.004
0.982
(0.003) (0.977)
0.004
0.040
(0.007) (0.023)
0.006
0.022
(0.006) (0.020)
0.004
0.013
(0.005) (0.015)
0.002
0.007
(0.006) (0.009)

Occ 3
0.118
(0.145)
0.105
(0.144)
0.112
(0.146)
0.127
(0.098)
0.007
(0.008)
0.003
(0.006)
0.002
(0.004)
0.002
(0.006)
0.006
(0.017)
0.003
(0.008)
0.002
(0.006)
0.001
(0.005)
0.893
(0.901)
0.922
(0.922)
0.939
(0.950)
0.954
(0.965)
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Figure 2.6: Predicted Occupational Choice by Diiferent Utility Type

Figure 2.6 presents the distributions of occupational affiliation of type A and type B
workers at given potential experience levels. Naturally, occupation 3 is a dominant choice
among type B workers because it gives them the large non-pecuniary utility. More than
70% of this group are employed in occupation 3 within 20 quarters of their labour market
entry. Because occupation 3 presents the highest unemployment risk, this group has a
higher unemployment rate than the other group.
Figure 2.7 shows predicted earnings profiles from the augmented model. The fit appears
good overall, but still is not able to produce a concave profile.
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Figure 2.7: Predicted Log Wage

2.6

The Effect of Learning on Job Search Effort Decisions
and Occupational Affiliation Outcomes

With the estimated augmented model fitting the data reasonably well, I utilize these estimates and perform several simulation exercises to examine how learning influences workers’ job search decisions and occupational transition outcomes. I start with analyzing the
effect of learning on workers’ job search effort decisions, followed by an analysis of the
effect of learning on their occupational transitions. With job search frictions playing a role
in workers’ transitions, changes in job search effort decisions induced by learning do not
necessarily translate into comparable changes in occupational transition outcomes. Thus,
how the estimated job search frictions affect learning and its impact on transition outcomes
are also examined.
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Figure 2.8: Joint Probability Density of θ1 and θ2

2.6.1

The Effect of Learning on Job Search Effort Decisions

Before describing how learning affects workers, I first present the initial state of workers’
beliefs implied by the parameter estimates. The model envisions an environment where
workers, initially uncertain about their skill acquisition probabilities, form their beliefs
from the population distributions of these probabilities. Figure 2.8 plots the joint probability density of θ1 and θ2 among workers. Since the average value of θ1 among workers is
around 0.18, workers initially believe that the likelihood that their skill 1 levels will increase
is not particularly high. In truth, the high positive skew of the distribution with respect to
θ1 means that a majority of workers’ skill 1 acquisition probabilities are even lower than
the mean of their prior beliefs. Moreover, since the distribution of skill acquisition probabilities is more spread out over θ1 than θ2 , the initial beliefs provides more uncertainty for
θ1 than θ2 .
This initial belief distribution forms a basis for workers’ job search decisions at labour
market entry, and workers decide how much effort to exert in searching in different occupations. Table 2.12 presents the proportions of search effort exerted to the three occupations
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Table 2.12: Predicted Job Search Effort Allocations and Distributions of Job Offered in the
2nd Quarter
Search effort allocation
Current Occupation Occ 1 Occ 2 Occ3
Unemployed
0.280 0.417 0.303
Occupation 1
1.000 0.000 0.000
Occupation 2
0.755 0.240 0.005
Occupation 3
0.349 0.563 0.088
0 0
For workers with (s1 , s2 ) = (5.34, 2.69).
by workers a quarter after their labour market entry.28 Search effort is spread out among
the three occupations while workers are unemployed, with approximately two fifths of their
effort allocated to occupation 2, and the rest almost evenly divided for occupations 1 and
3. Only a small fraction of job search effort is allocated to occupation 3 once the workers
leave unemployment.29 In occupations 1 and 2, effort is primarily devoted to occupation 1
and hardly to occupation 3. While working in occupation 3, approximately 60 percent of
job search effort is devoted to find employment in occupation 2, 30 percent to occupation
1, and 10 percent to occupation 3.
Next, I examine how new information alters workers’ job search effort allocations. Table 2.13 shows how the fraction of job search effort allocated to each occupation changes
after one quarter of employment in occupation 3.30 For example, the row labeled “No signal” refers to the case where workers encounter no skill acquisition opportunity, and the
next row, labeled “Signal for skill 1, success,” corresponds to the case where workers enThroughout this section, I focus on a group of type A workers with initial skill levels of (s1 , s2 ) =
(5.34, 2.69), which accounts for the largest fraction of workers in terms of initial conditions. The results for
the other types of workers are given in Appendix C. General conclusions presented in this section hold for
the other initial skill level configurations.
29
The predicted values for employed workers assume that their employer-specific wage components are at
the 25th percentile of the estimated distribution.
30
Predicted changes in job search effort in occupation 2 are in general similar to those predicted for occupation 3. In contrast, effort allocations exerted in occupation 1 remain highly concentrated on occupation 1
after any possible learning outcomes in quarter 2.
28

56

Table 2.13: Predicted Changes in Job Search Effort Allocations and Distribution of Offered
Jobs in the 3rd Quarter
Skill dynamics scenario in t = 2
No signal
Signal for skill 1, success
Signal for skill 1, failure
Signal for skill 2, success
Signal for skill 2, failure

Change in Search effort allocation
Occupation 3
Unemployed
Occ 1
Occ 2
Occ 3
Occ 1
Occ 2
Occ 3
−0.004
0.005
0.000 −0.002
0.002
0.000
0.150 −0.128 −0.021
0.129 −0.064 −0.064
−0.047
0.042
0.005 −0.032
0.017
0.015
−0.015
0.017 −0.002 −0.005
0.007 −0.002
0.002 −0.003
0.001
0.006 −0.008
0.002

counter a skill 1 acquisition opportunity and their skill 1 levels have increased. The three
columns under the label “Occupation 3” present the search effort allocations exerted by
workers if they stay employed in occupation 3, while the three rightmost columns report
predicted search effort allocations searching for a job while unemployed.
While no new information resulting in negligible changes in search effort allocations
from the previous period is expected, new signals about skill 2 acquisition probabilities
also produce only small changes. In contrast, a large change in search effort allocation
is predicted in response to an increase in the skill 1 level, with workers reallocating their
effort toward occupation 1, as well as a moderate change in job search effort away from
occupation 1 if a skill acquisition opportunity for skill 1 fails to produce an increase. These
heterogeneous responses stem from the shapes of the initial belief distributions. The workers’ initial beliefs indicate that the odds of skill 1 acquisition is low. Therefore, an increase
in the skill 1 level acts as a signal dramatically updating their beliefs. The initial belief distribution for θ2 is symmetric, with the density highly concentrated around the mean. New
information about θ2 does not substantially alter their beliefs, and therefore generates only
a small response.
Having examined the effect of a single signal, I now turn to how workers change their
job search behaviour as learning progresses over time. To this end, I simulate a 10 year
spell of labour market transitions since labour market entry for a large number of workers,
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Figure 2.9: Predicted Search Effort Allocations in the 41st Quarter

and predict how the progress of learning during this period alters their job search effort
allocations. Figure 2.9 presents the predicted fraction of job search effort that workers with
given skill acquisition probabilities allocate to each of the three occupations in the 41st
quarter if they are unemployed.
This simulation exercise shows that 10 years of labour market experience can change
their job search behaviour sizeably. Workers with high skill 1 acquisition probabilities are
predicted to allocate nearly half of their job search effort toward occupation 1 as opposed
to the nearly one third they allocated at their labour market entry. Workers with low skill
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1 acquisition probabilities change their effort allocation in the opposite direction, putting
more than half of their effort to search for a job in occupation 2.
Figure 2.9 also shows that there is a weaker pattern between job search effort allocations
and θ2 , such that skill 2 acquisition probabilities affect their job search effort decisions less
than θ1 . This also reflects the earlier result that a signal about θ2 has a much smaller effect
on job search effort allocations than a signal about θ1 . In sum, the analysis indicates that
learning about θ1 affects workers far more than learning about θ2 , and learning largely
affects the allocation of job search effort between occupations 1 and 2, with the fraction of
effort allocated to occupation 3 largely unaffected.

2.6.2

The Effect of Learning on Transition Outcomes

Due to search frictions, job search effort is only a part of the equation determining occupational transition outcomes of workers. How learning affects the latter therefore needs
to be examined separately. To this end, I first simulate labour market transitions for a
large number of workers whose true acquisition probabilities are drawn from the population distributions of θ1 and θ2 , and predict their occupational affiliation distribution after 10
years of (potential) experience for this simulated sample. Then, I compare the result with
a counterfactual occupational affiliation distribution for the same period simulated under a
scenario where learning is shut down. Specifically, I consider a scenario where workers do
not update their initial belief distributions of θ1 and θ2 despite receiving new information,
thus holding on to their initial beliefs.
Table 2.14 presents the simulated distributions of employed workers in the three occupations under the two scenarios with and without learning, respectively. Comparing these
two distributions shows that learning increases the likelihood of working in occupation 2,
with this difference offset by a comparable decrease in the proportion of employed workers
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Table 2.14: Predited Occupational Choice Distributions in the 41st Period
Occupation 1
With learning
0.277
Without learning
0.306
Difference
−0.029

Occupation 2
0.624
0.598
0.026

Occupation 3
0.099
0.096
0.003

in occupation 1. However, the differences between the two distributions are small even if a
10 year period of labour market experience is considered.
This small difference is partly due to the composition of workers with different skill
acquisition probabilities in the simulated sample. With workers of different skill acquisition
probabilities affected by the learning process differently, their changes can offset each other
to some degree. Indeed, it is more illumining to analyze the effect at a more disaggregated
level.
Therefore, I simulate occupational affiliation distributions for samples of workers with
the same skill acquisition probabilities, and present the results in Figure 2.10. The three
surface graphs on the left-hand side of the figure show that the fractions of workers working
in given occupations in the 41st quarter since their labour market entry under the counterfactual no-learning scenario. All the graphs are flat, indicating that without learning, the
occupational affiliation distribution vary little with skill acquisition probabilities.
The three graphs on the right-hand side of Figure 2.10 present the simulated occupational affiliation distribution in the 41st quarter with learning. Following the way learning influences workers’ job search effort decisions presented in Figure 2.9, the proportion
working in occupation 1 increases with θ1 , and this change is largely offset by a fall in
the proportion working in occupation 2. There is a weaker pattern between occupational
choice and θ2 .
Figure 2.9 showed that workers with high θ1 learn to focus their job search effort on
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Figure 2.10: Predicted Occupational Affiliations in the 41st Quarter
No Learning

With Learning
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occupation 1. However, such effort faces high search frictions associated with this occupation, and as a result, their occupational affiliation outcomes do not match their job search
effort. Around two fifth of them are employed in occupation 1, with a majority of them
are in occupation 2 instead. Because of search frictions, their occupational affiliation outcomes do not reflect the extent of the changes in job search effort allocations. In contrast,
the search frictions are less of a concern for workers with low θ1 , because they direct their
job search effort away from occupation 1 toward occupation 2 as learning progresses. They
indeed attain occupational affiliation where more than three fifths of them are employed
in occupation 2. The search frictions associated with occupation 2 are substantially lower
than those associated with occupation 1, and job search effort to find work in occupation 2
is more likely to be successful in generating transitions to this occupation.
Not only does the low likelihood of finding a job in occupation 1 substantially affect
occupational transitions of workers with high skill 1 acquisition probabilities, it also influences learning in a different way. Specifically, it slows down workers’ learning about θ1
because the likelihood of receiving a signal about θ1 is the highest in occupation 1. This
effect can be seen by simulating labour market transitions where the arrival of signal is
made more frequent. For example, I consider an environment where signals for both θ1
and θ2 arrive every period when workers are employed in any occupation so that the difficulty to find work in occupation 1 does not hinder the learning process. Under this faster
learning process, I simulate the occupational affiliation distributions in the 41st quarter,
and compare them with the counterfactual distribution without learning. These distributions are presented in Figure 2.11. Comparing the distributions presented in Figure 2.11
with those in Figure 2.10 shows that the faster learning process makes larger differences in
the workers’ labour market outcomes. With the faster learning process, workers whose θ1
are at either end of the skill 1 acquisition probability distribution attain more transitions to
the occupations targeted by their job search effort. With more signals, the learning process
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Figure 2.11: Predicted Occupational Affiliations in the 41st Quarter with the Faster Learning Process
No Learning

With Learning
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accelerates changes in workers’ job search effort decisions, which in turn generates larger
differences in occupational transitions outcomes.

2.7

Concluding Remarks

This chapter develops and estimates a dynamic model in which skill acquisition, learning,
and job search frictions influence workers’ mobility decisions, and uses the estimates to
measure the extent to which learning behaviour affects the workers’ job search behaviour
and transitions. The model is estimated using a sample of white male high school graduates
in the U.S. The estimated parameters show large differences among occupations in search
frictions, and skill acquisition and learning opportunities. Occupation 3, which mainly consists of low skill jobs and accounts for the largest share of the workers’ employment immediately after their labour market entry, is associated with the least search frictions of the
three occupations, but provides workers with the least favourable opportunities for human
capital growth. The other two occupations, representing skilled white-collar and blue-collar
occupations, provide favourable skill acquisition and learning environment. However, transition to the white-collar occupation is infrequent because of high search frictions.
Simulation exercises show that while workers initially spread out their job search effort across occupations, learning about the white-collar related skill acquisition can have a
sizeable effect on their job search effort over time. A signal regarding the blue-collar skill,
however, has a very small effect on workers’ job search effort choice.
Because of job search frictions, changes in job search effort due to learning do not result in a comparable effect in occupational transition outcomes. Moreover, the high search
frictions associated with the white-collar occupation slow down learning by limiting opportunities to acquire signals about the white-collar skill acquisition. This diminishes the
effect of learning on workers’ early labour market outcomes.
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Chapter 3
Motherhood, Part-time Work, and Skill
Dynamics of British Women
3.1

Introduction

Generally, women take primary responsibility for childcare. Among different alternatives
used to meet this responsibility, part-time employment is frequently chosen by mothers in
many countries, which some argue enables them to balance their work and family lives.
The popularity of part-time employment among mothers is widely documented in Britain.
While most women in Britain start their career with full-time work, many of them make
transitions to nonemployment or part-time employment upon the arrival of a child.1 These
transitions are, however, unlikely to be reversed later in their working lives with part-time
work becoming prevalent after the birth of their children. Such moves are common even
with the large wage differentials between full-time and part-time work widely reported in
1

Percentage of women with no children who work full-time was 84.9 in study using BHPS by Paull
(2008). Using the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) between 1991 and 2004, Paull (2008) found that
43% of women who worked full-time before the birth of their first child switched to part-time jobs, while
about 30% of them continued to work full-time.
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the literature.2
With fewer hours worked and a lower wage rate, a substantial earnings loss is likely
to follow when individuals transition from full-time to part-time employment. Thus, there
appears to be a potent disincentive against part-time work, especially for mothers who need
to arrange paid childcare. Therefore, the part-time wage penalty and prevalence of parttime work are difficult observations to explain simultaneously in standard labour supply
models based on leisure-income trade-off. One view consistent with these two observations
is to assume that motherhood induces a permanent preference shock changing workers’
income-leisure tradeoff in favour of leisure. While plausible, this view has the limitation
that the change should favour non-participation over part-time work.
An alternative explanation for the pervasive part-time employment among mothers is
skill dynamics during career interruptions. First, the reason to remain attached to the labour
market even when their family concerns are important may reflect their desire not to let their
human capital atrophy and to maintain their earning capacities. Second, though it is customary to associate a spell of nonemployment with human capital depreciation, such risk
may also be present even while workers are employed. Research has provided evidence
that the pay gap between full-time and part-time work is attributable to the occupational
segregation between them.3 As a result, when workers switch to part-time work, they may
end up accepting positions that do not require the skills used in their previous employment.4 Mismatch of worker’s skill and chosen occupation might lead to skill depreciation,
causing workers difficulties in returning to the previous occupation later. When limited to
job opportunities in less skilled occupations and therefore lower earnings potential, they
may find it optimal to stay in part-time employment given their leisure-income tradeoff.
2

Manning and Petrongolo (2008), for example, reports that the average hourly earnings of women working
part-time was 26% below women working full-time in 2001.
3
See, for example, Connolly and Gregory (2008); Manning and Petrongolo (2008); Hirsh (2005).
4
Connolly and Gregory (2008) found that 40% of the women who changed employers to reduce their
work hours experienced the occupational downgrading.
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The extent to which skill depreciation may account for the persistent part-time employment among mothers hinges on whether they voluntarily make such moves in the first
place despite the adverse effect on their lifetime earnings potentials. Naturally, the answer
is likely to depend on the benefits and costs of such moves over their lifetimes, which
are not only determined by the process of skill dynamics, but also by a variety of factors such as the wage structure, workers’ income-leisure tradeoff and expectations of the
lengths of childcare responsibilities and their labour market opportunities afterward. This
paper develops a dynamic model of employment transitions between full-time, part-time
and non-participation incorporating these aspects in order to capture the potential role of
skill depreciation in British mothers’ employment pattern.
The model is based on the search-matching model of the labour market in Albrecht and
Vroman (2002). Their model incorporates differences in skill levels among workers and
skill requirements among jobs. Due to these differences, the workers can only be matched
with jobs for which they are qualified. Specifically, in the model, high-skilled and lowskilled workers, and employers looking to fill high-skill or low-skill job vacancies search
for the other party to form a productive match. The high skilled workers can meet the skill
requirements of both jobs, while the low-skilled workers can only satisfy the low-skill jobs’
skill requirement. The current paper extends this modelling framework by adding hours of
work as another job characteristic, and lets workers search for jobs in terms of hours of
work as well as skill requirement. Search frictions are used in this paper to account for the
scarcity of part-time jobs in the high-skill occupation. Because of the frictions, part-time
job offers are expected to be predominantly low-skill jobs.
In addition, I add to the worker’s problem two more dynamic aspects. The first comes
from changes in family circumstances due to the arrival of a child, which changes the pecuniary returns from work in the labour market and potentially changes workers’ preferred
hours of work. The second is a skill depreciation process, which changes workers’ abil-

70
ity to meet the skill requirements of different jobs. While family concerns are assumed
to change exogenously, skill dynamics depend on workers’ employment decisions, giving
them a certain control over their skill levels.
After formulating the workers’ problem and describing their transition behaviour, a series of numerical examples of the model are given to present model predictions under different parameter configurations. The goal of this exercise is twofold. First, using numerical
examples, I illustrate the general properties of the workers’ problem. Second, I examine
whether the model can capture the stylized facts of the observed life-cycle employment
transition patterns of British mothers. For this, the model needs to produce a prediction
that workers are willing to downgrade their occupations in order to switch from full-time
work to part-time work when childcare needs arise, and then prefer to stay employed part
time should skill depreciation prevent them from reversing their occupational changes. The
exercise finds a set of reasonable parameter values that produces this result.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I present the model.
In Section 3.3, I examine the problem of individual workers. In Section 3.4, I present the
numerical illustration of the model. Concluding remarks follow.

3.2

Model

In the model, time is discrete, and all exogenous events occur at constant arrival probabilities. There are two occupations in the economy: a high-skill occupation and a low-skill occupation. Jobs are available for both occupations on a full-time and a part-time basis. Thus,
four types of jobs can be offered to workers: high-skill full-time (HF), high-skill part-time
(HP), low-skill full-time (LF), and low-skill part-time job (LP). Each period workers are
employed, each job type, respectively, pays them the following amount: yHF , yHP , yLF , and
yLP . I assume yHF > yHP , yLF > yLP , and yHF > yLF . The amount of hours required by
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full-time and part-time jobs are denoted by hFT and hPT , where hFT > hPT , respectively.
Workers are heterogeneous with respect to their valuation of leisure. I treat a worker’s
valuation of leisure as her type. The type is represented by a real number θ, and the valuation of leisure relative to income is assumed to be increasing in θ. Each worker has a time
endowment of H in each period, and divides it between market work and leisure. Given the
types of jobs that can be offered to workers, choices of time allocation are limited to the
following: full-time work (hFT ), part-time work (hPT ), and nonemployment (hNE ≡ 0).
Workers also differ in skill endowments. They have either low-skill (sL ) or high-skill
(sH ). While high-skilled workers are able to work in both high-skill and low-skill occupations, low-skilled workers cannot perform high-skill jobs, and thus can only be employed in
the low-skill occupation. However, skills are not permanent characteristics. High-skilled
workers may become low-skilled workers if they are not working in the high-skill occupation. This occurs to workers with probability γNE if they are not employed, or with
probability γLS if they are working in the low-skill occupation. It is a plausible assumption
that the market-relevant skills are more easily maintained if workers are working in the
labour market. To incorporate this idea, I assume that γNE ≥ γLS .
Workers can experience three different life stages. In the first life stage, all workers
enter the labour market and start searching for jobs as nonemployed workers. This life
stage continues until the arrival of a child, which occurs as an exogenous random event
with probability η1 , and workers enter the next life stage, life stage 2. In life stage 2,
workers need to arrange for childcare. Two options are available to meet this need. First,
they can look after their child by themselves by choosing to be nonemployed. Alternatively,
they can procure child care service. The flow cost of the service is τ if she works full time,
or ψ τ if she works part time, where ψ ∈ (0, 1).
In any period in life stage 2, they transition to life stage 3 with probability η2 . Life
stage 3 represents time when the child has grown and childcare is no longer required. The
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environment surrounding workers in life stage 3 is similar to that in life stage 1 except that
workers do not expect any more life stage changes. In any given time, workers may exit
from the labour market permanently with probability ξ regardless of life stage.
The objective of workers is to maximize their discounted lifetime utility. Assume that
workers have a time-discount rate of r, and their flow utility from job type e ∈ {HF, HP, LF, LP}
in a period in life stage t is given by period-by-period utility function ue (t, θ), which is defined by



ε



yey + IFT (e)[θ(H − hFT )ε` ] + IPT (e)[θ(H − hPT )ε` ]







ue (t, θ) = 
IFT (e)[(ye − τ)εy + θ(H − hFT )ε` ]










 +IPT (e)[(ye − ψτ)εy + θ(H − hPT )ε` ]

if t = 1, 3

if t = 2

where IFT (e), and IPT (e) are the indicator functions defined by the following:







1
IFT (e) = 





0







if e ∈ {HF, LF}

1
, IPT (e) = 





otherwise
0

if

e ∈ {HP, LP}

.

otherwise

Assume that search frictions exist in the labour market, and workers meet with potential employers through a random search technology. Assume that job search is a costless
activity and a worker searches for a job every period regardless of her employment status.
Job offer arrival probabilities are given by λ0 while the workers are not employed, and λ1
while they are employed. The fraction of job offers accounted for by job type e is given by
φe for e ∈ {HF, HP, LF, LP}.
Match separations between workers and jobs occur for both exogenous and endogenous
reasons. On the one hand, exogenous job separation occurs at the rate δ. On the other hand,
a worker can voluntarily quit her current job at any time without cost.
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Assume that no employer agrees to change hours of work. Because of this, if a worker
wishes to change her hours of work, she has to search for a job that meets her preferred
hours.

3.3

Individual Worker’s Problem

As is standard in labour search models, an individual worker’s problem can be written
using a stochastic dynamic programming framework. Workers carry three state variables:
e (employment state), s (skill level), and t (life stage). Partitioning the state space according
to the values of s and t yields the following six sets:
S (sH , 1) ≡ {(e, sH , 1)| e ∈ {NE, HF, HP, LF, LP}} ,
S (sH , 2) ≡ {(e, sH , 2)| e ∈ {NE, HF, HP, LF, LP}} ,
S (sH , 3) ≡ {(e, sH , 3)| e ∈ {NE, HF, HP, LF, LP}} ,
S (sL , 1) ≡ {(e, sL , 1)| e ∈ {NE, LF, LP}} ,
S (sL , 2) ≡ {(e, sL , 2)| e ∈ {NE, LF, LP}} ,

and

S (sL , 3) ≡ {(e, sL , 3)| e ∈ {NE, LF, LP}} .
S (s, t) contains all states which workers with skill level s can occupy in life stage t. The
last three sets reflect the assumption that low-skilled workers cannot be employed in the
high-skill occupation.
The state vector can move either within a set, or between sets. Moves within the set
reflect only a change of employment state, and are made either by endogenous employment
transitions or exogenous job separations. Transitions across the sets are driven either by life
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stage changes, or by skill depreciation. These transitions may also lead workers to choose
to move to the nonemployment state.
First, consider the low-skilled workers’ problem. Let Ve (s, t; θ) denote the value of state
(e, s, t) to type θ workers. The value of nonemployment in life stage 3 to the low-skilled
workers, VNE (sL , 3; θ), is given by
VNE (sL , 3; θ) =

X


1 h
uNE (3, θ) +
λ0 φ j max V j (sL , 3; θ), VNE (sL , 3; θ)
1+r
j∈{LF,LP}
i
+ ξV̄ + (1 − λ0 φLF − λ0 φLP − ξ)VNE (sL , 3; θ) ,

(3.1)

Equation (3.1) shows that the value of the state comprises the period-by-period utility and
option value associated with the state. Every period workers are nonemployed, they gain
the utility flow corresponding to nonemployment. They meet with job vacancies with probability λ0 , are offered a low-skill full-time job with probability φLF or a low-skill part-time
job with probability φLP , and decide whether to accept the offer. With probability ξ, they
exit from the labour market permanently. If no event occurs, workers keep their current
positions. With loss of generality, assume V̄ = 0. Then equation (3.1) can be rearranged to
(r + ξ)VNE (sL , 3; θ) = uNE (3; θ) +

X



λ0 φ j max V j (sL , 3; θ) − VNE (sL , 3; θ), 0 . (3.2)

j∈{LF,LP}

Similarly, the value of being employed either full-time or part-time for low-skilled
workers in life stage 3 is given by
(r + ξ)Ve (sL , 3; θ) =ue (3; θ) +

X



λ1 φ j max V j (sL , 3; θ) − Ve (sL , 3; θ), 0

j∈{LF,LP}

(3.3)



+ δ VNE (sL , 3; θ) − Ve (sL , 3; θ)
for e ∈ {LF, LP}. Equation (3.3) has the same interpretation as equation (3.2) except that
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the job offer arrival probability is given by λ1 , and the possibility of an exogenous job
separation with probability δ is included.
For the earlier life stages, i.e., t = 1, 2, the value to low-skilled workers is given by
(r + ξ)VNE (sL , t; θ) =uNE (t; θ) +

X



λ0 φ j max V j (sL , t; θ) − VNE (sL , t; θ), 0

j∈{LF,LP}

(3.4)



+ ηt VNE (sL , t + 1; θ) − VNE (sL , t; θ)
or
(r + ξ)Ve (sL , t; θ) =ue (t; θ) +

X



λ1 φ j max V j (sL , t; θ) − Ve (sL , t; θ), 0

j∈{LF,LP}



+ δ VNE (sL , t; θ) − Ve (sL , t; θ)

(3.5)




+ ηt max VNE (sL , t + 1; θ), Ve (sL , t + 1; θ) − Ve (sL , t; θ)
for e ∈ {LF, LP}. As in equations (3.2) and (3.3), equations (3.4) and (3.5) show that
the value for the workers consists of the current utility flow and the option value of the
employment state. However, in these life stages, a possible transition to the next life stage
also contributes to the option value. This is reflected in the last terms of both equations
(3.4) and (3.5). In life stage t, workers transition to life stage t + 1 with probability ηt . If
they are employed when a transition to the next life stage occurs, they decide whether to
quit the current job to be nonemployed.
Next, the high-skilled worker’s problem is considered. Their problem differs from the
low-skilled workers’ problem in two ways. First, the high-skilled workers can be matched
with high-skill jobs as well as low-skill jobs. Second, they face a risk of skill depreciation
when they are not employed in the high-skill occupation.
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The value of nonemployment to the high-skilled workers in life stage 3 is given by
(r + ξ)VNE (sH , 3; θ) =uNE (3; θ) +

X



λ0 φ j max V j (sH , 3; θ) − VNE (sH , 3; θ), 0

j∈{HF,HP,
LF,LP}

+ γNE



(3.6)


VNE (sL , 3; θ) − VNE (sH , 3; θ) .

The second term of the equation’s right-hand side reflects the workers’ job search. With
probability λ0 , they receive a job offer, and with probability φ j , they are given a chance to
work in employment state j. The last term on the equation’s right-hand side reflects the
contribution of skill destruction to the value of the nonemployment state. With probability
γNE , a worker’s skill depreciates and the skill level changes to sL .
Similarly, the value of working in the low-skill occupations in life stage 3 is given by
(r + ξ)Ve (sH , 3; θ) =ue (3; θ) +

X



λ1 φ j max V j (sH , 3; θ) − Ve (sH , 3; θ), 0

j∈{HF,HP,
LF,LP}



+ δ VNE (sL , 3; θ) − Ve (sH , 3; θ)

(3.7)




+ γLS max VNE (sL , 3; θ), Ve (sL , 3; θ) − Ve (sH , 3; θ)
for e ∈ {LF, LP}. On the right-hand side of equation (3.7), the second term accounts for
job search, the third term accounts for exogenous job separation, and the last term accounts
for skill destruction. Skill destruction may induce workers to leave their current jobs if the
value associated with the current job becomes lower than the value of nonemployment.
The workers do not face a risk of skill destruction while working in the high-skill occupation. Therefore, the option value associated with the high-skill jobs in life stage 3 consists
of just a possible job-to-job transition and an exogenous job separation. For e ∈ {HF, HP},
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Ve (sH , 3; θ) is given by
X

(r + ξ)Ve (sH , 3; θ) =ue (3, θ) +



λ1 φ j max V j (sH , 3; θ) − Ve (sH , 3; θ), 0

j∈{HF,HP,
LF,LP}

(3.8)



+ δ VNE (sH , 3; θ) − Ve (sH , 3; θ) .
For life stages t = 1, 2, the high-skilled workers take into account a transition to the
next life stage, which occurs with probability ηt . The value functions also account for
skill destruction that workers may experience when they are not working in the high-skill
occupation. The value of nonemployment to the high-skilled workers in these life stages,
VNE (sH , t; θ), is given by
(r + ξ)VNE (sH , t; θ) = uNE (t; θ) +

X



λ0 φ j max V j (sH , t; θ) − VNE (sH , t; θ), 0

j∈{HF,HP,
LF,LP}



+ ηt VNE (sH , t + 1; θ) − VNE (sH , t; θ)

(3.9)



+ γNE VNE (sL , t; θ) − VNE (sH , t; θ) .
For each job type e ∈ {LF, LP, HF, HP}, Ve (sH , t; θ) is given by
(r + ξ)Ve (sH , t; θ) = ue (t; θ) +

X



λ1 φ j max V j (sH , t; θ) − Ve (sH , t; θ), 0

j∈{HF,HP,
LF,LP}



+ δ VNE (sH , t; θ) − Ve (sH , t; θ)

(3.10)




+ ηt max VNE (sH , t + 1; θ), Ve (sH , t + 1; θ) − Ve (sH , t; θ)



+ ILS (e)γLS max VNE (sL , t; θ), Ve (sL , t; θ) − Ve (sH , t; θ)
where I(e) is an indicator function taking 1 if e ∈ {LF, LS } and 0 otherwise. The last term on
the right-hand side of this equation captures the effect of skill destruction that may occur to
high-skilled workers working in the low-skill occupation, and this term is irrelevant when
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they are working in the high-skill occupation.
In the remainder of this section, the workers’ decision rules are discussed. Since the
transitions of s and t are exogenous to workers, the workers’ decision rules govern transition
between the employment states given their skill levels and life stages. Given skill level s and
life stage t, their decision rules are determined by how they rank the values of Ve (s, t; θ) over
S (s, t). Within S (s, t), workers always transition to states that rank higher than their current
state when they encounter such an opportunity, or remain in the present state otherwise.
Generally, low-skill employment is never preferred to high-skill employment with the
same hours of work, as low-skill employment yields a lower earnings flow than high-skill
employment and the likelihood of the arrival of an exogenous event is independent of hours
worked. However, it is possible that low-skill full-time work is preferred to high-skill parttime work, depending on a worker’s valuation of leisure relative to income. Similarly,
low-skill part-time work may be preferred to high-skill full-time work by some workers.
There exists θ such that the values of two employment states with different hours of
work coincide with each other given a skill level and a life stage. Given s ∈ {sL , sH } and
t ∈ {1, 2, 3}, these cutoff values, denoted by θ je (s, t), are implicitly given by


V j s, t; θ je (s, t) = Ve s, t; θ je (s, t)
where j and e are a pair of employment states to be compared.5 These values indicate the
valuation of leisure of workers who are indifferent between the two relevant employment
states.
For both high-skilled and low-skilled workers, the cutoff values differ across the three
life stages for two reasons. First, the cutoff values relevant to life stage 2 differ from those
5

For low-skilled workers, all the possible paris for ( j, e) are (LF, LP), (LF, NE), and (LP, NE). In addition to them, there are five more pairs for high-skilled workers to consider: (LF, HP), (HF, NE), (HF, LP),
(HF, HP) and (HP, NE).
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pertaining to life stages 1 and 3 because the childcare costs reduce the pecuniary returns to
employment in life stage 2. Second, while the flow utility from work is the same in both life
stages 1 and 3, the cutoff values differ between these two life stages because of workers’
forward-looking decision-making behaviour. In life stage 1, workers expect a transition to
life stage 2, where they face different economic conditions. Anticipating this, they do not
make decisions solely based on the current environment, but also on that of the next life
stage. In contrast, such concern is absent in life stage 3 since there is no further life stage
changes.
These cutoff values divide the type space into several intervals such that within each of
the intervals, workers have a common ranking over the employment states. By the assumption that the value of leisure relative to income is increasing in θ, full-time employment
ranks higher in an interval containing low values of θ than in those intervals containing
high values of θ. Once θ is sufficiently high, workers effectively stay out of labour force by
not accepting any job offer.
Interestingly, with a difference in job offer arrival probability between nonemployment
and employment, deriving no value from leisure does not necessarily mean that nonemployment is ranked the lowest of all the possible employment states. If λ0 is larger than λ1 ,
there may be two distinct cutoff values equating nonemployment with a particular job type.
Then, workers with θ below the lower cutoff value and those with θ above the higher cutoff
value prefer nonemployment to this particular job, while the rest values the former below
the latter. This occurs because workers with sufficiently low valuation of leisure may reject
a job offer with a low pay, preferring to stay nonemployed since the likelihood of receiving
a job offer with a higher pay is higher while nonemployed.
Beyond these results, a complete analytical characterization of the workers’ problem
is difficult given the large number of parameters in the model, making it intractable to
describe their transition behaviour under all parameter configurations. Instead, I present a
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Table 3.1: Baseline Parameter Values
Hours

hFT
hPT
H
Pay
yLF
yHF
yLP
yHP
Childcare
τ
cost
ψ
Preference εy
ε`

1.00
0.55
1.25
1.00
1.20
0.55
0.66
0.25
0.55
0.7
0.7

η1
η2
ξ
Skill
γNE
depreciation γLS
Job search
λ0
λ1
δ
Offer
φLF
distribution φHF
φLP
φHP
Life cycle

0.0391
0.0083
0.0028
0.0333
0.0167
0.20
0.04
0.006
0.25
0.25
0.45
0.05

few numerical examples of the model in the next section.

3.4

Numerical Illustrations

This section presents numerical examples of the model. The goal of this exercise is twofold.
First, using numerical examples, I illustrate the general properties of the workers’ problem
described in the previous section. Second, I examine whether the model can capture the
stylized facts of mothers’ life-cycle employment transition patterns under reasonable parameter values.
Table 3.1 presents the baseline parameter values. The hours of full-time work and parttime work are set at hFT = 1 and hPT = 0.55, respectively, while the total time endowment
is set at H = 1.25. The baseline parameter values envision a 20% wage gap between the
high-skill and low-skill occupations, and the difference in earnings between full-time and
part-time jobs within the same occupation purely reflects the difference in hours worked.
Therefore, with the normalization of yLF = 1, I set yHF = 1.2, yHP = 0.66, and yLP = 0.55.
The childcare costs incurred to work full time are set at a quarter of the earnings of low-
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skill full-time work. Thus τ = 0.25. The parameter governing part-time child care cost, ψ,
is set at 0.55.
The parameters governing changes in life stage, skill destruction, and employment transitions are set as follows. The life-cycle parameters, η1 , η2 and ξ, are set at 0.0139, 0.0083,
and 0.0028, respectively.6 The skill destruction probabilities, γNE and γLS , are set to 0.0333
and 0.0167, respectively.7 The job offer arrival probabilities are set at λ0 = 0.2 while
nonemployed, and at λ1 = 0.04 while employed.8 The job destruction probability is set at
δ = 0.006.
The job offer parameters are set at values that reflect the scarcity of high-skill part-time
work in a simple way. Specifically, the fraction of high-skill part-time job offers among all
offers, φHP , is set at 0.05, while φLP is set at 0.45, and the rest, φHF and φLF , are both set at
0.25.
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 present the cutoff values θ je (s, t) defined in the previous section. In
each table, the second and third columns indicate the two employment states to be compared, and the remaining columns list the cutoff values for given life stages under particular
parameter configurations.
The fourth column in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 presents the results under the baseline parameter values. There are two distinct cutoff values equating low-skill part-time work and
nonemployment for high-skilled workers in each life stage. The interval bounded by these
two values contains valuations of leisure that rank low-skill part-time work higher than
nonemployment. For any other value of θ, nonemployment is ranked higher than lot-skill
part-time work.
6

These parameter values imply that the first and second life stages are on average 72 and 120 periods
long, respectively, and the average time spent in the labour market is 360 periods. Using months as a time
unit, these numbers yield 6, 10 and 30 years.
7
With these parameters, the expected length of time before a high-skilled worker experience skill destruction is 2.5 years while nonemployed , and is 5 years while employed in the low-skill occupation.
8
These probabilities imply that on average, it takes 5 months to receive a job offer while non employed,
and 25 month while employed.
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The rest of the cutoff values indicate that θ below them ranks employment state in the
second column higher than the one in the third column, as the employment state listed in
the former is associated with less hours of leisure, and the valuation of leisure is increasing
in θ. For example, θLFHP (sH , 1) = 0.334 means that high-skilled workers with θ < 0.334
prefer the low-skill full-time work to high-skill part-time work in life stage 1, and those
with θ > 0.334 prefer the latter to the former.
Because of the differences in the cutoff values across different life stages, a transition to
the next life stage induces some workers to change their transition behaviour. For example,
low-skilled workers with θ = 0.7 prefer full-time work to part-time work in life stage 1, but
the opposite is true in life stage 2. Thus upon moving to life stage 2, low-skilled workers
with θ = 0.7 working full time wish to move to part-time work. The ranking between
low-skill full-time and part-time work is reversed again for these workers in life stage 3,
inducing them to move back to full-time work.
These cutoff values divide workers into several groups having a common ranking over
the different employment states. Table 3.4 shows how the ranking of the employment states
changes according to θ under the baseline parameter values. The table consists of six parts,
each of which shows how different levels of valuation of leisure are divided into several
intervals for a particular pair of skill level and life stage. For instance, the upper left part of
the table shows how high-skilled workers rank the employment states in life stage 1.9
The extent to which the model captures mothers’ occupational downgrading and moves
to persistent part-time employment in response to the arrival of a child hinges on the predicted employment transition patterns of high-skilled workers. Indeed, the middle left
panel of Table 3.4 shows that some high-skilled workers find it preferable to work in
low-skill part-time jobs over both nonemployment and full-time work in life stage 2 (θ ∈
Values considered for θ range from 0 to 1.917. High-skilled workers with θ greater than 1.917 prefer
nonemployment to any employment type in any life stage, effectively choosing to be labour market nonparticipants.
9
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Table 3.2: Cutoff Values - High-Skilled Workers
Life
Stage
1

Employment
States
LP
NE
LP
NE
LF
NE
HP
NE
HF
NE
LF
LP
HF
LP
LF
HP
HF
HP

Parameter Configuration
baseline γLS = 0.0139 ψ = 0.6 η2
0.715
0.653
0.722
1.630
1.636
1.632
0.913
0.937
0.911
1.917
1.917
1.917
1.327
1.326
1.331
0.841
0.839
0.844
1.218
1.214
1.221
0.334
0.360
0.342
0.922
0.922
0.931

2

LP
LP
LF
HP
HF
LF
HF
LF
HF

NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
LP
LP
HP
HP

0.856
1.311
0.697
1.746
1.177
0.734
1.150
0.234
0.864

0.767
1.319
0.727
1.746
1.177
0.735
1.147
0.261
0.864

0.927
1.282
0.703
1.730
1.187
0.757
1.167
0.257
0.884

0.860
1.314
0.700
1.754
1.180
0.737
1.153
0.238
0.867

3

LP
LP
LF
HP
HF
LF
HF
LF
HF

NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
LP
LP
HP
HP

0.781
1.601
0.892
1.917
1.309
0.855
1.229
0.390
0.971

0.723
1.609
0.916
1.917
1.309
0.855
1.227
0.415
0.971

0.781
1.601
0.892
1.917
1.309
0.855
1.229
0.390
0.971

0.781
1.601
0.892
1.917
1.309
0.855
1.229
0.390
0.971

= 0.0093
0.717
1.629
0.912
1.917
1.326
0.842
1.217
0.336
0.924

(1.150, 1.311)). Since these workers prefer high-skill full-time work to low-skill part-time
work in life stage 1, their predicted transitions between these two employment states are
reversed upon the arrival of a child. Thus the model predicts voluntary transitions from
high-skill full-time work to low-skill part-time work. Furthermore, these moves may have
a permanent effect on their transition behaviour because the low-skill employment carries
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Table 3.3: Cutoff Values - Low-Skilled Workers
Life
Stage
1

Employment
States
LF
NE
LF
LP
LP
NE

Parameter Configuration
baseline γLS = 0.0139 ψ = 0.6 η2
1.060
1.060
1.061
0.817
0.817
0.824
1.687
1.687
1.687

2

LF
LF
LP

NE
LP
NE

0.879
0.741
1.402

0.879
0.741
1.402

0.890
0.762
1.375

0.881
0.744
1.405

3

LF
LF
LP

NE
LP
NE

1.042
0.855
1.687

1.042
0.855
1.687

1.042
0.855
1.687

1.042
0.855
1.687

= 0.0093
1.060
0.818
1.687

the risk of skill depreciation. When skill destruction hits these workers and makes them
low-skilled, low-skill part-time work becomes their preferred employment option in the
remainder of their labour market careers.
These workers have moderately high values of leisure, and are sensitive to economic
incentives arising from both childcare needs and skill depreciation. A reduction in net
earnings due to the childcare costs has a large negative impact on their incentives to work.
Without a fear of skill depreciation, they would simply choose the nonemployment state in
response to the arrival of a child. However, they still hope to work full time in the highskill occupation when they no longer face childcare responsibilities, and nonemployment
presents the largest risk of skill depreciation. It is this trade-off that makes part-time employment attractive to these workers. Part-time work has an advantage over full-time work
in the provision of child care, and part-time work has an advantage in preserving skill over
nonemployment.
These results are specific to the baseline parameters. Next, I examine how θ je (s, t)
changes in response to changes in some of the parameters controlling key features of the
model: skill depreciation, childcare cost, and the length of childrearing period. First, I
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Table 3.4: Ranking of Value Function in the Benchmark Parameter Configuration

θ interval
t
1

2

3

s = sH

(0.000, 0.334)
(0.334, 0.715)
(0.715, 0.841)
(0.841, 0.913)
(0.913, 0.922)
(0.922, 1.218)
(1.218, 1.327)
(1.327, 1.630)
(1.630, 1.917)

Ranking
1 2 3 4 5
HF LF HP NE LP
HF HP LF NE LP
HF HP LF LP NE
HF HP LP LF NE
HF HP LP NE LF
HP HF LP NE LF
HP LP HF NE LF
HP LP NE HF LF
HP NE LP HF LF

(0.000, 0.234)
(0.234, 0.697)
(0.697, 0.734)
(0.734, 0.856)
(0.856, 0.864)
(0.864, 1.150)
(1.150, 1.177)
(1.177, 1.311)
(1.311, 1.746)
(1.746, 1.917)
(0.000, 0.390)
(0.390, 0.781)
(0.781, 0.855)
(0.855, 0.892)
(0.892, 0.971)
(0.971, 1.229)
(1.229, 1.309)
(1.309, 1.601)
(1.601, 1.917)

HF LF HP NE LP
HF HP LF NE LP
HF HP NE LF LP
HF HP NE LP LF
HF HP LP NE LF
HP HF LP NE LF
HP LP HF NE LF
HP LP NE HF LF
HP NE LP HF LF
NE HP LP HF LF
HF LF HP NE LP
HF HP LF NE LP
HF HP LF LP NE
HF HP LP LF NE
HF HP LP NE LF
HP HF LP NE LF
HP LP HF NE LF
HP LP NE HF LF
HP NE LP HF LF

s = sL
θ inverval
Ranking
1 2 3
(0.000, 0.817) LF LP NE
(0.817, 1.060) LP LF NE
(1.060, 1.687) LP NE LF
(1.687, 1.917) NE LP LF

(0.000, 0.741)
(0.741, 0.879)
(0.879, 1.402)
(1.402, 1.917)

LF LP NE
LP LF NE
LP NE LF
NE LP LF

(0.000, 0.855)
(0.855, 1.042)
(1.042, 1.687)
(1.687, 1.917)

LF LP NE
LP LF NE
LP NE LF
NE LP LF
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consider a case where the low-skill occupation presents a lower risk of skill depreciation
by decreasing γLS to 0.0139 from the baseline value of 0.0167. Even if workers choose to
experience occupational downgrading, they are likely to look for occupations that require
similar type of skills to perform similar lines of work. In this case, the risk of skill depreciation may be mitigated. The cutoff values for high-skilled workers under the new parameter
value configuration are presented in the fifth column in Table 3.2.10 The decrease in γLS
leads the cutoff values equating the high-skill occupation and the low-skill occupation to
decrease. It also expands the interval where low-skill part-time work is ranked higher than
nonemployment at each life stage, since the distance between the two relevant cutoff values increases. Overall, the change leads more high-skill workers to accept occupational
downgrading to switch part-time work in life stage 2 .
Second, the baseline parameter value of ψ = 0.55 implies that the childcare costs are
proportional to hours of work. However, there is evidence that the hourly price of childcare
increases at a decreasing rate in hours (Duncan et al., 2001). Thus, ψ is increased to 0.6 to
consider potential nonlinearity of the childcare cost. This change decreases the pecuniary
returns from part-time work in life stage 2, creating an effect of lowering the value of parttime employment relative to the other employment states. Comparing the cutoff values in
the fourth and sixth columns in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 reveals that the increase in the part-time
childcare costs narrows the range for θ where part-time employment ranks higher than fulltime employment or nonemployment, implying fewer transitions to part-time work with
more workers choosing to stay working full-time or leaving the labour market in life stage
2.
Lastly, η2 is increased to 0.0093 to consider a case where the expected duration of the
period requiring childcare is shortened, with the new parameter value implying that the
10

This change does not affect low-skilled workers’ problem since skill destruction does not affect their
problem.
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average length of life stage 2 is 108 periods instead of 120 periods. The seventh column
in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 shows that the cutoff values equating full-time work to the other employment states have increased in life stage 2, indicating that the increase in η2 raises the
value of full-time work relative to other employment states in this life stage. This change
stems from the workers’ forward-looking behaviour. Due to search frictions, workers cannot change their employment states immediately when a shock changes their economic
conditions, and if their current employment states differ from their optimal employment
states after the shock, they have to forgo values that could have been attained but for the
frictions. Therefore, there is value to occupying the employment state which will be optimal after a shock hits workers, and such value increases with the likelihood of the shock.
In this model, workers tend to prefer to work full time in life stage 3 so that the higher
likelihood of transitioning from life stage 2 to life stage 3 increases the value of full-time
work in life stage 2.
Overall, the baseline parameter values reasonably reflect the labour market environment
facing British women. First, using data from BHPS, Paull (2008) finds that the distribution
of hours worked by female workers in Britain has two peaks, located around 16-20 and 3640 hours per week, respectively. By treating them as typical hours of part-time and full-time
work, respectively, the ratio between them yields a similar value implied by the baseline
parameter values, i.e., h pt /h f t = 0.55. The 20% wage gap between the high-skill and lowskill occupations closely reflects the wage rate reduction associated with a common episode
of occupational downgrading experienced by British women, as presented in Connolly and
Gregory (2008). With τ set at 0.25, the childcare costs account for a quarter of earnings for
low-skilled workers, and approximately two-fifths for high-skilled workers. These values
are in line with the ratio between the average hourly payment of childcare and the average
hourly wage reported in Viitanen (2005).11
11

Using the British Family Resources Survey from 1997 and 2004, Viitanen (2005) calculated the average
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Second, the chosen values for the skill destruction parameters provide quantitatively
reasonable implications for the expected wage loss and the likelihood to return to the
high-skill occupation for high-skilled workers who experience occupational downgrading
or nonemployment. Consider a high-skilled worker who switches to low-skill part-time
work when she enters life stage 2, but prefers to go back to high-skill full-time work once
she leaves this life stage. The baseline parameter configuration implies that the probability
that she maintains her skill level during this life stage is 0.34.12 This value closely represents the probability of returning to her previous occupation. The value is in line with the
findings in Dex and Bukodi (2012) that only one third of the occupational downgrading experienced by British women changing from full-time work to part-time work was reversed
later in their careers.
The baseline value of γNE implies that the probability of skill depreciation resulting
from one year spell of nonemployment is 0.2870.13 With the 20% wage gap between the
high-skill and low-skill occupations, this probability implies that the expected wage loss
associated with one year of nonemployement for high-skilled workers is 5.9%, which is in
line with the findings in Mincer and Ofek (1982).
Third, the values for the parameters governing employment transitions are also reasonable. The baseline value of λ0 = 0.2 implies that the per-period probability of exiting from
nonemployment is 0.2 for high-skilled workers accepting any type of job offers, and 0.15
for low-skilled workers accepting any eligible job offers, implying that the average durahourly payment of childcare based on actual payments made to childcare workers or nurseries. Thus, the ratio
between this value and the hourly wage adequately represents the size of childcare costs relative to earnings.
Chevalier and Viitanen (2002) also calculated the average hourly payment to formal childcare in an analogous
manner for the time period between 1994 and 1998 from the same survey, obtaining a comparable value. The
figure was also comparable with the cost of a typical nursery placement reported in Daycare Trust (2001).
12
Recall that in the model, the childrearing period, i.e., life stage 2, ends with probability η2 in a given period, and skill depreciation occurs with probability γLS in any given period working in the low-skill occupation. These two processes are independent. Under these assumption that the probability that skill depreciation
occurs before the end of life stage 2 is given by γLS /(γLS + η2 ).
13
The value corresponds to 1 − (1 − γNE )12 .
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tions spent out of work for these two groups of workers are 5 and 6.7 months, respectively.
These values are close to the average unemployment duration of female workers based on
data from BHPS in Böheim and Taylor (2000). λ1 is set one fifth the job offer arrival probability while nonemployed. The same ratio between λ1 and λ0 is chosen by Mortensen
(1994). Moreover, λ1 /λ0 = 0.2 is in the range of the values estimated by Bowlus and Grogan (2009) using data from BHPS. The value of δ, the per-period job separation probability,
matches the corresponding estimates in Bowlus and Grogan.
Some limitation exists in the model, however. Recall that ε` and εy govern the degrees
of diminishing marginal utilities with respect to leisure and income, respectively. Not too
surprisingly, the model’s ability to produce transitions to part-time work involving occupational downgrading is somewhat sensitive to them. For example, with an increase in
ε` from 0.7 to 0.8, which reduces the degree of diminishing marginal utility with respect
to leisure, the model fails to find high-skilled workers preferring low-skill part-time work
to both high-skill full-time work and nonemployment in life stage 2, ruling out voluntary
occupational downgrading at the onset of life stage 2. This invalidates the model’s applicability to the observed transition patterns of British mothers.14
Modifying the job search process may be an interesting way to make the model more
robust. Increasing the efficiency of on-the-job search will increase the value of employment
relative to the value of nonemployment, switching some high-skills workers’ ranking in
favour of low-skill part-time work over nonemployment. Allowing endogenous search
effort may achieve this without contradicting the documented differences in job offer arrival
probabilities between nonemployment and employment. As shown in Christensen et al.
(2005), incorporating endogenous job search effort can explain these differences even with
a common search technology. Extending the current model in this dimension may be an
In contrast, lowering ε` or εy induces more concavity in the utility function, and increases the value of
part-time work because it is associated with intermediate outcomes both in hours and earnings.
14
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interesting avenue for future work.
Lastly, the present model is admittedly stylized and abstracts from a number of important aspects. These include earnings growth on the job, restoration of skills, and joint
decision-making within a household. Incorporating these aspects may provide the model
with better predictive performance as well.

3.5

Concluding Remarks

It is common for British women to switch from full-time to part-time employment when
they become mothers, even though such moves are often associated with occupational
downgrading. Interestingly, not many reverse these changes later in their careers. In this
chapter, I offer a potential explanation for these patterns which emphasizes the role of skill
depreciation. In the model developed here, workers’ endogenous choices over hours of
work and occupations in different life stages can produce the patterns under reasonable
parameter values.
The employment patterns studied in this chapter come from a time period when the UK
government primarily viewed childcare as the responsibilities of parents (Randall, 1995).
More recently, several policy changes have been enacted to improve the balance between
work and family lives of workers, and the government is likely to continue playing a proactive role in childcare provision (Lewis, 2003; Lewis and Campbell, 2007).15 Therefore, it
is important for future work to incorporate the elements of those policies to account for
their impact on mothers’ preferences over various employment options and career choices
beyond the childcare period.
In particular, in 2003, an employment law that grants parents with children under age
15

The policies recently enacted to improve workers’ work-life balance include free public part-time early
childhood education for children aged between three and four, and the right to request flexible working
patterns for parents with children aged under six.
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six the right to request a flexible working arrangement from employers was introduced.
While Grainger and Holt (2005) reported that the most popular request from women using
this right was to switch to part-time work, the model suggests other potential impacts of
this policy. For example, it may encourage mothers to return to full-time employment
later in their working lives by allowing them to stay in the same occupation, and thus
avoid occupational downgrading and the associated skill depreciation. As a result, parttime employment may become more of a temporary state. The policy may also encourage
women to pursue career paths where the continuity of job experience is important for career
progression. Thus, the model can provide a framework to evaluate family-friendly polices
from the view point of life-cycle skill dynamics, hours and employment.
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Chapter 4
Immigrant Job Search Assimilation in
Canada
4.1

Introduction

Immigration has always played a major role in Canada. It serves as an important source
of labour for the country, and therefore successful integration of immigrants in the labour
market has direct implications for the Canadian economy. There is a large literature documenting and analyzing Canadian immigration patterns and the relative success of Canadian
immigrants by landing cohort and immigrant type in the labour market.1 The vast majority
of this research, and for that matter research on immigrant assimilation in all countries, has
been based on the standard human capital model.2
The lower earnings of immigrants upon arrival is attributed to their lower levels of
human capital specific to the host country, and the catch-up of their earnings is explained by
their stronger incentives to invest in host-country specific human capital. Numerous papers
1

See, for example, Abbott and Beach (2011), Green and Worswick (2010), Xue (2010), Baker and Benjamin (1994), and Sweetman and Warman (2013).
2
Chiswick (1978); Borjas (1999)
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have been written studying the relationship between immigrants’ earnings and observable
characteristics related to their human capital acquired in the source country as well as
that acquired in the host country. The set of characteristics often includes information on
educational attainment and labour market experience in each country as well as age and
literacy level at immigration.3
A new approach to the immigrant-native earnings gap has recently emerged and is asking how much of the gap is due to differences in job search behavior.4 There are a number
of reasons to expect that new immigrants face a different search environment than natives.
First, it is natural to think that newly arrived immigrants are simply not accustomed to local practices of job search. Second, the same factors accounting for the native-immigrant
human capital gap may contribute to job search differentials between natives and immigrants. Examples include qualification recognition and language fluency. Possible difficulties of having foreign credentials recognized by employers may slow the application
process, while language fluency likely plays an important role in the job search and interview processes.5
It is also important to consider the role of social networks in job search. Differences
in networks formed and network usage between natives and immigrants are likely to be
reflected in differences in job search outcomes between natives and immigrants. A number
of papers have documented that workers utilize friends and relatives when searching for
a job, and recent work indicates that social networks are especially important for newlyarrived immigrants. Using the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada (LSIC), Goel
and Lang (2012) find that having close friends or relatives in Canada significantly increases
the likelihood that recently arrived immigrants will find employment within the first six
3

See, for example, Skuterud and Su (2012).
Examples include Chassamboulli and Palivos (2010), Ortega (2000) and Liu (2010), Lessem and Sanders
(2012), and Gupta and Kromann (2013)
5
Oreopoulos (2011) and Dechief and Oreopoulos (2012) provide evidence that employers discriminate
against job applicants with foreign-sounding names in hiring, associating with them low local language skills.
4
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months of their arrival.6 Other examples include Munshi (2003) who documents that use
of social networks is very common in acquiring employment for Mexican migrant workers
in the United States, and Frijters et al. (2005) who document that immigrants in the U.K.
tend to rely on their social networks to obtain a job more than natives.
Taking this idea of differences in job search behaviour one step further this paper uses
search theory to examine the role of job search in immigrant assimilation. The idea being
that not only can immigrants invest in human capital once they enter the host country to
achieve earnings assimilation but that they can also learn more about the labour market
and how to better search for a job. This idea is similar to that proposed by Daneshvary
et al. (1992) who take the view that immigrants acquire more information about the host
country’s labour market the longer they have been there and this results in earnings that are
much closer to their potential or maximum attainable earnings. Here we take a different
approach and develop a Burdett-Mortensen style general equilibrium search model with
two types of workers: immigrant workers and native workers. Importantly, new immigrants
face more search frictions than natives but over time can assimilate such that they face the
same search frictions as natives.
The Burdett-Mortensen equilibrium search model has been used to explain earnings differentials between many different groups, including the male-female earnings gap (Bowlus,
1997), the black-white earnings gap (Bowlus et al., 2001; Bowlus and Eckstein, 2002), and
the family earnings gap (Zhang, 2012). This paper extends this tradition to the immigrant
earnings gap. The Burdett-Mortensen search model can generate earnings differentials because how fast workers are able to generate job offers has direct implications for their
earnings. More specifically, the theory predicts that the distribution of the earnings of a
group with higher job offer arrival rates dominates that of a group with lower rates. If new
6

Interestingly the structural estimates of their search model reveal that the presence of close ties in Canada
increases the likelihood of receiving a job offer but does not help in finding better offers.
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immigrants have search behaviour that is characterized by lower job offer arrival rates than
those of native born workers, the model will predict an immigrant earnings gap. However,
if there is an assimilation process such that immigrants can learn how to search more effectively over time and increase their arrival rates of job offers, then the model predicts that
this assimilation of the search process will provide a mechanism for earnings convergence.
To conduct our analysis we build on the model developed by Zhang (2012) to study
the difference in earnings between mothers and non-mothers. Zhang extended the BurdettMortensen equilibrium search model in two important ways. First, her model has two
groups of workers with different job offer arrival rates conducting job search in a single
labour market.7 Second, her model allows one of the groups (in her case non-mothers)
to transition to the other group (mothers). Firms then take these transitions into account
when posting offers and equilibrium earnings differentials result. This model setting fits
our purposes well as it is important for us to model both the job search differences between immigrants and natives, but also the possibility that immigrants can assimilate and
become like natives in their job search behaviour. In addition, we also capture the general
equilibrium effects of both the presence of the immigrants in the labour market and their
assimilation behaviour on not only their earnings levels but also on those of natives.
We estimate the model using duration and earnings data from the Canadian Survey of
Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) to measure the difference in job offer arrival rates
between new immigrants and natives, and estimate how long it takes immigrants to acquire the same job search parameters as natives. Then, we study the implications of this
assimilation process for the earnings gap between immigrants and natives, and immigrants’
earnings growth.8
7

Prior to Zhang (2012) the standard method was to assume that the two groups were operating in separate
markets. Because of the assimilation process this standard method is not suitable for our setting.
8
Papers using SLID to study immigrant assimilation include Skuterud and Su (2012), Hum and Simpson
(2004) and Hum and Simpson (2000).
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Our estimation results indicate that there are substantial and significant differences in
job offer arrival and job destruction rates between natives and newly arrived immigrants.
Job offer arrival rates for immigrants are 36% lower while unemployed and 93% lower
while employed. The latter figure has substantial consequences for the amount of search
frictions faced by immigrants. Immigrants receive almost no job offers during an employment spell compared to natives who receive nearly 2 offers. Importantly, these differences
are able to account for three quarters of the observed earnings differential between natives
and immigrants.
Our results also indicate that it takes immigrants 13 years, on average, to assimilate and
acquire the same search parameters as natives, with counterfactual exercises indicating that
job search assimilation accounts for the vast majority of earnings growth immigrants experience after migration. Studies of earnings assimilation using the human capital framework
have reported a wide range of estimates of the time it takes for assimilation. In a recent
study on assimilation of Canadian immigrants Skuterud and Su (2012) find an initial gap
of 0.29 log points is halved after 8 years and a slower narrowing subsequently. Thus our
results on the search component are consistent in magnitude with the human capital based
assimilation literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the
model and its implications for earnings. Section 4.3 discusses the estimation strategy and
data. The estimation results are given in Section 4.4 followed by concluding remarks in
Section 4.5.
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4.2
4.2.1

Equilibrium Search Model
Environment

As noted above our model is a version of the equilibrium search model in Zhang (2012).
Here we describe the model noting the differences between immigrant and native workers.
In the model, time is continuous and the economy is in a steady state. There are a large
number of firms and workers in the labour market, with the population of the workers
normalized to 1. All workers are either native or immigrant workers. The measure of
immigrant workers is denoted by µ ∈ (0, 1).
There are two types of immigrant workers. A type 1 immigrant worker represents an
individual new to the country and unfamiliar with its labour market. A type 2 immigrant
worker represents an immigrant who has lived in the country for a sufficiently long period
and as a result has acquired the same level of knowledge of the local labour market as native
workers. A type 1 immigrant worker may become a type 2 immigrant worker over time.
This event is modeled as a Poisson process with arrival rate η.
All workers are either unemployed or employed, and search for jobs both on and off
the job. If workers are unemployed, they receive b, the flow value of non-market time
while unemployed. The arrival of job offers is modeled as a Poisson process. For nativeborn workers and type 2 immigrant workers, the job offer arrival rate is λ0 if they are
unemployed and λ1 if they are employed. Because of their lack of knowledge about the
labour market, it takes type 1 immigrant workers longer to receive a job offer, on average.
For type 1 immigrant workers, the job offer arrival rate is α0 λ0 while unemployed and α1 λ1
while employed, where 0 < αi < 1 for i = 0, 1.
All firms have constant returns-to-scale production technologies with labour being their
sole input. We assume that both native and immigrant workers are equally productive
within a firm. However, the productivity of a worker differs across firms. Specifically, we
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assume that there are Q types of firms that differ in their marginal productivity of labour.
For a type j firm, p j denotes the per-worker output of the firm, where we assume p j < p j+1
for j = 1, 2, . . . , Q − 1.
Each firm posts a wage offer w to attract workers. We assume that it must post the same
offer to both native and immigrant workers.9 The distribution of offers in equilibrium is
given by F(w) with support [w, w], and workers and firms meet each other through random
search. This implies that a worker draws a wage offer from F(w) when receiving a job
offer. A worker-firm match can be terminated exogenously at rate δ1 , forcing the worker
into unemployment.
To ensure that both types of immigrants are present in the steady-state, we assume
that workers exit from the labour market permanently according to a Poisson process with
arrival rate δ2 . Exiting native workers are replaced by unemployed native workers, while
all exiting immigrant workers are replaced by unemployed type 1 immigrant workers.

4.2.2

Workers’ Problem

After receiving an offer, the worker decides whether to accept or reject it. Let Vnu denote the
value of unemployment to native workers, and let Vne (w) denote the value to native workers
of being employed at wage w. Then Vnu is characterized by the following Bellman equation:
rVnu

= b + λ0

Z

w

h

i

max Vne (x), Vnu − Vnu dF(x) − δ2 Vnu .

(4.1)

w

The left-hand side of equation (4.1) represents the payoff to unemployment, while the righthand side shows how the payoff is derived. The first term on the right-hand side is the
9

That is immigrants and natives are competing in the same labour market. If firms could post separate
offers, then effectively the two markets would be separate. This assumption does tie our hands somewhat
in the degree to which the model can generate an immigrant earnings differential. However, we prefer this
specification of direct competition both in terms of the assimilation process and in terms of understanding the
impact the lower search frictions of the immigrants has on the native workers.
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monetary value of non-market time. The remainder is the option value of unemployment
due to possible transitions out of unemployment. There are two possible transitions from
unemployment. First, at arrival rate λ0 , a worker receives a job offer, and accepts it if it
yields a higher value than unemployment. Second, at arrival rate δ2 , a worker permanently
leaves the labour market and receives the value of zero thereafter.
Similarly, Vne (w) is characterized by the following Bellman equation:

rVne (w)

= w + λ1

w

Z

h

i

max Vne (x), Vne (w) − Vne (w) dF(x)

w


+ δ1 Vnu − Vne (w) − δ2 Vne (w). (4.2)

The left-hand side of equation (4.2) represents the payoff to a native working at wage
w. The first term on the right-hand side is the wage flow. The remainder indicates the
option value accruing from possible transitions to different states. There are three possible
transitions from the current job. First, at arrival rate λ1 , a worker receives a new job offer,
and decides whether to accept the offer. Second, at arrival rate δ1 , a worker is separated
from the current job. Third, a worker permanently leaves the labour market at rate δ2 .
The optimal search strategy of workers has a reservation wage property. While employed, workers accept any job offer that specifies a higher wage than the current job.
While unemployed, workers optimally set a reservation wage, and accept any job that offers a wage above the reservation wage, and reject offers otherwise. Let Rn denote the optimal reservation wage for unemployed native workers. Rn satisfies condition Vne (Rn ) = Vnu .
Together with equations (4.1) and (4.2), the condition yields
Rn = b +

Z

w
Rn

(λ0 − λ1 )F(x)
ρ + λ1 F(x)

dx,

(4.3)

where F(w) ≡ 1 − F(w) and ρ ≡ r + δ1 + δ2 . Notice that type 2 immigrant workers face the
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same problem as native workers. Thus this group of immigrants acts according to the same
reservation wage strategy as native workers.
Type 1 immigrant workers face a slightly different process. Let Vmu denote the value
of being unemployed and Vme (w) denote the value of being employed at wage w to type 1
immigrant workers. Then Vmu is determined by the following equation:
rVmu

= b + α0 λ0

Z

w

h

i

max(Vme (x), Vmu ) − Vmu dF(x) + η Vnu − Vmu − δ2 Vmu .

(4.4)

w

When compared with equation (4.1), equation (4.4) shows that the option value of unemployment for type 1 immigrants differs from that of natives and type 2 immigrants in two
ways. First, as shown in the second term on the right-hand side, the arrival rate of job offers
is scaled by α0 . Second, as the third term on the right-hand side shows, a possible change
in type also contributes to the option value of unemployment. Similar points are made for
Vme (w), which satisfies the following Bellman equation:

rVme (w)

= w + α1 λ1

Z

w

h

i

max Vme (x), Vme (w) − Vme (w) dF(x)

w

h
i


+ η max Vne (w), Vnu − Vme (w) + δ1 Vmu − Vme (w) − δ2 Vme (w). (4.5)
Again the differences from equation (4.2) are that the job offer arrival rate is scaled by α1 ,
and the optimal response to a change in type is accounted for in the option value.
When a type 1 immigrant working at wage w becomes a type 2 immigrant worker, it is
optimal to quit the current job if Vne (w) < Vnu . Since Vnu = Vne (Rn ), and Vne (w) is increasing
in w, such behavior is optimal only if w < Rn .
It is straightforward to show that Vme (w) is increasing in w, implying that the optimal
search strategy of type 1 immigrant workers is a reservation wage strategy as well. Employed type 1 immigrant workers accept any job offer that pays a higher wage than the
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current job, and unemployed type 1 immigrant workers optimally set a cut-off wage level,
denoted by Rm , and accept any job offering a wage that exceeds Rm and reject otherwise.
The following result shows the equation characterizing Rm :
Proposition 4.2.1 Rm solves the following equation:

Rm = b +

w

Z

(α0 λ0 − α1 λ1 )F(x)
ρ + η + α1 λ1 F(x)

Rm

dx +

Z

w

(α0 λ0 − α1 λ1 )F(x)

η

dx
ρ + η + α1 λ1 F(x) ρ + λ1 F(x)
Z Rm
ρ + η + α0 λ0 F(x)
η
− I(Rm ≥ Rn )
dx,
Rn ρ + η + α1 λ1 F(x) ρ + λ1 F(x)
Rn

where Rn is given by equation (4.3).
Proof. See Appendix D.
When η = 0, type 1 immigrant workers never assimilate by changing their types. In
this case, their problem is similar to that of native workers except for the differences in job
offer arrival rates. That is, Rm satisfies essentially the same nonlinear equation as Rn , since
the second and third terms on the right-hand side of equations (4.4) and (4.5) vanish. When
η > 0, in contrast, type 1 immigrant workers need to take into account events that may
occur after their type changes in order to set their reservation wage strategies.
The condition determining the ranking between Rm and Rn is given in Lemma 1.
Lemma 4.2.2 Rm ≤ Rn if and only if
Z

w

Rn

 ρ + η + λ F(x)
0
ρ + λ1 F(x)

−

ρ + η + α0 λ0 F(x) ρ + η + λ1 F(x) 
dx ≥ 0,
ρ + η + α1 λ1 F(x) ρ + λ1 F(x)

Proof. See Appendix D.
The above condition is difficult to verify analytically except in a small number of cases.
However, the following two examples show that the ranking between Rm and Rn is in gen-
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eral ambiguous. First suppose α1 = 1, then the left-hand side becomes
Z

w

Rn

ρ + η + (1 − α0 )λ0 F(x)
ρ + λ1 F(x)

dx ≥ 0,

establishing Rm ≤ Rn . In contrast, if α0 = 1, then the left-hand side of the equation becomes
Z

w

Rn

(α1 − 1)(ρ + λ1 F(w))λ1 F(w)
ρ + η + α1 λ1 F(w)

< 0,

concluding Rn < Rm .

4.2.3

Firms’ Problem and Equilibrium Wage Offer Distribution

The equilibrium wage offer distribution is derived from firms’ optimal behaviour. Given
the technology, a firm’s profit is the product of the per-worker profit margin and the stock
of workers in the firm. Letting l(w) denote the steady-state measure of workers available to
a firm offering wage w, the steady state profit flow of a type- j firm is written as
π j (w) = (p j − w)l(w).

Each firm posts a wage to maximize the steady-state profit flow.
Lemma 1 indicates that in general Rm is not equal to Rn . As pointed out in Mortensen
(1990), the equilibrium wage offer distribution may have gaps in the support when workers
with different reservation wages operate in a single labour market. To avoid complications
resulting from this feature of the wage offer distribution, we follow Zhang (2012) and
assume that there is an exogenously set minimum wage in the economy, denoted by wmin
which is set higher than both Rm and Rn . Given this simplifying assumption, all wage offers
will be accepted by all unemployed workers.
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The labour stock at a firm paying w can be divided into three components based on the
characteristics of workers:
l(w) = ln (w) + lm1 (w) + lm2 (w)

where ln (w) denotes the steady-state mass of natives working for a firm offering wage w,
and for y ∈ {1, 2}, lmy (w) denotes the steady-state mass of type y immigrants working for a
firm offering wage w. These three objects are derived by balancing the steady-state flows
generated by job-to-job, unemployment-to-job and job-to-unemployment transitions made
by workers. In particular, native workers make these transitions in the same way as modeled
in Burdett and Mortensen (1998) with the exception that permanent exit from the labour
market is a possible transition. The per-firm native worker stock is therefore given by
ln (w) =

λ0 δ(λ1 + δ)
(λ0 + δ)(δ + λ1 F(w))2

(1 − µ)

where δ ≡ δ1 + δ2 . For immigrant workers, the steady-state flow analysis is analogous to
that of Zhang (2012) such that the per-firm stocks of type 1 and type 2 immigrant workers
are respectively given by10
lm1 (w) =

and
lm2 (w) =

10

α0 λ0 δ2 (δ + η)(δ + η + α1 λ1 )

2 µ,
(α0 λ0 + δ + η)(δ2 + η) δ + η + α1 λ1 F(w)

λ0 η(δ + λ1 ) δ(δ + η) + δ1 α0 λ0



2 µ
(η + δ2 )(δ + λ0 )(η + δ + α0 λ0 ) δ + λ1 F(w)

λ0 ηδ2 α0 (δ + η) (δ + λ1 )(δ + η + α1 λ1 ) − α1 λ21 F(w)2
+
2
2 µ.
(η + δ2 )(η + δ + α0 λ0 ) δ + λ1 F(w) δ + η + α1 λ1 F(w)

Unlike Zhang (2012), the present paper does not model transitions in and out of nonparticipation of
workers. Therefore, the results in this paper are obtained by setting the relevant transition parameters to zero
in her model.
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Note that ln (w), lm1 (w) and lm2 (w) all depend on w only through F(w), the quantile of
w in the offer distribution. Because of this property, it is convenient to express the perfirm labour force in terms of the wage quantile when characterizing the equilibrium offer
distribution. To this end, define l∗ (y) with domain [0, 1] by l∗ (y) = l(F −1 (y)).
Following Mortensen (1990), several properties of the equilibrium hold. First, all firms
with the same productivity level earn the same steady-state profit flow in equilibrium. Second, the wage offer from a higher productivity firm should be at least as high as the one
from a lower productivity counterpart. Third, the highest wage offer made by a type j firm
corresponds to the lowest wage offer made by a type j + 1 firm. Fourth, w = wmin . Finally,
F(w) is implicitly defined by the following equal profit conditions:
(p j − wL j )l∗ (F(wL j )) = (p j − w)l∗ (F(w)) for w ∈ [wL j , wH j ],

(4.6)

with wL1 = w and wH j = wL j+1 for j ∈ {1, 2, ..., Q − 1}.
Let γ0 = 0, and for j = 1, 2, . . . , Q, let γ j denote the fraction of firms whose labour
productivity is p j or less. Given the equilibrium condition, firms with labour productivity
equal to or less than p j offer wages equal to or less than wH j , and firms with the higher
productivity offer wages above wH j . Therefore F(wH j ) = γ j for j ∈ {1, ..., Q}, and equation
(4.6) yields
(p j − wH j−1 )l∗ (γ j−1 ) = (p j − wH j )l∗ (γ j ) for j ∈ {1, . . . , Q}.

(4.7)

For each firm type j, equation (4.7) characterizes the upper- and lower-bounds of possible
wage offers made by firms of the given type. This equation can be used to recover p j from
observed wage data. This property of the equilibrium is exploited in estimation.
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4.2.4

Implications for Native-Immigrant Wage Gap

Given the offer distribution of wages F(w), the earnings distribution of workers is characterized by the flows generated by the steady-state job-to-job, unemployment-to-job, jobto-unemployment transitions. Let Gn (w) represent the steady-state earnings distribution
among native workers. This takes the standard form:
Gn (w) =

δF(w)
δ + λ1 F(w)

.

(4.8)

Analogously, let Gm1 (w) and Gm2 (w) denote the steady-state earnings distributions for
type 1 and type 2 immigrants, respectively. From Zhang (2012), we have that these distributions are, respectively, given by
Gm1 (w) =

(δ + η)F(w)
δ + η + α1 λ1 F(w)

.

(4.9)

and
Gm2 (w) =


δ(η + δ) + α0 λ0 δ1 (δ + η + α1 λ1 F(w)) + (δ + η)(δ + λ0 )δ2 α0
(δ + λ1 F(w)(α0 δ2 + α0 λ0 + δ + η)(δ + η + α1 λ1 F(w))

F(w).

(4.10)

Equations (4.8), (4.9) and (4.10) establish that these three distributions can be ranked unambiguously in terms of the first-order stochastic dominance. The following proposition
states this result.
Proposition 4.2.3 Gm2 (w) first-order stochastically dominates Gn (w). Gn (w) first-order
stochastically dominates Gm1 (w).
Proof. See Appendix D.
The first-order stochastic dominance of Gm2 (w) over Gn (w) may not be intuitive since
both of the relevant groups share the same search parameters. The reason can be thought of
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as an age-effect. Since an immigrant worker starts as a type 1 immigrant and later become a
type 2 immigrant, type 2 immigrants have, on average, more labour market experience and,
therefore, more time to improve their earnings through job-to-job transitions. In contrast,
the native worker group includes workers who are new to the labour market and have not
had a sufficient time to move up the earnings distribution. Therefore the difference in
the average length of time spent in the labour market between these two groups generates
the earnings gap between them. Analogously, the native group has on average has longer
labour market experience than the type 1 immigrant group. This difference contributes
to the ranking between the earnings distributions of these groups. Moreover, the higher
job offer arrival rate on the job for the native group also widens the earnings gap between
natives and type 1 immigrants.
Even though the native earnings distribution lies between those of type 1 and type
2 immigrant workers, it first-order stochastically dominates the earnings distribution for
the whole immigrant population once we account for the steady-state composition of the
immigrant population. Proposition 3 establishes this result.
Proposition 4.2.4 Let Gm (w) denote the earnings distribution for all immigrant workers.
Then Gn (w) first-order stochastically dominates Gm (w).
Proof. See Appendix D.
Finally, we examine the implications of the model for the earnings dynamics for both
natives and immigrants by deriving the age profiles of their earnings distributions, and show
that the model can generate earnings convergence between native and immigrant workers.
To this end, let Gn (w; a) be the earnings distribution for native workers with labour market experience given by a. Similarly let Gm (w; a) be the earnings distribution for immigrant
workers with host country labour market experience given by a. The following proposition
establishes that Gn (w; a) and Gm (w; a) have the same limit.
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Proposition 4.2.5 For given w ∈ [w, w],
lim Gn (w; a) = lim Gm (w; a) =

a→∞

a→∞

δ1 F(w)
δ1 + λ1 F(w)

.

Proof. See Appendix D.
The result in Proposition 4 is driven by the gradually increasing share of type 2 immigrants among all immigrants with the same level of (potential) experience. The model
predicts that the share of type 1 immigrants among all immigrants with a given labour
market experience declines as the time spent in the host country’s labour market increases.
Therefore, a group of immigrants with sufficiently long labour market experience mostly
consists of type 2 immigrants, who behave like native workers. As a result, the earnings
distributions converge.

4.3
4.3.1

Estimation
Estimation Procedure

The parameters to be estimated are those governing event arrivals (λ0 , λ1 , δ1 , α0 , α1 and
η), wage cuts ( w, {wH j }Qj=1 ), and those representing the productivity heterogeneity of firms
( {(p j , γ j )}Qj=1 ). Estimation is performed by the maximum likelihood procedure developed
by Bowlus et al. (1995, 2001) and Bowlus (1998) and then modified by Zhang (2012).11
First, we use the lowest and highest wages observed in data for the estimates of w and
wHQ . Then the following two-stage optimization routine is repeated until the log-likelihood
value converges. In the first stage, while fixing the event arrival parameters, we maximize
There are two other parameters in the model: δ2 and µ. These are calibrated before performing the
estimation procedure described in this section. Specifically, µ, the proportion of immigrants among the
worker population, is set at 0.212 based on the comparable number for 2001. The arrival rate of permanent
exit from the labour market is set at 0.0024, which implies that workers on average spend 35 years in the
labour market.
11
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the log-likelihood function by sampling values from the wages earned by native workers
and use them for the estimates of wH1 , ..., wHQ−1 . In the second stage, while fixing the
wage-cut levels, the log-likelihood function is maximized over the event arrival parameters
with a standard iterative optimization routine. Note that every time the objective function is
evaluated at a new guess, γ j and p j are calculated from the other parameters. Specifically,
given equation (4.8), γ j is calculated by
γj =

(δ + λ1 )Ĝn (ŵH j )
δ + λ1Ĝn (ŵH j )

,

where Ĝn (w) is the empirical cumulative distribution function of the wages earned by native
workers, and p j is calculated by
wH j l∗ (γ j ) − wH j−1 l∗ (γ j−1 )
pj =
.
l∗ (γ j ) − l∗ (γ j−1 )
from equation (4.7).
Let θ denote the set of parameters that we aim to estimate, and xi be a list of variables
of individual i. The log-likelihood function is written as
`(θ) =

N
X


(1 − χi ) ln Ln (θ; xi ) + χi ln Lm (θ; τi , xi )
i=1

where Ln (θ; xi ) and Lm (θ; τi , xi ), respectively, denote the likelihood contributions for native
workers and immigrant workers; χi is an indicator variable taking 1 if individual i is an
immigrant and 0 otherwise; and τi denotes individual i’s time since migration. We write
Lm (θ; τi , xi ) as the mixture of likelihood contributions for immigrants of different types. Let
Lm1 (θ; xi ) and Lm2 (θ; xi ) denote the likelihood contribution of type 1 and type 2 immigrants,
respectively, and let πi denote the probability that immigrant i is type 1 at the start of the
survey. Then the likelihood contribution for an immigrant worker is given by Lm (θ; τi , xi ) =
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πi Lm1 (θ; xi ) + (1 − πi )Lm2 (θ; xi ), and the log-likelihood function can be rewritten as
N
X


(1 − χi ) ln(Ln (θ; xi )) + χi ln πi Lm1 (θ; xi ) + (1 − πi )Lm2 (θ; xi ) .
`(θ) =

(4.11)

i=1

The structural model dictates that the length of time in which an immigrant remains as a
type 1 since migration is an exponential random variable with parameter η. Thus πi = e−ητi .
The expressions for Ln (θ; xi ), Lm1 (θ; xi ) and Lm2 (θ; xi ) are given in Appendix E.

4.3.2

Identification

Identification of the structural parameters other than α0 , α1 and η follows Bowlus et al.
(1995) with the parameters governing firms’ productivity heterogeneity identified from the
observed earnings distribution and the native search parameters identified from the relevant
duration and transition data. Specifically, λ0 is identified from unemployment durations of
the natives in the data. Job durations and transitions at the end of job spells help to identify
λ1 and δ1 .
The immigrant job search parameters, α0 and α1 are identified from differences in unemployment durations and job durations between natives and recently immigrated individuals as well as differences in unemployment rates. η is identified from variation in spell
durations of immigrants with respect to years since migration as well as changes in the
earnings distribution with respect to years since migration.

4.3.3

Data

To estimate our model we need panel data on both immigrant and native populations. We,
therefore, make use of the Canadian SLID, which is a household longitudinal survey containing a wide range of information on the labour market experiences, educational activities
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and attainment, and demographic characteristics of individuals residing in the country. The
survey has several waves, each of which follows respondents for 6 years. The first wave
started in 1994, and a new wave was introduced every three years such that two contiguous
waves overlap for 3 years. Every January, the survey asks respondents about their labour
market activities and/or schooling in the previous year, enabling the construction of their
employment histories.
For this paper, the third and fourth waves of the survey are used to construct the estimation sample in order to ensure that it contains a sufficient number of immigrant observations. The third wave covers the period from 1999-2004 and the fourth wave from
2002-2007. Instead of pooling the 9 years of data we construct employment histories only
from 2002 on for both waves. This results in a shorter panel for the third wave, but aids in
maintaining the stationarity assumption of the model by not introducing large business cycle effects between the late 1990s and early 2000s.12 We use cross-section sample weights
from 2002 to address issues of attrition.
We restrict the estimation sample to male individuals aged between 20 and 55 in the
beginning of 2002, and exclude respondents who were institutionalized for more than 6
months or who died during the survey period. Respondents are also excluded from the
sample if information on their educational attainment or key demographic characteristics,
such as the country of birth or years since migration, are missing. In addition, to keep the
sample population as homogeneous as possible, we impose a restriction on the educational
attainment of individuals. Specifically, the estimation sample contains only respondents
who had some post-secondary schooling or a post-secondary diploma excluding master’s
degree or above. Finally, our model concerns individuals who are active labour force participants. Thus, we attempt to include only those who are either working or searching for
12

In practice, however, survey non-response or missing information did not allow us to follow every respondent for the intended period. Rather than excluding these respondents from the estimation sample, if we
encounter a problem, we censor the job history at that point.
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jobs at any given time. To this end, we exclude individuals who were mainly in school,
were in retirement, or were disabled or had a long-term illness.
The above model does not consider schooling decisions and, therefore, only captures
immigrant assimilation through post-schooling labour market experience. Thus, it is only
relevant for immigrants who completed their schooling before moving to Canada. However, not every immigrant respondent in SLID meets this modeling assumption. In fact,
there are ample cases in which we suspect that individuals moved to Canada and then went
through schooling activities.13 Including those individuals in the estimation may, therefore,
be problematic as various studies argue that there are differences in labour market outcomes
between immigrants who were educated in Canada and those who were not.14 Although
SLID contains information on schooling activities during the survey, it provides less information on schooling undertaken before the survey.15 To address this complication, we
exclude immigrants who migrated to Canada before age 20 as a rough approximation for
the desired sampling restriction.
We construct individual labour market histories by first identifying all the jobs held
during the survey period. We define a job by an employment relationship with a particular
employer, and to be counted as a job spell in our data set an employment relationship needs
to last for more than 30 days and have 30 or more usual weekly hours of work.
While the model in this paper does not consider multiple job holding, it is not uncommon to observe individuals who worked for more than one employer simultaneously. To
reconcile the difference, when observing an instance of multiple job holding, we assume
that the spell that started later did not begin until the one that started earlier ended, and
13

For a number of immigrant respondents, the reported age at immigration is lower than the typical age of
the reported completed schooling level. For example, immigrants reporting a college degree who migrated at
age 18 likely obtained their degrees in Canada.
14
See, for example, Skuterud and Su (2012) and Ferrer and Riddell (2008).
15
There is a survey question asking respondents where they did most of their elementary and high-school
education. However, no such information is available for post-secondary schooling.
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adjust the starting date of the latter job accordingly. This treatment of multiple job-holding
is common in the literature.16
When a job spell is completed, the type of transition made at the end of the spell is based
on how long it takes the worker to start a new job. We determine that an individual makes a
job-to-job transition if the gap between two jobs is less than 14 days. Otherwise, the gap is
treated as an unemployment spell and the transition is recorded as a job-to-unemployment
transition.
Wage information is converted into monthly terms based on the reported unit of pay,
and converted into real terms with year 2002 as the base year. In order to exclude extreme
observations, we trimmed the top 3% and bottom 2% of the earnings distribution.17
The above steps yield the final estimation sample of size 3877, with 228 immigrant
observations. Of the constructed labour market histories during the survey, the following
set of information is used to calculate the likelihood contributions. The first pieces of
information that enter into the likelihood are the employment status and residual duration
of the first spell. If it is a job spell, the wage earned on the job and, if applicable, the type
of transition made at the end of the spell are also included in the likelihood. If the initial
spell is a complete unemployment spell, the characteristics of the following job spell enter
into the likelihood as well. If the initial spell is a complete job spell, the duration of the
next spell is also included in the likelihood but only if it is an unemployment spell.
Table 4.1 shows the sample statistics from the estimation sample.18 Row 2 shows that
the fractions of individuals who were initially unemployed were 0.053 for natives and 0.134
for immigrants, yielding a gap of 0.081. In addition to a higher unemployment rate, immigrants also have a longer mean unemployment duration than natives. The mean job
16

See, for example, Bowlus et al. (2001).
Trimming is standard in this literature to avoid estimates of reservation wages that are too small and
productivity estimates that are too large. See Bowlus et al. (2001).
18
As noted above the reported statistics are weighted by the 2002 cross-section sample weights.
17
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durations are about 36 months and 30 months for natives and immigrants, respectively, and
job spells exhibit high censoring rates for both groups.19 While two fifths of the completed
job spells ended with transitions to a new job for natives, the corresponding number for
immigrants was less than a quarter.
The descriptive statistics suggest that immigrants are facing different search frictions
with longer unemployment durations and lower job-to-job transition rates. Immigrants
also have much higher unemployment rates and shorter job durations. Differences in job
offer arrival rates alone may readily account for higher unemployment rates, but may have
more difficulty in simultaneously explaining the lower job-to-job transition rates. Immigrants may also be facing higher job destruction rates. Therefore, in what follows, we also
estimate a model specification that allows for different job destruction rates for the two
groups.20 This improves the model fit substantially.
There is a sizable gap in monthly earnings between the two groups. As shown in row
8, the mean monthly earnings for immigrant was $3510.50 as opposed to $4021.24 for
natives, yielding roughly a $500 earnings gap. Consistent with the job search model with
on-the-job search, the mean monthly earnings out of unemployment is lower than the mean
monthly earnings for both groups. There is a $443.73 earnings gap in the mean accepted
earnings level between natives and immigrants. This gap is quite large and is incompatible
with the modeling assumptions that natives and immigrants face the same offer distribution
and accept all offers. However, the standard errors (134.14 and 259.32 for natives and
immigrants, respectively) are rather large because of the small numbers of observations.
19

When reading the values reported in rows 3 to 7, it is important to keep in mind that spells may be
censored at different dates for two reasons. First, the estimation sample is from unbalanced panel data.
Second, the second spell inevitably has a shorter sample window than the first spell.
20
The job destruction rate is not allowed to change when immigrants assimilate in the model. That is, the
job offer arrival rates change but immigrants continue to face a higher job destruction rate. This is partly
done to match the observed data, but also for simplicity in solving the equilibrium wage offer distribution.
In addition, it is not clear that changes in the job destruction process should be part of assimilation due to
learning about how to search more effectively.
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics from the Estimation Sample
Natives
3649
0.053
5.06

1
2
3
4

Immigrants
228
0.134
6.84

Number of observations
Fraction of individuals initially unemployed
Mean unemployment duration (in month)
Fraction of censored spells
among unemployment spells
0.15
†
5 Mean job duration (in month)
35.59
30.21
6 Fraction of censored spells
among job spells
0.75
0.70
7 Fraction of completed job spells
ending with a job-to-job transition
0.40
0.23
8 Mean monthly earnings
4021.24
3510.50
9 Mean monthly wage accepted
out of unemployment
2907.32
2463.59
† This statistics was not released due to Statistics Canada’s disclosure rules
regarding confidential survey data.

4.4

Estimation Results

4.4.1

Parameter Estimates

We follow Bowlus et al. (2001) in determining the number of firm types Q. Their method
yields Q = 7 for our estimation sample. Levels beyond seven yielded no further improvements in the likelihood and productivity parameter estimates that were substantially higher
at the top. In addition, the estimated search parameters were stable once the number of firm
type was increased to this level.
The estimation results are presented in Tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4. Table 4.2 presents the
estimated values for the search parameters. The first column shows the estimation results
with both natives and immigrants facing a common job destruction rate, and the second
column shows the estimation results with natives and immigrants facing job destruction
rates of δ1 and δm1 , respectively. The parameter estimates reveal a large difference between
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Table 4.2: Parameter Estimates: Event Arrival Rates
Parameter

Common job
Separate job
destruction rate destruction rates
∗
δ2
0.0024
0.0024
∗
µ
0.2120
0.2120
λ0
0.1556
0.1546
(0.0094)
(0.0094)
λ1
0.0089
0.0086
(0.0010)
(0.0010)
δ1
0.0047
0.0044
(0.0003)
(0.0003)
m
δ1
0.0075
(0.0017)
α0
0.6288
0.6471
(0.1927)
(0.2100)
α1
0.0735
0.0702
(0.1146)
(0.1453)
η
0.0055
0.0064
(0.0008)
(0.0010)
Log-likelihood
−37402.59
−37391.24
Note: Bootstrap standard errors are presented
in parentheses.
∗
Values assigned outside estimation
δ1 and δm1 , though δm1 is not precisely estimated. Allowing the job destruction rates to differ
between the two groups results in an improvement in the log-likelihood value and fits the
observed duration and transition data better. In the following discussion, therefore, we
focus on the parameter estimates with separate job destruction rates.21
The estimate for λ0 shows that receiving a job offer is a fairly frequent event for native workers during unemployment with an implied mean unemployment duration of 6.4
21

Once we allow for different job destruction rates for the two groups, the propositions stated in Section
2 need to be modified because they rely on the assumption of common job destruction rate. However, if
δ1 < δ m
1 , the result presented in Proposition 3 remains intact and the earnings distribution of natives firstorder stochastically dominates the one for immigrants. In contrast, in Proposition 4 Gn (w, a) and Gm (w, a)
will have different limits with respect to a. As a result, earnings convergence will be reduced such that the
limit of Gn (w, a) will still first-order stochastically dominate the one for Gm (w, a).
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Table 4.3: Parameter Estimates: Wage Cuts
Parameter

Common job
Separate job
destruction rate destruction rates
wmin
1315.80
1315.80
(3.19)
(2.92)
wH1
2580.00
2580.00
(433.26)
(452.36)
wH2
3440.00
3440.00
(479.38)
(473.70)
wH3
4000.00
4000.00
(425.22)
(436.20)
wH4
4733.44
4733.44
(500.63)
(525.96)
wH5
5000.00
5000.00
(585.64)
(637.88)
wH6
5825.00
5825.00
(759.34)
(793.43)
wH7
8520.79
8520.79
(0.82)
(0.82)
Note: Bootstrap standard errors are presented
in parentheses.

months. In contrast, the job offer arrival rate while employed and job destruction rate are
estimated to be very low for natives. The ratio of λ1 and δ1 gives a measure of the expected
number of job offers during an employment spell and is often used as a measure of search
frictions. It is also a measure of how much earnings growth the model will generate as
individuals move up the job ladder through on-the-job search. For the natives, this ratio is
1.98, which is higher than the value found for Canada in Bowlus (1998), but by international comparisons is relatively low.22 Given the high censoring rate of job spells observed
in data, these low values can be expected.23
22

The fact that our ratio is higher than that in Bowlus (1998) is not surprising given our estimation sample
contains more educated Canadians. However, in both cases the ratio for Canada is low compared to other
countries. For example, the value estimated for U.S. males with educational attainment comparable to those
in our analysis sample ranges from 1.75 to 4.62 (Bowlus and Seitz (2000) and Flinn (2002)).
23
In order to examine the effect of the high job censoring rate on the parameter estimates, we estimated
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Table 4.4: Parameter Estimates: Firm Productivity Levels and Distribution
Parameter

Common job Separate job Parameter Common job Separate job
destruction
destruction
destruction
destruction
rate
rates
rate
rates
p1
5100.91
5113.64
γ1
0.3598
0.3627
(468.10)
(496.40)
(0.1141)
(0.1198)
p2
5517.98
5533.66
γ2
0.6026
0.6057
(545.92)
(594.65)
(0.1146)
(0.1121)
p3
6384.91
6440.80
γ3
0.7281
0.7306
(1031.13)
(1161.29)
(0.0768)
(0.0762)
p4
7645.26
7728.36
γ4
0.8462
0.8478
(1703.17)
(1928.94)
(0.0572)
(0.0573)
p5
9070.35
9188.67
γ5
0.8769
0.8783
(2716.80)
(3292.69)
(0.0410)
(0.0436)
p6
11908.38
12100.86
γ6
0.9354
0.9362
(5897.89)
(6736.32)
(0.0260)
(0.0267)
p7
24989.68
25553.25
γ7
1
1
(8838.72)
(9672.67)
Note: Bootstrap standard errors are presented in parentheses.

Although not precisely estimated, the point estimates for α0 and α1 reveal differences
in the job search process between natives and newly-arrived immigrants. The estimates for
α0 and λ0 together imply that the job offer arrival rate for immigrants is 0.1002 giving an
unemployment duration of 10.0 months for type 1 immigrants. The estimate for α1 implies
that the job offer arrival rate for employed type 1 immigrants is less than one tenth the
native job offer arrival rate on the job and one tenth their own job destruction rate. All of
this suggests that type 1 immigrants face substantial search frictions while employed and
are, therefore, much more likely to have their jobs end with transitions to unemployment
than are natives. Once immigrants acquire the same search parameters as natives, their job
offer arrival rate while employed slightly exceeds their job destruction rate giving a ratio of
the model restricting the native worker sample to age 20 to 35, which had a lower job censoring rate than
the original sample. We also attempted a different estimation strategy, used in Bowlus and Seitz (2000), that
omits job duration data and relies on the initial unemployment rates and the transition data at the end of job
spells to identify λ1 and δ1 . Although unreported here, in both cases, the estimates yielded higher values not
only for λ1 but also for δ1 resulting in ratios and earnings growth predictions that were hardly altered.
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1.17.
The estimate for η is 0.0064, which implies that it takes newly arrived immigrants 13
years to acquire the native search parameters. Interpreted slightly differently, 47% of a
cohort of immigrants who immigrated 10 years previously have acquired native search
parameters.
The finding that search assimilation for immigrants takes, on average, more than a
decade is in line with some of the previous search assimilation findings. For example,
based on their estimation results, Daneshvary et al. (1992) argue that immigrants reach “information parity” with natives after about 12 years since migration in the United States.24
In contrast, based on their duration analysis of unemployment, Frijters et al. (2005) extrapolate that it takes immigrants more than 40 years to attain the same hazard rate out of
unemployment as their native peers in Britain.
Studies taking a human capital approach to assimilation also often find that it takes immigrants decades to catch up with natives, though a common feature is a much faster initial
rate of catch up. Skuterud and Su (2012), for example, report results for a sample of recent Canadian immigrants (arrival cohort 1990-2002). These were compared with similarly
aged native workers. In their preferred specification the initial wage gap of 0.29 log points
was more than halved after 8 years, declined further to year 13, but then remained roughly
constant at 0.09 log points thereafter. Skuterud and Su argue that this pattern of strong
decreasing relative returns to host country experience reflects what might be expected from
“language acquisition or acculturation processes” (p.1124). However, our results indicate
that search assimilation may be responsible for much of this convergence and that more
conventional human capital models may overestimate the role of human capital assimila24

Their view is that the amount of information available to workers searching for jobs is related to the ratio
between the actual and potential earnings where potential earnings means the upper support of the wage offer
distribution. They found that this ratio was below natives’ level for newly arrived immigrants, but it caught
up to the same level after roughly 12 years since migration.
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tion in not taking into account search assimilation.
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show the estimates related to the firm productivity distribution and
the resulting wage cuts. The productivity distribution is right skewed with the lowest two
levels accounting for the majority of the productivity distribution. The implied average
monthly productivity level is $7526.56. The large values for the highest productivity levels,
needed to meet the equal-profit condition at the upper end of the wage distribution, are a
common outcome of this model.

4.4.2

Model Fit

We examine how well the model fits the observed data by comparing the summary statistics
reported in Table 4.1 with model predictions. When predicting the moments of the duration
and transition data, it is important to account for the fact that our estimation sample is
unbalanced panel data and spells can be censored at different dates. To control for this
issue we simulate a sample of a large number of job histories matching the survey response
outcomes in the estimation sample. One exception to this is that the predicted values for
the earnings outcomes given in row 8 are obtained by numerically calculating the mean of
the offer distribution rather than from the simulations. The results are presented in Table
4.5.
The model matches the duration and transition data of natives and immigrants well
overall. It underpredicts the unemployment rates for both groups, and somewhat overpredicts the unemployment durations. Unfortunately the model cannot match both of these
moments since to match the first the job offer arrival rate while unemployed needs to be
lower and to fix the second it needs to be higher.
Not surprisingly, as shown in Figure 4.1, the predicted distribution of natives’ earnings
fits the observed distribution very closely. The model produces an earnings gap between

122

Table 4.5: Predicted Moments from the Estimation Result with Separate Job Destruction
Rates for Natives and Immigrants
Natives
Observed Predicted

Immigrants
Observed Predicted

1

Fraction of individuals
initially unemployed
0.053
0.042
0.134
0.072
2 Mean unemployment
duration (in month)
5.06
5.83
6.84
7.37
3 Fraction of censored spells
among all unemployment spells
0.15
0.10
†
0.14
4 Mean job duration (in month)
35.59
35.87
30.21
32.33
5 Fraction of censored spells
among all job spells
0.75
0.74
0.70
0.69
6 Fraction of completed job spells
ending with a job-to-job transition
0.40
0.41
0.23
0.20
7 Mean monthly earnings
4021.24
4063.54
3510.50
3676.74
8 Mean monthly wage accepted
out of unemployment
2907.73
3341.87
2463.59
3341.87
† This statistics was not released due to Statistics Canada’s disclosure rules regarding
confidential survey data.

natives and immigrants of approximately $390, which captures three quarters of the observed gap. The same figure shows that the predicted earnings distribution for immigrants
lies slightly to the right of the observed distribution reflecting the unexplained portion of
the observed earnings gap.
Row 8 of Table 4.5 shows that the model is having a difficult time fitting the offer
distribution, substantially overpredicting it. The offer distribution is identified from earnings observations accepted out of unemployment and the number of such observations is
modest in the data. Therefore, fitting the data in this dimension does not seem to have
influenced the estimation substantially. The difficulty in capturing enough difference between the earnings and offer distributions reflects the estimated low value of λ1 /δ1 , and
also points to the model’s problem in generating sufficient earnings growth. This suggests
that the model is missing important earnings growth mechanisms. The most obvious factor
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Figure 4.1: Observed and Predicted Earnings Distributions for Natives and Immigrants

omitted by the model is human capital accumulation, and enriching the model in this direction is an interesting avenue for future work.25 Finally, the observed gap in accepted wages
out of unemployment between natives and immigrants may reflect productivity differences
between the two groups. Therefore, it may be important to investigate whether there are
separate labour markets for natives and immigrants.26

4.4.3

Implications for Earnings Assimilation

The estimation results imply that it takes newly arrived immigrants, on average, 13 years
to acquire the native search parameters. We examine the implications of this estimated
job search assimilation process for immigrants’ life cycle earnings growth. In Figure 4.2,
the solid-lined curve shows the predicted mean monthly earnings profile of immigrants
since migration, relative to the earnings level in the first year since migration. On average,
immigrants are predicted to experience about 5.1% earnings growth in the first 10 years
25
26

The addition of human capital can substantially complicate the equilibrium solution to the model.
This difference may also be aggravated by our assumption of a common minimum wage.
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Figure 4.2: Predicted Immigrants’ Earnings Growth

since migration, and about 17.8% earnings growth over 40 years since migration. The
earnings profile is S-shaped, originally exhibiting slower earnings growth because of the
lower rates of job offer arrival when they are new to the host country.
Indeed, the estimates reveal that newly arrived immigrants search under a very low job
offer arrival rate while employed. This limits their chances of finding better paying jobs.
The broken lined curve in Figure 4.2 shows a counterfactual scenario in which η is set to
0 and therefore immigrants do not experience job search assimilation. Under this scenario,
the same 40 year period produces barely 1.9% earnings growth, showing that nearly 90%
of the earnings growth for immigrants is attributable to job search assimilation.
In contrast, if immigrants could search as effectively as natives sooner than the estimates
indicate, they would experience faster earnings growth. The dotted lined curve in the same
figure shows a counterfactual scenario in which η is doubled to 0.0127, halving the average
length of time needed to spend in the host country before acquiring the native job search
efficiency. The counterfactual earnings profile shows faster and larger earnings growth,
with 7.5% and 19.3% increases in 10 and 40 year periods since migration, respectively.
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Figure 4.3: Predicted Immigrant Earnings Relative to Native Earnings

Figure 4.3 shows predicted earnings profiles of immigrants entering the host country
at different ages. These profiles are measured relative to their native counterparts, with an
assumption that native workers enter the labour market at age 20. The earnings are followed until immigrants reach age 65. For each age group, the initial earnings gap reflects
the natives’ advantage of having more time operating in the host country labour market.
For any age group in Figure 4.3, the relative earnings decline initially for two reasons.
First, newly arrived immigrants search with lower job search efficiency. Second, natives
are experiencing robust earnings growth during their early years in the labour market. As
immigrants age, their earnings level converges to a level about 8% below the native earnings, failing to achieve the earnings parity. This failure of earnings convergence is because
of the immigrants’ higher job destruction rate. The same exercise is conducted assuming
that immigrants face the native job destruction rate, and this counterfactual experiment produces the relative earnings profile in Figure 4.4. In this counterfactual scenario, immigrants
close the earnings gap more than in the previous case. However, even as they turn 65 they
have yet to achieve earnings parity.
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Figure 4.4: Counterfactual Immigrant Earnings Relative to Native Earnings

It is also interesting to ask how natives are affected by having to compete with immigrants in the same labour market. The presence of new immigrants produces an equilibrium
effect, which reflects a change in firms’ wage posting strategies. They search at lower job
offer arrival rates, resulting in an increase in the fraction of workers with less propensity
to make a job-to-job transition. This leads to an increase in firms’ monopsony power in
the model, allowing them to post lower wages and shift the offer distribution to the left in
equilibrium.27 Without immigrants, the firms’ monopsony power would be reduced, and
the equilibrium wage offer distribution would shift to the right.28 To look at this effect on
natives’ earnings, we solve the equilibrium with µ = 0, and compare the native earnings
distribution under this equilibrium with the one under the estimated parameters. These distributions are presented in Figure 4.5. The mean difference in these two distributions are
$175.88, implying a 4% reduction in the mean earnings of natives due to the presence of
27

See Burdett and Mortensen (1998) for a discussion on how workers’ likelihood to make a job-to-job
transition as opposed to a job-to-unemployment transition affects the monopsony power of firms.
28
We do not account for the effect of the immigrant labour force on native job offer arrival rates and any
resulting equilibrium effects.
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Figure 4.5: Predicted Native Earnings Distributions

immigrants in the labour market.

4.5

Concluding Remarks

Immigrant assimilation is a major issue in many countries. There is a very large literature that studies assimilation primarily through a human capital framework. While a variety of these studies, going back to Chiswick (1978), refers to immigrants accumulating
host country specific knowledge as well as skills following migration, the accumulation of
knowledge of how the host country labour market works and how to search efficiently has
received relatively little attention. In this paper, we use a search model to study assimilation
via this potentially important host-country specific knowledge. Specifically, we present and
estimate an equilibrium search model of immigrants operating in the same labour market
as natives using Canadian panel data.
Assimilation via acquisition of knowledge of how the host country labour market works
and how to search efficiently in it takes place in the model by having immigrants initially
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face a (potentially) lower arrival rate of job offers, and allowing them to acquire the same
job offer arrival rate according to a stochastic process. The estimation results show substantial differences in job offer arrival rates between natives and newly arrived immigrants, as
well as a difference in the job destruction rate between natives and immigrants. These differences are able to account for three quarters of the observed earnings differential between
natives and immigrants.
The results also imply that it takes immigrants, on average, 13 years to acquire the same
search parameters as natives. The parameter estimates reveal that newly arrived immigrants
have a hard time generating earnings growth because of their very low job offer arrival
rate while employed, with counterfactual exercises indicating that the vast majority of the
earnings growth for immigrants is due to job search assimilation. Moreover, if the time
needed to acquire the native job search process were halved, immigrants would experience
a faster and larger earnings growth. This has important implications for policy initiatives
to encourage immigrant assimilation.
Although the model is able to fit various dimensions of the observed data well, it is
at odds with the observed data in some dimensions. Particularly, the model is not able to
capture the difference in accepted wages out of unemployment between natives and immigrants and it has difficulty generating sufficient earnings growth. These two findings may
point to productivity differences and the role of human capital accumulation, and enriching the model in this dimension is an interesting avenue for future research. In particular,
given the large previous literature emphasizing the role of human capital accumulation in
immigrant assimilation, it is important to understand the relative roles of human capital and
search in this process.
Finally, given the modest number of immigrant observations in the estimation sample,
the estimates pertaining to the immigrant job search parameters are not precisely estimated.
In addition, it was not possible to allow for initial job offer arrival rates to depend on
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potentially relevant factors, such as the degree of similarity between the labour markets in
the source and host countries. An important next step is to incorporate heterogeneity in
initial Canadian Labour market knowledge through the use of alternative data sources such
as the LSIC.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This thesis studies job and occupational transition patterns of different groups of workers.
The second chapter examines the effect of learning on young workers’ job search and transition patterns by developing and estimating a model unifying learning, skill accumulation
and directed search processes. The estimation results using U.S. data show large differences in search frictions, returns to skills, skill acquisition rates, and learning opportunities
across occupations. Simulation exercises show that while learning can have a sizeable effect on young workers’ job search, changes in search effort allocation due to learning do
not result in a comparable effect in occupational transition outcomes because of search frictions. In particular, high search frictions associated with the white-collar occupation limit
opportunities to receive signals that have a large impact on workers’ search decisions. As
a result, they reduce the effect of learning in workers’ early career occupational mobility.
The third chapter studies the role of skill depreciation in explaining the stylized lifecycle employment transition patterns of British women, which highlight pervasive parttime employment that follows occupational downgrading at the start of motherhood. A
dynamic model of employment transitions between full-time work, part-time work and
nonemployment is developed, and numerical exercises with the model find reasonable pa133
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rameter values that can produce these patterns as a result of workers’ choices over hours
and occupations in the life cycle.
The fourth chapter develops and estimates an equilibrium search model of immigrants
operating in the same labour market as natives, where newly arrived immigrants have lower
job offer arrival rates than natives but can acquire the same arrival rates according to a
stochastic process. Using Canadian panel data, substantial differences in job offer arrival
and destruction rates between natives and immigrants are found that are able to account for
three quarters of the observed earnings gap. The estimates imply that immigrants take, on
average, 13 years to acquire the native search parameters. Counterfactual exercises show
that the vast majority of earnings growth immigrants experience after migration is due to
the job search assimilation process. This is due to the large difference in on-the-job job
offer arrival rates between new immigrants and natives.

Appendix A
A Case Allowing for Correlation
between the Skill Acquisition
Probabilities and the Initial Skill Levels
In this appendix, I consider a case where a particular form of correlation between the skill
acquisition probability and the initial skill level is allowed. While maintaining the assumption that the initial skill level takes on two possible values, s` or s` , I now assume that the
distribution of the initial skill level is given by the following conditional distribution:
Pr(s0 = s` | θ` ) = m` + n` θ` ,

(A.1)

where 0 ≤ m` ≤ 1, 0 ≤ n` ≤ 1, and 0 ≤ m` + n` ≤ 1. This specification allows the initial
skill levels and skill acquisition probabilities to be positively correlated. Note that a case
with n` = 0 is equivalent to the original model.
For each skill ` = 1, 2, two initial belief distributions emerge for the skill acquisition
probabilities because there are two possible initial skill levels. Suppose that a worker’s
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initial level is s` . By Bayes’ rule, the posterior distribution of θ` conditional on s` is given
by
(m` + n` θ` )θ`p` −1 (1 − θ` )q` −1

Pr(θ` |s0 = s` ) = R 1
0

(m` + n` θ)θ p` −1 (1 − θ)q` −1 dθ

.

(A.2)

In contrast, if a worker’s initial skill level is s` , then the initial belief distribution is given
by
(1 − m` − n` θ` )θ`p` −1 (1 − θ` )q` −1

Pr(θ` |s0 = s` ) = R 1
0

(1 − m` − n` θ)θ p` −1 (1 − θ)q` −1 dθ

.

(A.3)

It can be shown that the distributions in equations (A.2) and (A.3) are mixtures of two
Beta distributions.
Proposition A.0.1 Define probability density functions φ(θ, p, q, m, n) and ψ(θ, p, q, m, n),
respectively, by
φ(θ, p, q, m, n) ≡

m(p + q) f (θ; p, q) + np f (θ; p + 1, q)
m(p + q) + np

and
ψ(θ; p, q, m, n) ≡

(1 − m − n)(p + q) f (θ; p, q) + nq f (θ; p, q + 1)
,
(1 − m − n)(p + q) + nq

where f (θ; p, q) is the density function of the Beta distribution with parameters p and q.
Then the initial belief distributions shown in equations (A.2) and (A.3) are respectively
rewritten as Pr(θ` |s0 = s` ) = φ(θ` ; p` , q` , m` , n` ) and Pr(θ` |s0 = s` ) = ψ(θ` ; p` , q` , m` , n` )
for ` = 1, 2.
Proof. Simple algebraic manipulations on equations (A.2) and (A.3) establish the claim.

Both φ(·) and ψ(·) are mixtures of two Beta distributions with mixing proportions given
by functions of m` , n` , p` and q` . On the one hand, if n` = 0, both of them are reduced
to the Beta distribution with parameters p` and q` . In this case, the initial skill level does
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not provide any new information regarding θ` because they are uncorrelated. As a result,
the initial belief distribution coincides with the population distribution of θ` . On the other
hand, if m` = 0 and n` = 1, then the initial skill level has the same information content
regarding θ` as a skill acquisition outcome. In this case, φ(·) is the Beta distribution with
parameters p` + 1 and q` , while ψ(·) is the Beta distribution with parameters p` and q` + 1.
It has been shown that mixtures of the Beta distributions are natural conjugates for the
Bernoulli distribution.1 This is also true in the present case, and the following result is
presented to provide the Bayesian updating rules in this case.
Proposition A.0.2 Consider a Bernoulli random variable with parameter θ and suppose
the true value of θ is unknown. If the prior distribution of θ is given by φ(θ; p` , q` , m` , n` ),
then the posterior distribution is given by φ(θ; p` + 1, q` , m` , n` ) in the event of success,
and φ(θ; p` , q` + 1, m` , n` ) in the event of failure. Similarly, if the prior distribution is
ψ(θ; p` , q` , m` , n` ). Then the posterior distribution is given by ψ(θ; p` + 1, q` , m` , n` ) in the
event of success, and ψ(θ; p` , q` + 1, m` , n` ) in the event of failure.
Proof. Application of the Bayes’ rule and straightforward algebraic steps prove the claim.

The above statement means that the workers’ learning process can be captured just by
incrementing either the first or second parameter of φ(·) or ψ(·), depending on the outcome
of skill acquisition. In the event of success, the parameter p` is incremented by 1, while in
the event of failure, q` is incremented by 1. Therefore the Bayesian updating rule in this
model is as simple as in the standard Bernoulli learning model.
Using these two mixture distributions instead of the Beta distribution in the workers’
dynamic problem only requires the change in equation (2.12). Specifically, the equation
1

See, for example, Bernardo and Smith (1994).
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will be replaced by

Vtk (S , r)

1 
k
0
= r + yk (s1 , s2 ) +
(1 − ωk1 − ωk2 ) max[Wt+1
(S , r), Vt+1
(S )]
1+ρ
1
2

X
X
0
k
0
p` (a; s` ) max[Wt+1 (S k` (a), r), Vt+1 (S k` (a))] , (A.4)
ωk`
+
`=1

a=0

where p` (a; s0` ) is given by
p` (a; s0` ) = θ` (η` , υ` , s0` ) a [1 − θ` (η` , υ` , s0` )]1−a ,
with θ` (η` , υ` , s0` ) denoting the mean of the belief distribution.2 This value is given by
θ` (η` , υ` , s0` ) = η` +

n` η` (1 − η` )υ`
I(s0` =s` )

(m` + n` η` )

(m` + n` η` − 1)I(s` =s` )
0

.

Table A.1 presents the parameter estimates of the augmented model allowing the correlation. The parameters controlling the correlation between s0` and θ` for both ` = 1, 2 are
estimated to be just around 0.02 and statistically insignificant at the 5% level. Furthermore,
the likelihood ratio test does not reject the hypothesis of no correlation.
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Workers’ initial skill levels (s01 , s02 ) enter p` (a, s0` ) because their initial skill levels influence their initial
belief for (θ1 , θ2 ).
2
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Table A.1: Parameter Estimates - Skill Acquisition, Initial Skill Level

Parameter
γ1` × 100
γ2` × 100
γ3` × 100
ω1`
ω2`
ω3`

Skill (`)
Skill (`)
1
2
Parameter
1
2
9.7683 0.0000
p`
1.4749 11.4096
(1.3633) (1.1996)
(0.3956) (4.3484)
0.6423 1.1930
q`
6.5627 10.7274
(15.0685) (0.1358)
(1.9365) (4.1178)
4.0180 2.6952
0.0323 0.8927
s`
(0.0164) (0.0040)
(0.6410) (0.6221)
s`
5.3316 3.0351
0.6805 0.1520
(0.0452) (0.0366)
(0.6238) (0.6256)
0.0254 0.9005
m`
0.9691 0.3481
(0.0085) (0.0170)
(0.0127) (0.1093)
0.3945 0.4902
n`
0.0238 0.0223
(0.0257) (0.0278)
(0.0135) (0.1991)

Occupation (k)
1
2
3
Parameter
0.0097 0.0289 0.0353
α
0.8183
(0.0014) (0.0038) (0.0050)
(0.0171)
λ1k
0.0036 0.0209 0.0220
b
6.7831
(0.0007) (0.0035) (0.0036)
(0.6139)
δk
0.0135 0.0458 0.0596
σu
0.3032
(0.0000) (0.0034) (0.0041)
(0.0015)
0
0.0135 0.0138 0.0383
π
0.5894
δk
(0.0000) (0.0025) (0.0047)
(0.0264)
00
δk
0.0135 0.0138 0.0383
ε
1.6260
(0.0018) (0.0022) (0.0045)
(0.1667)
βk1
0.7243 0.5881 1.0000†
χ
0.2586
(0.0998) (0.0480)
(0.0424)
βk2
1.5315 1.3447 1.0000†
(0.1452) (0.0807)
µk
0.1477 1.3836 0.0000†
(0.2747) (0.3444)
σk
0.2665 0.2185 0.2562
(0.0232) (0.0111) (0.0126)
Loglikelihood value: −10.682.34
Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses
† normalized value
Parameter
λ0k

Appendix B
Occupation Classification
Suppose that the population of occupations is comprised by K > 0 groups. The proportion
of each group in all occupations is given by pk for k = 1, 2, . . . , K. Each occupation j
has a vector of characteristics x j . Assume that for occupations belonging to group k, their
characteristics are drawn from distribution with density function f (x j ; Θk ), where Θk is the
parameters corresponding to group k. Under these assumptions, the likelihood of observing
x j is given by
K
X

pk f (x j ; Θk ).

k=1

The probability that occupation j belongs to group k is given by
pk f (x j ; Θk )
.
PK
g=1 pg f (x j ; Θg )

(B.1)

Suppose that for k = 1, . . . , K, pk and Θk are estimated with a sample of occupations. Then
the sample analog of equation (B.1) is given by
p̂k f (x j ; Θ̂k )
.
PK
g=1 p̂g f (x j ; Θ̂g )
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(B.2)
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Table B.1: Parameter Estimates from Cluster Analysis
Cluster (k)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

pk
0.2007
0.0303
0.0904
0.0579
0.1232
0.1204
0.2602
0.1168

1.2049
1.8826
0.7909
−0.8813
−0.1967
−0.9033
−0.5398
−1.0776

µk
σk
−0.3164
0.5609 0.2333
−0.0414
0.8952 0.0007
1.8348
0.2882 0.3516
1.5840
0.8648 0.0724
1.5079 −0.5164 0.1955
0.6461
1.4244 0.4242
−0.1368 −0.8937 0.4179
−0.8484
0.3581 0.3929

Occupation j is assigned to group k that maximizes the value given in equation B.2.
I follow Banfield and Raftery (1993)’s framework, and assume that f ( ·; Θk ) is the multivariate normal distribution. The model is estimated with various specifications of the
covariance matrix of the distribution, and with various values of K. The specification that
attains the highest BIC level is chosen as the best fitting model. The actual estimation is
performed with the mclust program for R.1
When grouping the 1970 census 3-digit occupation codes this way, their scores for the
first three factors extracted by Robinson (2011)’s factor analysis are used as their observed
characteristics.2 The estimation results find that the best fitting model has K = 8 clusters,
with each mixed distribution f ( ·; Θk ) specified as the multivariate normal distribution with
mean vector µk and covariance matrix σk I, where I denotes the identity matrix of dimension
three. Table B.1 presents the estimates for µk and σk for the best fitting model.
Unfortunately, it is highly difficult to estimate the worker’s problem with eight occupation groups. Thus, these clusters are combined further into three clusters.3 Specifically,
1

See Fraley and Raftery (2003)
While 4 factors are retained in his analysis, the last factor is omitted since adding of this factor to the
present cluster analysis produced a result that was unintuitive than those obtained from the three factors.
Leaving out this factor might be justified on the grounds that this factor seems to have marginally identified
as a significant factor.
3
One can estimate the multivariate normal model for a pre-specified number of clusters. The estimation
result with three clusters provide similar occupation classification as the one used in this model. It appears
2
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Figure B.1: Factor Scores of the 3-digit Occupations by Aggregated Occupation Group

clusters 1 and 2 are combined to form occupation group 1, clusters 3, 4, 5 and 6 into occupation group 2, clusters 7 and 8 into occupation group 3. Figure B.1 plots the factor scores
of the 3-digit occupations by aggregated occupation group, and Table B.2 lists the 3-digit
occupation codes in each aggregated occupation group.
Finally, to handle cases where reported 3-digit occupation codes for a particular job
spell are classified into different aggregate occupation groups, the following three rules are
applied in turn. First, if more than two-thirds of the reported 3-digit occupation codes are
classified into a single occupation group, the corresponding job spell is assigned to this
occupation group. Second, if reported 3-digit occupation codes are either classified into
occupation 1 or occupation 3, but not to occupation 2, then the corresponding job spell
is assigned to occupation 1. Analogously, if the reported 3-digit codes are either classified to occupation 2 or occupation 3, but not to occupation 1, then the corresponding job
spell is classified to occupation 2. Third, if the reported 3-digit occupations are classified
that as the number of cluster is increased by one, a new cluster is formed by dividing an existing cluster into
two.
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into occupation 1 not less than occupation 2, then the corresponding job spell is assigned
occupation 1. Otherwise, the job spell is assigned into occupation 2.
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Table B.2: List of the 1970 Census Occupation Codes in Each Aggregated Occupation
Group
Aggregated Occupation Group
Occupation Category 1
2
3
Professional
1, 3-5, 13, 22
2, 6-12, 14-21
82, 84, 156, 171
23, 25, 26, 33
173
24, 30-32, 34-36
54-56, 74, 86-102 42-53, 61-72
104-122, 25-133
75-81, 83, 85
135-144, 174
103, 123, 124, 134
181, 184, 192-195 145-155, 161-170
172, 175, 180, 182
183, 185-191
Managers
201-212, 215-220 213, 221
222-245
Sales workers
260, 261, 265
262, 264, 266, 283
270-282, 284, 285
Clerical workers
312, 313, 326, 363
301-310, 314-325
330-362, 364-396
Craftmen
441
403, 404, 410-440 401, 402, 405, 442
444, 445, 452-495 443, 446, 450, 501
502, 504-515
503, 516, 533, 542
520-531, 534-540 572
543-571, 575
Operatives
603, 614, 615, 635 601, 602, 604-612
640, 661, 680
620-634, 641-660
662-674, 681-695
Transport equipment
701, 702, 710, 712 704-706, 711, 713
operatives
714, 715
Laborers
750, 761
740, 751-760
762-785
Farmers
801,802, 821
822, 823, 824
Service workers
940, 950, 952, 954 903, 935, 944, 945 901, 902, 910-934
982
961, 964, 965
941-943, 953, 960
962, 963, 980, 981
983, 984

Appendix C
Supplementary Results on Predicted
Effects of Learning on Search Effort

Table C.1: Predicted Job Search Effort Allocations in the 2nd Quarter – Type A Workers
Search effort allocation
Current Occupation Occ 1 Occ 2 Occ3
(s01 , s02 ) = (5.34, 3.03)
Unemployed
0.301 0.417 0.282
Occupation 1
1.000 0.000 0.000
Occupation 2
0.798 0.201 0.001
Occupation 3
0.358 0.575 0.067
0 0
(s1 , s2 ) = 4.02, 3.03)
Unemployed
0.347 0.563 0.090
Occupation 1
1.000 0.000 0.000
Occupation 2
0.734 0.266 0.000
Occupation 3
0.227 0.736 0.037
0 0
(s1 , s2 ) = (4.02, 2.69)
Unemployed
0.331 0.583 0.086
Occupation 1
1.000 0.000 0.000
Occupation 2
0.675 0.325 0.000
Occupation 3
0.207 0.748 0.044
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Table C.2: Predicted Job Search Effort Allocations in the 2nd Quarter – Type B Workers

Current Occupation
(s01 , s02 ) = (5.34, 3.03)
Unemployed
Occupation 1
Occupation 2
Occupation 3
0 0
(s1 , s2 ) = (5.34, 2.69)
Unemployed
Occupation 1
Occupation 2
Occupation 3
(s01 , s02 ) = (4.02, 3.03)
Unemployed
Occupation 1
Occupation 2
Occupation 3
(s01 , s02 ) = (4.02, 2.69)
Unemployed
Occupation 1
Occupation 2
Occupation 3

Search effort allocation
Occ 1 Occ 2 Occ3
0.124
0.137
0.088
0.211

0.198
0.000
0.033
0.000

0.678
0.867
0.879
0.789

0.094
0.046
0.052
0.080

0.171
0.000
0.030
0.000

0.735
0.954
0.918
0.920

0.149
0.511
0.156
0.364

0253
0.000
0.077
0.002

0.598
0.489
0.767
0.634

0.113
0.124
0.089
0.208

0.222
0.003
0.064
0.000

0.665
0.873
0.847
0.792
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Figure C.1: Predicted Search Effort Allocations in the 41st Quarter – Type A Workers
Workers with (s01 , s02 ) = (5.34, 3.03)

Workers with (s01 , s02 ) = (4.02, 3.03)

Workers with (s01 , s02 ) = (4.02, 2.69)
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Figure C.2: Predicted Search Effort Allocations in the 41st Quarter – Type B Workers
Workers with (s01 , s02 ) = (5.34, 3.03)

Workers with (s01 , s02 ) = (5.34, 2.69)
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Figure C.3: Predicted Search Effort Allocations in the 41st Quarter – Type B Workers
(Continued)
Workers with (s01 , s02 ) = (4.02, 3.03)

Workers with (s01 , s02 ) = (4.02, 2.69)

Appendix D
Mathematical Proofs for Chapter 4
Proof of Proposition 1
Accounting for the reservation wage property of type 1 immigrant worker’s problem, equation (4.4) can be rewritten as

rVmu

= b + α0 λ0

Z

w



Vme (x) − Vmu dF(x) + η Vnu − Vmu − δ2 Vmu .

Rm

Analogously equation (4.5) can be rewritten as

rVme (w)

= w + α1 λ1

Z

w



Vme (x) − Vme (w) dF(x) + ηI(w ≥ Rn ) Vne (w) − Vme (w)

w



+ ηI(w < Rn ) Vnu − Vme (w) + δ1 Vmu − Vme (w) − δ2 Vme (w).

The above equation yields
d
1 + ηI(w > Rn ) dw
Vne (w)
d e
V (w) =
dw m
ρ + η + α1 λ1 F(w)
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(D.1)
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where Vme (w) is differentiable.1 Equation (4.2) yields
1
d e
Vn (w) =
.
dw
ρ + λ1 F(w)

(D.2)

These two equations, together with Vme (Rm ) = Vmu and Vne (Rn ) = Vne , yield
Z
Rm =b + (α0 λ0 −α1 λ1 )

w

Rm
w

Z
=b + (α0 λ0 −α1 λ1 )

Rm



Vme (x)−Vme (Rm ) dF(x) + ηI(Rm > Rn ) Vne (Rn )−Vne (Rm )
d
F(x) Vme (x)dx + ηI(Rm > Rn )
dw

Z

Rn

Rm

(D.3)

d e
V (x)dx,
dw n

where the second term is obtained by integration by parts.
Using equation (D.1), the integral in the second term on the right-hand side of equation
(D.3) is given by
Z

w

Rm

Z w
d e
F(x)
dx
F(x) Vm (x)dx =
dw
Rm ρ+η+α1 λ1 F(x)
Z w
Z w
d
d
ηF(x) dw
Vne (x)
ηF(x) dw
Vne (x)
+ I(Rm < Rn )
dx + I(Rm ≥ Rn )
dx. (D.4)
Rn ρ+η+α1 λ1 F(x)
Rm ρ+η+α1 λ1 F(x)

The integral in the third term on the right-hand side of equation (D.4) can be split into two
terms as follows:
Z

w

Rm
1

d
ηF(x) dw
Vne (x)

ρ+η+α1 λ1 F(x)

=

Z

w

Rn

d
ηF(x) dw
Vne (x)

ρ+η+α1 λ1 F(x)

Z

Rm

dx −

From equation (4.5), it is clear that Vme (w) has a kink at Rn .

Rn

d
ηF(x) dw
Vne (x)

ρ+η+α1 λ1 F(x)

dx.
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Thus equation (D.4) can be rearranged to
Z

w

F(x)Vme (x)dx
Rm

=

Z

w

F(x)

dx +

Z

w

ηF(x)Vne (x)

ρ+η+α1 λ1 F(x)
Rn ρ+η+α1 λ1 F(x)
Z Rm
ηF(x)Vne (x)
−I(Rm ≥ Rn )
dx
Rn ρ+η+α1 λ1 F(x)

dx

Rm

Then substituting the above expression into equation (D.3) and a few algebraic steps yield
the desired result.

Proof of Lemma 1
Define function H(w) by

H(w) = b − w +

Z

w̄

(α0 λ0 − α1 λ1 )F(x)
ρ + η + α1 λ1 F(w)

w

dx +

− I(w > Rn )

w

Z

Rn

Z

w

Rn

(α0 λ0 − α1 λ1 )F(x)

η

dx
ρ + η + α1 λ1 F(x) ρ + λ1 F(x)
ρ + η + α0 λ0 F(x)
η
dx. (D.5)
ρ + η + α1 λ1 F(x) ρ + λ1 F(x)

By Proposition 1, Rm solves equation H(Rm ) = 0. Function H(w) can be rewritten as

H(w) = b − w̄ +

Z
w

w̄

ρ + η + α0 λ0 F(x)
ρ + η + α1 λ1 F(x)

dx +

− I(w > Rn )

w

Z

Rn

Z

w

Rn

(α0 λ0 − α1 λ1 )F(x)

dx
ρ + η + α1 λ1 F(x) ρ + λ1 F(x)
ρ + η + α0 λ0 F(x)
η
dx. (D.6)
ρ + η + α1 λ1 F(x) ρ + λ1 F(x)

Note that H(w) is continuous. It is also decreasing because
H 0 (w) = −

η

ρ + η + α0 λ0 F(w)
ρ + η + α1 λ1 F(w)

<0
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for w < Rn , and
H 0 (w) = −

ρ + η + α0 λ0 F(w)
ρ + η + α1 λ1 F(w)

−

ρ + η + α0 λ0 F(w)

η

ρ + η + α1 λ1 F(w) ρ + λ1 F(w)

<0

for w > Rn . Therefore Rn > Rm if and only if H(Rn ) < H(Rm ) = 0.
Evaluate H(w) at Rn :

H(Rn ) = b − w̄ +

Z

w̄

ρ + η + α0 λ0 F(x)

dx +

Z

w

(α0 λ0 − α1 λ1 )F(x)

η

dx
ρ + η + α1 λ1 F(x)
Rn ρ + η + α1 λ1 F(x) ρ + λ1 F(x)
Z w̄
Z w̄
ρ + η + α0 λ0 F(x) η + ρ + λ1 F(x)
η
= b − w̄ +
dx −
dx. (D.7)
Rn ρ + η + α1 λ1 F(x) ρ + λ1 F(x)
Rn ρ + λ1 F(x)
Rn

Now equation (4.3) can be rewritten as
b−w=−

Z

w

Rn

ρ + λ0 F(w)
ρ + λ1 F(x)

(D.8)

dx.

Substituting equation (D.8) into equation (D.7) yields
H(Rn ) =

Z

w̄

Rn

ρ + η + α0 λ0 F(x) η + ρ + λ1 F(x)
ρ + η + α1 λ1 F(x) ρ + λ1 F(x)

Z

w̄

dx −
Rn

η + ρ + λ0 F(x)
ρ + λ1 F(x)

Hence Rn > Rm if and only if
Z

w̄

Rn



 η + ρ + λ0 F(x) ρ + η + α0 λ0 F(x) η + ρ + λ1 F(x) 
 dx > 0,
−

ρ + λ1 F(x)
ρ + η + α1 λ1 F(x) ρ + λ1 F(x)

which is the desired result.

dx.
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Proof of Proposition 2
Given α1 < 1 and η > 0, using equations (4.8) and (4.9), we can show that
Gm1 (w) =

F(w)
1+

α1 λ1
F(w)
δ+η

>

F(w)
1+

λ1
F(w)
δ+η

>

F(w)
1+

λ1
F(w)
δ

= Gn (w),

which yields Gm1 (w) > Gn (w) for any w ∈ [w, w]. This establishes the first-order stochastic
dominance of Gn (w) over Gm1 (w).
Next, using equations (4.8) and (4.10), we can show that


Gm2 (w) = 1 −

δ2 α0 (δ + λ0 )α1 λ1 F(w)
δ(α0 δ2 + α0 λ0 + δ + η)(δ + η + α1 λ1 F(w))



 Gn (w).

(D.9)

It is straightforward to show

0≤

δ2 α0 (δ + λ0 )α1 λ1 F(w)
δ(α0 δ2 + α0 λ0 + δ + η)(δ + η + α1 λ1 F(w))

< 1,

which yields Gm2 (w) < Gn (w) for any w ∈ [w, w]. This establishes the first-order stochastic
dominance of Gm2 (w) over Gn (w).

Proof of Proposition 3
Gm (w) is given by
Gm (w) =

Em1Gm1 (w) + Em2Gm2 (w)
Em1 + Em2

(D.10)

where Em1 and Em2 denote the steady-state measures of employed type 1 and type 2 immigrants, respectively. These two variables are determined by the following steady-state flow
analysis.
First, define Um1 and Um2 as the steady-state measures of unemployed type 1 and type
2 immigrants, respectively. Then, Em1 , Em2 , Um1 , and Um2 sum up to the measure of all
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immigrant workers:
Um1 + Um2 + Em1 + Em2 = µ.

(D.11)

Second, type 1 immigrants leave employment at rate δ1 due to job separation, and at rate
δ2 due to permanent exit from the labour market. They may become type 2 immigrants at
rate η. This outflow is balanced by the inflow of unemployed type 1 immigrants becoming
employed at rate α0 λ0 . Therefore,
(δ1 + δ2 + η)Em1 = α0 λ0 Um1 .

(D.12)

Third, type 2 immigrants leave unemployment at rate λ0 , and leave the labour market permanently at rate δ2 . This outflow is balanced by type 1 unemployed immigrants becoming
type 2 at rate η, and type 2 employed immigrants becoming unemployed at rate δ1 . Therefore,
(λ0 + δ2 )Um2 = ηUm1 + δ1 Em2 .

(D.13)

Fourth, employed type 2 immigrants become unemployed at rate δ1 , or leave the labour
market permanently at rate δ2 . This outflow is balanced by the inflow of unemployed
type 2 immigrants becoming employed at rate λ0 and type 1 immigrants becoming type 2
immigrants. Therefore,
(δ1 + δ2 )Em2 = λ0 Um2 + ηEm1 .

(D.14)

Solving equations (D.11) - (D.14), we obtain Em1 and Em2 , respectively, as
δ2 α0 λ0
µ,
(η + δ2 )(α0 λ0 + η + δ)

(D.15)

ηλ0 (δ + η + α0 λ0 + α0 δ2 )
µ.
(η + δ2 )(δ + λ0 )(α0 λ0 + η + δ)

(D.16)

Em1 =

and
Em2 =
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Substituting equations (4.9), (4.10), (D.15), and (D.16) into equation (D.10) to obtain the
expression for Gm (w), and then comparing the result with Gn (w) in equation (4.8) yields
the following relationship between Gm (w) and Gn (w):


Gm (w) = 1 +

δ2 (δ + λ0 )(δ + η)α0 λ0 (1 − α1 )λ1 F(w)



  Gn (w).
δ (δ + η + λ0 )(λ0 δ2 α0 + ηλ0 (δ + η + α0 λ0 ))(δ + η + λ1 F(w)

Since α1 < 1, then
δ2 (δ + λ0 )(δ + η)α0 λ0 (1 − α1 )λ1 F(w)
δ (δ + η + λ0 )(λ0 δ2 α0 + ηλ0 (δ + η + α0 λ0 ))(δ + η + λ1 F(w)

 > 0,

which yields
Gm (w) > Gn (w)
for any w ∈ [w, w]. Thus, Gn (w) first-order stochastically dominates Gm (w).

Proof of Proposition 4
In order to establish Proposition 4, we solve a number of differential equations. The outline
of this proof is as follows. First, we show the limit of Gn (w, a). Then we do the same for
Gm (w, a), and show that it has the same limit.
Step 1
Let En (a) and Un (a) denote the mass of natives of age a who are employed and unemployed,
respectively. At any given time, employed workers become unemployed at rate δ1 and leave
the labour market at rate δ2 , and unemployed workers become employed at rate λ0 , and
leave the labour market at rate δ2 . Moreover, due to the steady-state assumption, all cohorts
have identical aggregate employment and unemployment profiles at all ages. Exploiting the
steady-state assumption, Un (a) and En (a) are given by the following system of differential
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equations
U̇n (a) = −(λ0 + δ2 )Un (a) + δ1 En (a)
Ėn (a) = λ0 Un (a) − (δ1 + δ2 )En (a).
Furthermore, all workers enter the labour market initially unemployed, implying En (0) = 0,
R
while the aggregate condition yields (Un (a) + En (a))da = 1 − µ. Together with these
conditions, the system of the these differential equations yields
#
λ0 δ2 −(λ0 +δ1 +δ2 )a
δ1 δ2 −δ2 a
e
+
e
(1 − µ),
Un (a) =
λ0 + δ1
λ0 + δ1
"
#
λ0 δ2 −δ2 a
λ0 δ2 −(λ0 +δ1 +δ2 )a
En (a) =
e
−
e
(1 − µ).
λ0 + δ1
λ0 + δ1
"

(D.17)
(D.18)

Let Mn (w, a) be the steady-state stock of natives of age a earning wage w or less. Clearly
Mn (w, 0) = 0. Job-to-job transitions and unemployment-to-job transitions produce the
following differential equation regarding Mn (w, a):
dMn (w, a)
= −(δ1 + δ2 + λ1 F(w))Mn (w, a) + λ0 F(w)Un (a).
da
The differential equation shows that the change in Mn (w, a) with respect to a consists of two
parts. The first part is the outflow from Mn (w, a) due to on-the-job search, job destruction
and permanent exit from the labour market. The second part is the inflow of unemployed
natives finding wage offers of w or less. The general solution to this differential equation is
given by
Mn (w, a) = e

−(δ+λ1 F(w))a

"Z

#
[e

(δ+λ1 F(w))a

λ0 F(w)Un (a)]da + C

(D.19)

where C is a constant to be determined by the condition Mn (w, 0) = 0. Together with
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equation (D.17), equation (D.19) gives
δ1 δ2
e−δ2 a
λ0 δ2
e−(λ0 +δ)a
Mn (w, a) =(1 − µ)λ0 F(w)
−
λ0 + δ1 δ1 + λ1 F(w) λ0 + δ1 λ0 − λ1 F(w)
"

+e

−(δ+λ1 F(w))a

#
(D.20)

C.

After pinning down C by the condition Mn (w, 0) = 0, equation (D.20) can be rewritten as

 δ1 δ2 e−δ2 a − e−(δ+λ1 F(w))a
Mn (w, a) = (1 − µ)λ0 F(w) 
λ0 + δ1 δ1 + λ1 F(w)

λ0 δ2 e−(λ0 +δ)a − e−(δ+λ1 F(w))a 
−
 . (D.21)
λ0 + δ1
λ0 − λ1 F(w)
The age-dependent earnings distribution of natives, given by Gn (w, a), is
Gn (w, a) =

Mn (w, a)
.
En (a)

Using equation (D.18) and (D.21), we obtain
Gn (w, a) =

δ1 F(w)

1 − e−(λ1 F(w)+δ1 )a
λ1 F(w) + δ1 1 − e−(λ0 +δ1 )a
λ0 F(w) e−(λ1 F(w)+δ1 )a − e−(λ0 +δ1 )a
,
+
1 − e−(λ0 +δ1 )a
λ0 − λ1 F(w)

and therefore
lim Gn (w, a) =

a→∞

δ1 F(w)
δ1 + λ1 F(w)

.

Step 2
The age profile of the earnings distribution of immigrants can be derived similarly. Let
Mmy (w, a) be the steady-state stock of type y immigrants of age a earning wage w or less.
For type 1 immigrants, the change in Mm1 (w, a) with respect to a comes from the outflow
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of workers due to job destruction, permanent exit, on-the-job search and type change, and
the inflow of unemployed workers accepting wage w or less:
dMm1 (w, a)
= −(δ1 + δ2 + η + α1 λ1 F(w))Mm1 (w, a) + α0 λ0 F(w)Um1 (a).
da

(D.22)

The above differential equation can be solved with the condition Mm1 (w, a) = 0. For type 2
immigrants, the change in Mm2 (w, a) with respect to a comes from the outflow of workers
due to job destruction, permanent exit and on-the-job search, the inflow from the pool of
employed type 1 immigrants due to type change, and the inflow of unemployed workers
accepting wage w or less:
dMm2 (w, a)
= −(δ1 + δ2 + λ1 F(w))Mm2 (w, a) + ηMm1 (w, a) + λ0 F(w)Um2 (a).
da

(D.23)

The above differential equation can be solved with the condition Mm2 (w, a) = 0.
The evolution of unemployment and employment measures of immigrants by age is
given by

 



 
 

δ1
0
0  Um1 (a)
U̇m1 (a) −(α0 λ0 + η + δ2 )




 
 

 Ė (a)  


α0 λ0
−(η + δ)
0
0   Em1 (a) 
 m1  
 


=
 

U̇ (a) 
η
0
−(λ0 + δ2 ) δ1  Um2 (a)
 m2  
 


 
 

 Ė (a)  
0
η
λ
−δ
E
(a)
m2
0
m2
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The system of differential equation has the solution

 

 
Um1 (a)  0 0

 
 Em1 (a)   0 0

 = 

 
Um2 (a)  δ1 1

 

 
Em2 (a)  λ0 −1

δ1
α0 λ0
δ1 (δ1 +α0 λ0 −η)
η−λ0 −δ1
(δ1 +α0 λ0 )λ0 −α0 λ0 η
η−λ0 −δ1



 

−δ2 a
1
  c1 e

 



−(λ0 +δ)a 



−1   c2 e

 



− η+(α0η−1)λ0   c3 e−(δ2 +η)a 
 

  −(α0 λ0 +η+δ)a 
η
ce
4

η+(α0 −1)λ0

with constants c1 , c2 , c3 and c4 determined by the following conditions:
Um2 (0) = Em1 (0) = Em2 (0) = 0,

and
∞

Z

(Um1 (a) + Um2 (a) + Em1 (a) + Em2 (a))da = µ.
0

These conditions yield
c1 =

δ2
µ,
δ1 + λ0

c3 =

δ2
µ,
δ1 + α0 λ0

c4 =

α0 λ0 δ2
µ,
δ1 + α0 λ0

and
c2 =

ηλ0 (α0 λ0 + δ1 )(η − λ0 − α0 δ1 )
µ.
(λ0 + δ1 )(η − λ0 − δ1 )(η + (α0 − 1)λ0 )

The general solution to differential equation (D.22) is given by
−(α1 λ1 F(w))a

Mm1 (w, a) = e

"
#
Z h
i
(α1 λ1 F(w)+δ+η)a
α0 λ0 F(w)
Um1 (a)e
da + C .

(D.24)
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The integral on the right-hand side of equation (D.24) can be rearranged to
Z

(α1 λ1 F(w)+δ+η)a

Um1 (a)e

da =

Z h

i
c3 δ1 e(α1 λ1 F(w)+δ1 )a + c4 e(α1 λ1 F(w)−α0 λ0 )a da
=

c3 δ1 e(α1 λ1 F(w)+δ1 )a
α1 λ1 F(w) + δ1

+

c4 e(α1 λ1 F(w)−α0 λ0 )a
α1 λ1 F(w) − α0 λ0

.

Therefore,
"
Mm1 (w, a) = α0 λ0 F(w)

c3 δ1 e−(η+δ2 )a
α1 λ1 F(w) + δ1

+

c4 e−(η+δ2 )a
α1 λ1 F(w) − α0 λ0

#

+ Ce−(α1 λ1 F(w)+η+δ)a . (D.25)

Using Mm1 (w, 0) = 0 to solve for C, and substituting the result into equation (D.25) yields


e−(η+δ2 )a − e−(α1 λ1 F(w)+η+δ)a

Mm1 (w, a) = α0 λ0 F(w) c3 δ1
α1 λ1 F(w) + δ1

e−(η+δ2 )a − e−(α1 λ1 F(w)+η+δ)a 
+c4
 .
α1 λ1 F(w) − α0 λ0
The general solution to equation (D.23) then yields
Mm2 (w, a) = e

"Z
−(λ1 F(w)+δ)a

= ηe

#
(ηMm1 (w, a) + λ0 F(w)Um2 (a))e

(λ1 F(w)+δ)a

da + C2

Z

−(λ1 F(w)+δ)a

Mm1 (w, a)e(λ1 F(w)+δ)a da
Z
−(λ1 F(w)+δ)a
+ λ0 F(w)e
Um2 (a))e(λ1 F(w)+δ)a da + C2 e−(λ1 F(w)+δ)a .

(D.26)

The integrals on the right-hand side of equation (D.26) can be written as
Z



(λ1 F(w)+δ1 −η)a
((1−α1 )λ1 F(w)−η)a


e
e



Mm1 (w, a)e(λ1 F(w)+δ)a da =
−

α1 λ1 F(w) + δ1 λ1 F(w) + δ1 − η (1 − α1 )λ1 F(w) − η


α0 λ0 F(w)c4  e(λ1 F(w)−α0 λ0 −η)a
e((1−α1 )λ1 F(w)−η)a 
+
−

 ,
α1 λ1 F(w) − α0 λ0 λ1 F(w) − α0 λ0 − η (1 − α1 )λ1 F(w) − η
α0 λ0 F(w)c3 δ1
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and
Z

Um2 (a)eλ1 F(w)+δ)a da = c1 δ1

e(λ1 F(w)+δ1 )a

+ c2

e(λ1 F(w)−λ0 )a

λ1 F(w) + δ1
λ1 F(w) − λ0
c4 η
e(λ1 F(w)−α0 λ0 −η)a
δ1 (δ1 + α0 λ0 − η) e(λ1 F(w)+δ1 −η)a
−
.
+ c3
η − λ0 − δ1 λ1 F(w) + δ1 − η η + (α0 − 1)λ0 λ1 F(w) − α0 λ0 − η

Using Mm2 (w, 0) = 0 to solve for C2 in equation (D.26), and substituting the result into the
same equation yields

Mm2 (w, a)


ηα0 λ0 F(w)c3 δ1  e−(η+δ)a − e−(λ1 F(w)+δ)a e−(α1 λ1 F(w)+η+δ)a − e−(λ1 F(w)+δ)a 
=
−


α1 λ1 F(w) + δ1
λ1 F(w) + δ1 − η
(1 − α1 )λ1 F(w) − η


ηα0 λ0 F(w)c4  e−(α0 λ0 +η+δ)a − e−(λ1 F(w)+δ)a e−(α1 λ1 F(w)+η+δ)a − e−(λ1 F(w)+δ)a 
−
+


α1 λ1 F(w) − α0 λ0
λ1 F(w) − α0 λ0 − η
(1 − α1 )λ1 F(w) − η
+λ0 F(w)c1 δ1

e−δ2 a − e−(λ1 F(w)+δ)a

+ λ0 F(w)c2

e−(λ0 +δ)a − e−(λ1 F(w)+δ)a

λ1 F(w) + δ1
λ1 F(w) − λ0
−(δ2 +η)a
−(λ1 F(w)+δ)a
−e
δ1 (δ1 + α0 λ0 − η) e
+λ0 F(w)c3
η − λ0 − δ1
λ1 F(w) + δ1 − η

−λ0 F(w)

c4 η
e−(α0 λ0 +η+δ)a − e−(λ1 F(w)+δ)a
.
η + (α0 − 1)λ0
λ1 F(w) − α0 λ0 − η

The age-dependent earnings distribution of immigrants, given by Gm (w, a), is
Gm (w, a) =

Mm1 (w, a) + Mm2 (w, a)
.
Em1 (a) + Em2 (a)

(D.27)

To show that Gm (w, a) converges to the same distribution as Gn (w, a), rewrite equation
(D.27) as
Gm (w, a) =

eδ2 a [Mm1 (w, a) + Mm2 (w, a)] eδ2 a Mm1 (w, a) + eδ2 a Mm2 (w, a)
=
.
eδ2 a [Em1 (a) + Em2 (a)]
eδ2 a Em1 (a) + eδ2 a Em2 (a)
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It is then straightforward to show the limits of the terms appearing in both the numerator
and denominator.
lim eδ2 a Mm1 (w, a) = 0,

a→∞

lim eδ2 a Em1 (a) = 0,

a→∞

lim eδ2 a Mm2 (w, a) =

a→∞

λ1 F(w) + δ1

lim eδ2 a Em2 (a) = λ0 c1 .

a→∞

Therefore we obtain the desired result.
lim Gm (w, a) =

a→∞

λ0 c1 δ1 F(w)

δ1 F(w)
λ1 F(w) + δ1

.

,

Appendix E
Likelihood Contributions for Chapter 4
For all individuals in the data set, the likelihood contributions account for their initially
observed employment outcomes, the duration of the initial spell, and if applicable, the
wages earned and transition made at the end of the spell. In addition to these pieces of
information, the characteristics of the next spell also enter into the likelihood if the initial
spell is an unemployment spell, or if it is a job spell that ends with a transition to an
unemployment spell. More specifically, a list of variables used in the likelihood can be
written as xi = (w1 , d1 , c1 , t1 , d2 , c2 ) for those initially employed, where w1 and d1 represent
the wage earned and duration of the initial job, c1 takes on a value of 1 if the initial spell
is censored and 0 otherwise, and t1 takes on a value of 1 if the initial spell ends with a
transition to a new job, and 0 if it ends with a transition to unemployment. If the initial spell
ends with a transition to unemployment, d2 represents the duration of the second spell, with
c2 being the indicator for censoring of the second spell. For those initially unemployed, xi
is given as xi = (d1 , c1 , w2 , d2 , c2 , t2 ) with d1 and c1 representing the duration and censoring
outcome of the unemployment spell, respectively, w2 , d2 and c2 representing the wage,
duration and censoring outcome of the following job spell, respectively, and t2 representing
the type of transition made if the second spell is complete.
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The likelihood contributions Ln (θ; xi ) and Lm2 (θ; xi ) have the familiar structure in the job
search literature because the search behaviours of the corresponding groups are standard.
In contrast, derivation of Lm1 (θ; xi ) involves accounting for possible changes in the search
process among workers, and requires more careful presentation. We discuss derivations for
these three in turn.

Derivation of Ln (θ; xi ) and Lm2 (θ; xi )
In the steady state, a native worker is employed with probability λ0 /(λ0 + δ), and the distribution of wages earned on that job is given by Gn (w1 ). Given the initial wage w, the
residual duration of the first job spell follows the exponential distribution with parameter (λ1 F(w) + δ). At the end of a job spell, a native worker makes a job-to-job transition
with probability λ1 F(w)/(λ1 F(w) + δ), or a job-to-unemployment transition with probability δ1 /(λ1 F(w) + δ). The duration of a new unemployment spell follows the exponential
distribution with parameter (λ0 + δ2 ) and ends with a transition to a new job with probability λ0 /(λ0 + δ2 ). Gathering all the components together, the likelihood contribution for
native-born individuals initially employed is given by
h
i1−c1
λ0
2 1−t1
gn (w)e−(λ1 F(w)+δ)d1 (λ1 F(w))t1 (δ1 e−(λ0 +δ2 )d2 λ1−c
)
0
λ0 + δ
where gn (w) denotes the density of Gn (w).
The probability that a native individual is unemployed in the steady-state is δ/(λ0 + δ).
The residual unemployment duration follows the exponential distribution with parameter
(λ0 + δ2 ), and the probability that an unemployment spell ends with a transition to a new
job as opposed to a permanent exit from the labour market is given by λ0 /(λ0 + δ2 ). The
distribution of wages on new jobs is given by F(w). The duration of a new job follows
the exponential distribution with parameter (λ1 F(w) + δ), and ends with a transition to a
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job spell with probability λ1 F(w)/(λ1 F(w) + δ) or with a job-to-unemployment transition
with probability δ1 /(λ1 F(w) + δ). Therefore, the likelihood contribution for native workers
initially unemployed takes the form

 1−t
 1−c1
δ
−(λ0 +δ2 )d1
t2 1−c2
−(λ1 F(w)+δ)d2
2
e
δ1 (λ1 F(w))
λ0 f (w)e
.
λ0 + δ
The likelihood contribution for type 2 immigrants is similar to the natives’ since they
share the same search process. Ln (θ, xi ) and Lm2 (θi , xi ) differ due to differences in the probabilities of the initial employment status and earned wage. The probability that a type 2
immigrant worker is employed at any instance is given by
λ0 (δ + η + α0 λ0 + α0 δ2 )
,
(λ0 + δ)(δ + η + α0 λ0 )
and the distribution of the wage earned is given by Gm2 (w) with its density denoted by
gm2 (w). The steady-state probability that a type 2 immigrant worker is unemployed is given
by
δ((δ + η) + δ1 α0 λ0 )
.
(λ0 + δ)(δ + η + α0 λ0 )
Thus, Lm2 (θ, xi ) takes the form
i1−c1
h
λ0 (δ + η + α0 λ0 + α0 δ2 )
2 1−t1
gm2 (w)e−(λ1 F(w)+δ)d1 (λ1 F(w))t1 (δ1 e−(λ0 +δ2 )d2 λ1−c
)
0
(λ0 + δ)(δ + η + α0 λ0 )
for those initially employed, or
 1−c1
 1−t
δ((δ + η) + δ1 α0 λ0 ) −(λ0 +δ2 )d1 
−(λ1 F(w)+δ)d2
t2 1−c2
2
e
λ0 f (w)e
δ1 (λ1 F(w))
(λ0 + δ)(δ + η + α0 λ0 )
for those initially unemployed.
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Derivation of Lm1 (θ; xi )
Derivation of Lm1 (θ; xi ) is more involved because of the possibility that type 1 immigrants
experience changes in search parameters. It is therefore helpful to introduce variables reflecting immigrant types upon transitions between spells. The variables, denoted y1 and y2 ,
are used to first form the joint probabilities with the observed outcomes, and then integrated
out to yield the expression for Lm1 (θ; xi ). This process results in the following expression
of the likelihood contribution of type 1 immigrants who are initially unemployed:


1−c1 
2 
2
X
X

 

1−c2 



PU
P j2 (d2 , y2 , c2 |w, y1 )Ptr (t2 |w, y2 )  
Pu1 (d1 , y1 , c1 )  f (w)
y2 =y1

y1 =1

where PU represents the probability that a type 1 immigrant is unemployed at any instant
in the steady state, i.e., PU = (δ + η)/(δ + η + α0 λ0 ). Component probability Pu1 (d1 , y1 , c1 )
is the joint probability of the residual unemployment duration, censoring indicator and the
ending immigrant type of the first spell. f (w) is the distribution of accepted wage offers.
P j2 (d2 , y2 , c2 |w, y1 ) is the joint probability of the duration, censoring outcome and ending
immigrant type of the following job spell conditional on the accepted wage and the starting
immigrant type on the job. The last factor, Ptr (t2 |y2 , w), accounts for the type of transition
made at the end of the second spell.
Similarly, for type 1 immigrants seen initially employed, the likelihood contribution
takes the form


1−t1 1−c1 
 2
2 

X

 X
  
P j1 (d1 , y1 , c1 |w) Ptr (t1 |w, y1 ) 
  
PE gm1 (w)
P
(d
,
y
,
c
|y
)
u2 2 2 2 1 

  


y1 =1

y2 =y1

where PE denotes the probability that a type 1 immigrant is employed at any instant in the
steady state, i.e., PE = α0 λ0 /(δ + η + α0 λ0 ), and gm1 (w) is the density of the steady state
earned wage distribution for type 1 immigrants. Component probability P j1 (d1 , y1 , c1 |w) is
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the joint probability of the residual duration, censoring outcome and the ending immigrant
type of the first job spell, and Ptr (t1 |w, y1 ) is the probability of the observed transition from
the job spell. For those who transition to unemployment, Pu2 (d2 , y2 , c2 |y2 ) accounts for
the joint probability of the duration, ending immigrant type and censoring indicator of the
following unemployment spell .
Having presented the overall structure of the likelihood contribution, we now provide
the expressions for its components. If an immigrant remains as type 1 during his first
observed spell, the residual duration of the spell follows the exponential distribution with
parameter (α0 λ0 + δ2 ) if it is an unemployment spell, or with parameter (α1 λ1 F(w) + δ)
if it is a job spell. Therefore for y1 = 1, Pu1 (d1 , c1 , y1 ) and P j1 (d1 , c1 , y1 |w) are given by,
respectively,
Pu1 (d1 , c1 , 1) = (α0 λ0 + δ2 )1−c1 e−(α0 λ0 +δ2 +η)d1

(E.1)

P j1 (d1 , c1 , 1|w) = (α1 λ1 F(w) + δ)1−c1 e−(α1 λ1 F(w)+δ+η)d1 .

(E.2)

and

If immigrants change types during the first spell, i.e., y1 = 2, the duration of the spell
can be given as the sum of two independent exponential random variables. If the spell is
an unemployment spell, the relevant two variables are exponential with parameters (α0 λ0 +
η + δ2 ) and (λ0 + δ2 ). Letting s and (d − s) denote the realizations of these two variables,
the distribution of their summed value, d, is given by
Z

d




e−(α0 λ0 +η+δ2 )s η e−(λ0 +δ2 )(d−s) (λ0 + δ2 ) ds

0

=


η(λ0 + δ2 )
e−(λ0 +δ2 )d − e−(α0 λ0 +η+δ2 )d .
(α0 − 1)λ0 + η

The probability that a completed unemployment spell ends with a transition to a job is
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λ0 /(λ0 + δ2 ), therefore for y1 = 2 and c1 = 0, Pu1 (d1 , y1 , c1 ), is given by
Pu1 (d1 , 2, 0) =


ηλ0
e−(λ0 +δ2 )d1 − e−(α0 λ0 +η+δ2 )d1 .
(α0 − 1)λ0 + η

(E.3)

If the spell is censored, i.e., c1 = 1, the relevant expression for Pu1 (d1 , y1 , c1 ) is given by

η(λ0 + δ2 )
e−(λ0 +δ2 )τ − e−(α0 λ0 +η+δ2 )τ dτ
d1 (α0 − 1)λ0 + η
η(λ0 + δ2 ) h e−(λ0 +δ2 )d1
e−(α0 λ0 +η+δ2 )d1 i
=
−
.
(α0 − 1)λ0 + η λ0 + δ2
α0 λ0 + η + δ2
Z

Pu1 (d1 , 2, 1) =

∞

(E.4)

Analogously, if a type 1 immigrant become a type 2 immigrant during a job spell, the
spell duration is the sum of two independent exponential random variables with parameters,
respectively, (α1 λ1 F(w) + η + δ) and (λ1 F(w) + δ). If it is a completed spell, i.e., c1 = 0, the
expression for P j1 (d1 , y1 , c1 |w) is given by
P j1 (d1 , 2, 0|w) =

Z

d1

e−(α1 λ1 F(w)+δ+η)s ηe−(λ1 F(w)+δ)(d1 −s) (λ1 F(w) + δ)ds

0

η(λ1 F(w) + δ)

=

(α1 − 1)λ1 F(w) + η


e−(λ1 F(w)+δ)d1 − e−(α1 λ1 F(w)+δ+η)d1 .

(E.5)

If it is censored, it is given by
P j1 (d1 , 2, 1|w) =

Z

∞

P j1 (τ, 2, 0|w)dτ
d1

=

η(λ1 F(w) + δ)

h e−(λ1 F(w)+δ)d1

(α1 − 1)λ1 F(w) + η λ1 F(w) + δ

−

e−(α1 λ1 F(w)+δ+η)d1 i
α1 λ1 F(w) + δ + η

.

(E.6)

If an immigrant starts the second spell as a type 1 immigrant, i.e., y1 = 1, the component probabilities given in equations (E.1) – (E.6) apply, so that Pu2 (d2 , c2 , y2 |y1 = 1) =
Pu1 (d2 , c2 , y2 ) and P j2 (d2 , c2 , y2 |w, y1 = 1) = P j1 (d2 , c2 , y2 |w). If an immigrant is of type
2 at the start of a spell, the duration of the spell follows the exponential distribution with
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parameter (λ0 + δ2 ) if it is an unemployment spell or with parameter (λ1 F(w) + δ) if it is a
job spell. Therefore for y1 = y2 = 2, Pu2 (d2 , y2 , c2 |y1 ) and P j2 (d2 , y2 , c2 |y1 ) are, respectively,
Pu2 (d2 , 2, c2 |2) = (λ0 + δ2 )1−c2 e−(λ0 +δ2 )d2 ,

and
P j2 (d2 , 2, c2 |w, 2) = (λ1 F(w) + δ)1−c2 e−(λ1 F(w)+δ)d2 .
For j ∈ {1, 2}, Ptr (t j |w, y j ) is the component probability of the transition outcome from
a job spell. Depending on the ending immigrant type, it is given by
1−t j

Ptr (t j |w, y j = 1) =

(α1 λ1 F(w))t j δ1

,

α1 λ1 F(w) + δ

or
1−t j

Ptr (t j |w, y j = 2) =

(λ1 F(w))t j δ1

λ1 F(w) + δ

.
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